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Chapter 1. Introduction: Explaining Institutional Change 
 
1.1 Preamble 
 
China’s economy has experienced staggering growth since implementing economic 
reforms. Between 1978 and 2006, for instance, China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
increased at an average rate of 9.8% per year after adjusting for inflation (Xie and 
Wang, 2009). However, accompanying the remarkable economic growth since 1978, a 
sharp rise in economic inequality has intensified social inequality and conflict across 
regions and social groups. In particular, the issue of farmer poverty and rural 
polarization have challenged the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership and 
subsequently become the focus of its social policy agenda.  
 
In response to the social risks and challenges induced by income inequality 
(Thøgersen, 2011, p.175), the central state, under Hu Jintao’s leadership, initiated a 
far-reaching social policy exclusively implemented in the Chinese countryside in 2006, 
called the “Construction of a New Socialist Countryside” program (shehui zhuyi xin 
nongcun jianshe, hereafter abbreviated to CNSC).1 Employing a sociological 
perspective, this study seeks to analyze how central Chinese social policy is 
implemented on the ground. Guided by this general perspective, this study examines a 
number of institutions that have been changing for more than one decade and that are 
involved with society, economic and political power, the high fluidity of private 
ownership, the authority vested in jurisdiction, administrative and political officials, 
the establishment of new types of enterprises, the contention over poverty, land use 
                                                 
1
 Five key points were written into CNSC: (1) Balance urban and rural development; (2) Develop 
modern agriculture; (3) Deepen rural reform (4) Improve rural public services; and (5) Increase 
peasants’ income. See Dierpian: jianshe shehui zhuyi xinnongcun (Chapter Two of Outline of the 
Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-2010): Constructing a New Socialist Countryside). Website of Chinese 
government. http://www.gov.cn/ztzl/2006-03/16/content_228841_3.htm (accessed 5 October 2015). For 
more detailed studies on CNSC, see Ahlers and Schubert (2009); He and Li (2006); Schubert and 
Ahlers (2012); Su (2009) and Thøgersen (2009, 2011).  
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and environment degradation. It also involves the paradox of huge affluence and 
impoverishment, of state intervention to regulate the social consequences of growth-
based development. By its nature, this study further integrates interlinking social, 
political and economic institutions that are in rapid transition.  
 
This study uses empirical evidence from the micro level, i.e. small towns in a county 
in Shaanxi Province, and theoretical approaches from the political economy field to 
harness these multiple dimensions. It will show that various groups of people acting 
within certain constraints and the institutional dynamics are changing social and 
political structures in localities.  The interplay between local official, coal mine 
owners and villagers in terms of poverty alleviation frames the Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) policy.  
 
In fact, the original idea of this study was to examine CSR as a symbolic form of rule 
that enabled voluntary compensatory transfers to villagers for their losses and 
interaction in relation to social traditions and norms. However, the field interviews 
with local cadres revealed that the issues are greater and more fundamental than just 
poverty reduction and CSR. What thus became the focus was the fundamental 
transformation of the local economy, politics and society, which I have now analyzed 
in the seven chapters of this dissertation. Developing on the basis of Oi’s “local state 
corporatism” (Chapter 2) and Heberer and Schubert’s “strategic group” (Chapters 2 
and 5) that provide a set of concepts for analysis, I have applied and contributed to 
these theoretical and analytical frameworks by examining the roles of local officials 
and coal mine owners and villagers. 
 
This chapter focuses on the introduction of the study and offers an explanation of 
institutional change. It is organized in three parts. The first section presents the 
research background, research questions, research design and methodology. The 
second section describes the region of Fugu County. The last section deals with the 
structure of the dissertation. 
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1.2 Research Background 
 
China has undergone dramatic institutional changes following its rapid socioeconomic 
transformation since the initiation of economic reforms in 1978, which simultaneously 
marked a transition from agriculture to industry and from a socialist planned economy 
to a market economy. However, such economic reforms marked by price realignment, 
resource reallocation, and spatial restructuring are bound to produce income shifts 
across regions and social groups, and therefore usually result in a widening income 
gap and an intensification of social inequality and conflict (Thøgersen, 2011, p.175; 
Wang and Hu, 1999, p.5). In particular, “starting roughly from 1993, Chinese reform 
entered the second phase, which appeared increasingly like a zero-sum game” (Wang, 
2000, p.374), meaning some social groups gained at the expense of others. Among all 
the social groups, the farmers are viewed as the most disadvantaged group as they 
benefited least from the recent reforms. 80% of Chinese farmers have an income 
below the national average of farmers’ incomes. In other words, the top 20% of rural 
residents have a much higher income than the rest of rural residents (Wang, 2000, 
p.380). Furthermore, according to the identified categories of income differentials, 
Wang (2000) argues that the recent reforms widened the gaps between regions, urban 
and rural populations, and between rich and poor households in either urban or rural 
China (p. 387-391). Among them, the rural-urban gap is unusually large, as real urban 
incomes are as much as four times that of real rural incomes, including urban 
residents’ welfare benefits of various kinds (Wang, 2000, p. 387-391). As a 
consequence, farmers’ poverty issues and rural polarization have become the focus of 
the government’s social policy agenda, with the aim of mitigating the social risks and 
challenges induced by these income inequalities (Thøgersen, 2011, p.175). In general 
terms, governments tend to play a role in redistributing gains and cost through tax 
extractive systems, institutionalizing social security, welfare spending, fiscal transfer 
programs, and other types of compensatory programs (Wang, 2000, p.376).  
 
As the CCP leadership’s latest approach to primarily narrowing the widening urban-
4 
 
rural gap and promoting the overall development of the countryside, CNSC was 
officially approved and written into the 11
th
 Five-Year Plan in 2006, which sought to 
provide a general guideline for developing rural China. In the political jargon this is 
called the “twenty-character guideline” (ershi zi fangzhen), referring to the five four-
character statements of the policy aims: “developing production” (shengchan fazhan), 
“life in plenty” (shenghuo kuanyu), “civilized rural atmosphere” (xiangfeng wenming), 
“clean and tidy villages” (cunrong zhengjie) and “democratic administration” (guanli 
minzhu). In fact, CNSC and a number of central social policy initiatives2 powerfully 
reflect the Chinese leadership’s strong commitment to promoting rural socioeconomic 
development (Ahlers and Schubert, 2009; He and Li, 2006; Schubert and Ahlers, 2012; 
Thøgersen, 2009, 2011), therefore, reinforce the argument that China is a 
developmental state (Baek, 2005; Beeson, 2009; Bolesta, 2012; Knight, 2014; Nee et 
al, 2007; Oi, 1999; Whiting, 2001) marked by the “growth with equity” approach 
(Ohnesorge 2007a; 2007b; Peng and Wong, 2004) which denotes that economic 
growth in China is accompanied by relative socioeconomic equity, in particular a 
poverty alleviation practice which has lifted a large number of people out of poverty, 
reflected in statistics showing a reduction from 270 million in 1978 to 27 million in 
2000 (Wang, 2007, p.218-9). Furthermore, China as a developmental state is 
characterized by four defining features: development-oriented political leadership, an 
autonomous and effective bureaucracy, a production-oriented private sector and 
performance-oriented governance (Meyns and Musamba, 2010, p.21).
3
  
 
State capacity is reflected in the policy-making process which facilitates institutional 
change. China’s policy-making process is typically characterized by extensive 
experimental programs through which central policy-makers encourage local officials 
                                                 
2
 All policies aimed at rural development have been brought together under the heading of CNSC 
(Thøgersen, 2011). Major initiatives include the New Rural Cooperative Medical System (NRCMS) 
(nongcun xinxing hezuo yiliao zhidu), the enactment of the Law on Farmers’ Professional Cooperatives 
(nongmin zhuanye hezuoshefa) in October 2006 and the adoption of a Comprehensive Rural Minimum 
Living Allowance System (zuidi shenghuo baoxian zhidu, abbreviated to dibao) in 2007 (Schubert and 
Ahlers, 2012). In practice, local governments combine CNSC with the practice of poverty alleviation, in 
particular in the underdeveloped areas, see Lu et al. (2010, p.39-42).  
 
3
 Chapter 2 will examine the theoretical implications of a developmental state in detail. 
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to try out new ways of problem-solving and then feed the local experiences back into 
national policy formulation (Heilmann, 2008a, p.1). A distinct mode of governance, 
“policy experimentation under hierarchy” is regarded as highly conducive to 
institutional innovation because it offers an effective approach to examining the 
institutional factors that induce behavioral changes in a rapidly changing institutional 
environment (Heilmann, 2008b, p. 2-3). However, “Policy experimentation is not 
equivalent to freewheeling trial and error or spontaneous policy diffusion. It is a 
purposeful and coordinated activity geared to producing novel policy options that are 
injected into official policymaking and then replicated on a larger scale, or even 
formally incorporated into national law” (Heilmann, 2008b, p.3). CNSC, an ambitious 
and comprehensive central policy program, aims to affect the social, economic and 
political sphere in rural China, and is a perfect example of the experimentation-based 
policy-making process. Indeed, prior to the national inception of CNSC, some 
provinces and cities had already carried out initiatives at “experimental sites” 
(shidian), and developed them to the next stage by “expanding the sites” (kuoda 
shidian), which then, under the direction of the national leaders, “proceeded from site 
to full-scale implementation” (youdian daomian).
4
  
 
Without question, Heilmann’s (2008b, p.10) experimentation-based policy cycle 
provides a sophisticated framework for explaining central-level policy making (or 
“policy formation”). Experimental approaches have had great political impact on 
local-level policy implementation. For example, “in all guidelines from province level 
down to the counties, the establishment of model villages is the focal point of XNCJS 
[CNSC] implementation” (Schubert and Ahlers, 2012, p.76-77). In short, the mode of 
experimentation facilitates the innovative policy instruments, rather than defining 
policy objectives (Heilmann, 2008a, p. 2-3). Nevertheless, given that the model policy 
instruments have been innovated and disseminated through extensive media coverage, 
high-profile conferences and study tours during the policy design period, empirical 
                                                 
4
 Early in 2004, provinces such as Zhejiang, Hebei and Jiangxi, cities such as Beijing initiated CNSC 
experimental programs (Huang, 2006, p.25). The related experimental program outcomes were drawn 
up and published immediately after the inception of CNSC. For the detailed case studies of model 
experiences based on the above mentioned selected regions, see Sun and Wang (2006a; 2006b).   
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studies have demonstrated that the policy choice and outcome (policy implementation) 
varies across regions (Ahlers and Schubert, 2009; Heberer and Schubert, 2012; 
Schubert and Ahlers, 2012; Su, 2009). Thus, policy implementation plays an important 
role in capturing the nature of institutional change.
5
 This study attempts to contribute 
to the literature of policy implementation that brings about institutional change, 
borrowing core concepts stemming from institutional economics that inform the 
approach to institutions taken in this study. It takes as its starting point the contention 
that the implementation of social policy is highly dependent on its own past, 
emphasizing the significance of past events and decisions as having a decisive 
function in shaping long term paths. Therefore, the institutional change facilitated by 
policy implementation is highly path dependent, and “the direction of change is 
determined by path dependence” (North, 1994, p. 7). As this study will show, the type 
of property rights, as well as economic, extractive, redistributive and mediative 
institutions, combine to create apparent path dependence in the implementation of 
CNSC. 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
State capacity ultimately depends on the nature of the institutions and bureaucrats that 
govern the economy and society (Whiting, 2001, p.1). Indeed, like all other centrally-
initiated rural development programs, CNSC is eventually carried out by county and 
township governments. This poses three central research questions: (1) why do 
variations exist in project implementation under the unified framework of 
national policy programs and political ideology? (2) How do local governments 
respond to the institutional constraints? (3) How is the centrally-initiated rural 
development project implemented by local governments? 
1.3.1 Institutional Constraints and Incentives 
                                                 
5
 The policy-making process consists of five stages, namely problem identification (agenda setting), 
policy formulation, policy adoption, policy implementation and policy monitoring and evaluation 
(Howlett and Ramesh, 1995).  
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The first question concerns the institutional environment within which the policy 
program is carried out. What are institutions exactly? As Douglass North puts it, 
“[i]nstitutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure 
incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic” (North,1990, 
p.3). The institutional factors are categorized into two groups: formal and informal 
institutions.  Informal institutions are described as codes of behavior, conventions 
and customs in contrast to formal institutions, which are rules that are provided in 
written form (North,1990, p.4). The formal and informal institutions determine the 
incentives of and the constraints on policy players, while influencing their behavior 
and shaping policy outcomes, which in turn lead to new institutions (Greif, 2006, 
p.379; Whiting, 2001, p.16). Moreover, “[t]he degree to which there is an identity 
between the objectives of the institutional constraints and the choices individuals 
make in that institutional setting depends on the effectiveness of enforcement” (North, 
1994, p.2). In short, whether CNSC is effectively implemented is contingent on 
various institutional factors, such as incentives, political constraints, severity of budget 
constraints and the particular configuration of resource endowments, skills of local 
leadership and subordinates. Among them, fiscal constraints in terms of budget 
allocation and matching funds (peitao zijin), and political constraints contained in the 
cadre evaluation system emerge as the most prominent institutional constraints 
determining local cadres’ behavior and policy outcomes. Consequently, no single 
pattern adequately describes CNSC implementation in the 21
st
 century.  
 
Concerning the fiscal constraints, on the one hand, the revenue-sharing fiscal system 
has dramatically changed the economic landscape of rural China since the major fiscal 
reform of 1980 was put in place, metaphorically referred to as “eating at separate 
stoves” (fenzao chifan), a term signifying how members of an extended family would 
take charge of their own incomes and expenses, i.e. in local government terms it 
means that each jurisdiction should be responsible for its own fiscal incomes and 
8 
 
expenditures.
6
 On the other hand, the inception of decollectivization of agricultural 
production in terms of household responsibility system (jiating lianchan chengbao 
zerenzhhi) during the reform era robbed village governments of rights to income from 
the sale of agricultural produce. “Officials in villages without a significant non-
agricultural economy were left with empty coffers and little salary for themselves 
except for whatever fees or surcharges they could extract from their villagers” (Oi, 
1995, p.1137). Sequentially, the tax-and-fee reform (shuifei gaige) in the early 2000s, 
aimed at abolishing agricultural taxes, further intensified the constraints that the local 
governments face. In order to extract sufficient matching funds from local tax 
revenues, as a consequence rural industry, as the most lucrative source of both 
budgetary and extra-budgetary revenues, became a prominent source of local public 
finance.   
 
The cadre evaluation system contained in the nomenklatura system
7
 has created 
strong political constraints and incentives for local cadres to maintain and expand their 
posts and influences with material and immaterial rewards.
8
 The evaluation indicators 
evolve from simple local economy-centered development in the 1980s to a 
comprehensive social, economic, and environmental development in the 21st century, 
under the heading of building a “harmonious socialist society” (shehuizhuyi hexie 
                                                 
6
 For detailed discussions of fiscal reforms, see Oi (1992); Oksenberg and Tong (1991); Shue (1984), 
Wong (1991) and Whiting (2001). 
 
7
 According to Christiansen and Rai (1996), “The nomenklatura (originally a Latin word, but borrowed 
through Russian into English; in Chinese referred to as renshi zhidu) is the Party personnel 
administration and control with posts. The Chinese Communist Party has a number of lists of posts 
within the state and Party hierarchies, the holders of which must be vetted by appropriate Party 
branches. The top-level appointments and elections roughly down to vice-minister level and vice-
provincial-governor level must be sanctioned by the Political Bureau. Lower-level posts must be 
sanctioned by a Party branch at a higher level of authority” (p.13). The detailed evolution of the cadre 
evaluation system will be presented in Chapter 3. 
  
8
 The first cadre evaluation system during the reform era was formulated in 1979. See Zhonggong 
zhongyang zuzhibu guanyu shixing ganbu kaohe zhidu de yijian (Opinions Concerning the 
Implementation of Cadre Evaluation System by the Organization Department of the Central Committee 
of the CCP). Website of the Communist Party of China. 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/71387/71591/4854973.html (accessed 5 October 2015).  
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shehui).
9
 In this sense, local cadres experience far greater pressure imposed by the 
cadre evaluation system, as they are simultaneously obliged to create job opportunities, 
promote local economic growth, maintain social stability and improve environmental 
protection.  
 
1.3.2 Institutional Devices: Patterns of Local Governments 
 
The second and third questions concern the capacity of local governments to respond 
to the institutional constraints. Indeed, the conjuncture of institutional changes in the 
tax and personnel systems have engaged local governments in the economic 
development in order to extract sufficient matching funds from local tax revenues. 
Different patterns of local governments are created to distinguish the role and the 
depth of government officials’ involvement in the economic activities, resulting in, for 
instance, the “developmental state” (Blecher, 1991), “entrepreneurial state” (Blecher, 
1991; Duckett, 1998), “local corporatist state” (Oi, 1995;1999), “the regulatory state” 
(Shue, 1995), “the dual developmental state” (Xia, 2000), “ the clientelist state” 
(Pearson, 1997; Wank, 1995), “the market-facilitating state ” (Howell, 1993), the 
“rent-seeking state” (Wedeman, 2003) and “the predatory state” (Bernstein and Lu, 
2000). The multiplicity of terms not only reflects the changing nature and relative 
strength of local governments, but also depicts the strategies of development that local 
officials adopt and the relations created between local state and business or society.
10
 
Indeed, local officials’ endeavors and strategies to expand the tax base for extracting 
matching funds have greatly contributed to the rural industrialization since the reform 
era.  
 
                                                 
9
 The concept of “harmonious Socialist society” was first introduced in the resolution of the 16th Party 
Congress in November 2002 and defined at the fourth plenary session in September 2004 as a society 
built on “democracy and rule of law, justice and equality, trust and truthfulness, amity and vitality, order 
and stability, and a harmonious relation with nature.” See Holbig (2009, p. 29). 
 
10
 Chapter 2 will present these concepts in more detail. 
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As this study will show, the economic growth in China was largely credited to the 
economic institutions created by the state which enabled private enterprises to thrive 
in China’s transition to a rising market economy. This major argument of state-led 
economic development drawn from empirical data strongly refutes the claims made by 
Nee and Opper (2012), that “the rise of capitalist economic institutions rests on 
bottom-up entrepreneurial action” (p.8) and “the economic success of firms becomes 
increasingly independent of the direct involvement of politicians” (p.236). Instead, 
despite the study sharing some similar qualities with the case of the Yangzi delta 
region presented by Nee and Opper (2012), whereby they both have analogous 
historical legacies of handicraft production industry and then develop to a private 
ownership dominated economy, this study serves as a contrasting case showing how 
local officials facilitated the economic growth by creating economic institutions for 
private firms, including credit and financial consulting, market and technical 
assistance, tax breaks and county support funds, and conflict mediation.
11
 These 
economic institutions play a crucial role in explaining the rise of China’s private 
enterprise economy. However, as the subsequent parts of the dissertation will show, 
private ownership was not only encouraged by the local government, but also 
harnessed and used for local accumulation. Private entrepreneurship was, to some 
extent, bounded by political utility.  
 
Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that the involvement of local cadres in the 
economic growth also highlights the economic concept that is rewritten in the official 
documentation in an ever-changing institutional context. Notably, it changes from 
“local economy” or “rural economy” since the reform era to the defining “county-wide 
economy” (xianyu jingji)
12
 after entering the 21
st
 century, signifying the institutional 
                                                 
11
 Chapter 4 will detail the economic institutions created by the local state. 
 
12
 County-wide economy (xianyu jingji) was first put forward in the 16th Party Congress Report dated 
Nov.8, 2002. It emphasized boosting the county-wide economy in order to make the rural economy 
flourish and speed up urbanization. See Full Text of Jiang Zemin’s Report at 16
th
 Party Congress on 
Nov.8, 2002. Website of Chinadaily. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/language_tips/news/2013-
11/26/content_17132209_6.htm (accessed 5 October 2015). China’s 11th Five-Year Guidelines (2006-
2010) further clarified the notion of the county-wide economy by focusing on the restructuring and 
innovation of township-village enterprises (TVEs) and development of central towns. See Dierpian: 
jianshe shehui zhuyi xinnongcun (Chapter Two of Outline of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-2010): 
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change in organizational and power structures in localities. In the 1980s and 
early1990s, which was characterized by the predominant collective ownership 
economy, the fiscal and administrative decentralization granted the local cadres great 
autonomy to exercise their economic powers. County, township and village 
governments had defined rights to extract profit surplus from collectively-owned firms, 
thus they established a multi-level corporate-like “local corporatist state” (Oi, 
1995,1999) to manage and run local businesses. Nevertheless, the privatization of 
collectively owned firms throughout the 1990s fundamentally reshaped the 
hierarchical structure by stripping the township and village cadres of the rights to 
extract profit surplus from privately-owned enterprises. As a result, the grip of power 
aggregates to the county level. The vertical economic structure collapsed; instead, a 
horizontal economic structure has emerged in the context of the county-wide economy. 
The change further intensified competition among local governments. Since the 
concept of “county-wide economy” was written in the political agenda, it has also 
played a significant role in shaping local officials’ behavior. The county-wide work of 
economy evaluation and allocating praise was carried out afterwards among 
provinces.
13
 Among them, the evaluation work pioneered by the National Bureau of 
Statistics in 2004 and 2005 reflects the political and economic significance for 
counties that were rewarded with a substantial grant. Even though the indexing system 
and targets evaluation system vary among provinces, the key indicators are identical: 
GDP and the provision of public goods and social welfare.  
1.3.3 The Institutional Economic Framework: Property Rights, Transaction 
Costs and Bargaining Power 
 
Institutional economics offer a systematic framework for understanding changing 
                                                                                                                                            
Constructing a New Socialist Countryside). Website of Chinese government. 
http://www.gov.cn/ztzl/2006-03/16/content_228841_3.htm (accessed 5 October 2015). In this study, 
county-wide economy refers to the economic development oriented by non-agricultural economy and 
based on county and central towns, and the main indicator is the county GDP. 
 
13
 See Jujiao quanguo ge shengshiqu xianyu kaoping biaozhang gongzuo (The Focus of County-Wide 
Economy Evaluation and Praise Work). Website of China Cities. 
http://www.chinacutv.com/Article_Show.asp?ViewType=&ArticleID=4811(accessed 5 October 2015). 
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institutional arrangements (Levi, 1988; North, 1981). The core concepts of property 
rights, transaction costs and bargaining power derived from institutional economics 
are very helpful in explaining the political economy of institutional change in property 
rights, extractive, redistributive and mediative institutions and how these formal 
institutions interact with various informal institutions in the process of rural 
development policy implementation in this study.  
 
Property rights are commonly defined as a bundle of rights that encompass the rights 
to use, control, derive income from, and alienate an asset. From the institutional 
economic perspective, secure property rights are extremely essential for economic 
development (North and Weingast, 1989; North, 1981). The heart of the discussion 
suggests that the state is closely related to the security of property rights because state 
officials seek to maximize revenue as much as possible, subject to certain constraints 
(Levi, 1988; North, 1981; Olson, 1993). As North (1981) notes, “[t]he key to 
understanding the state involves the potential use of violence to gain control over 
resources. One cannot develop a useful analysis of the state divorced from property 
rights” (p.21). However, the ability of the state to maximize the size of economic base 
from which it can extract revenue is constrained by two factors: costly transaction 
costs and relative bargaining power (Levi, 1988; Whiting, 2001).  
 
First, the state (principal) is constrained by the transaction costs incurred by 
“measuring (resource allocation), monitoring (agents and constituents), creating 
(institutional rules), and enforcing compliance” (Levi, 1988, p.12). Transaction costs 
involve the contracts between parties who have conflicting interests and for whom 
measuring and acquiring information is costly. The most important transaction cost in 
the context of revenue extraction is the cost of measuring the tax base (Whiting, 2001, 
p.19). For instance, the private enterprises may generate the most revenue in society 
efficiently, but they may react with a massive tax revolt or tax evasion. Consequently, 
the state may not be able to extract the revenue if it cannot gather and measure the tax 
information correctly, and collect it readily.  
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As far as the matter of principal-agent is concerned, an agency problem arises. The 
inevitable information asymmetries and conflicts of interests shape the principal-agent 
relationship by creating adverse selection, moral hazard and incentive problems (Moe, 
1984).
14
 The monitoring mechanism is always used by the principal to oversee and 
regulate the agent’s behavior. However, the process is costly and less effective if the 
agent colludes with partners to deceive the principal. The capacity of the central state 
in the context of extracting revenue is undermined by the dual role of local cadres and 
multiple-principal arrangements. For example, the tax collectors at the township level 
are both principals and agents in the revenue extractive system, which incentivize 
them to divert more revenues from collective firms to their local coffers (Whiting, 
2001). Whereas the multiple-principal arrangements motivate local tax, finance and 
audit bureau officials to prioritize their immediate principal’s interests rather than 
those of the central state (Oi, 1999). 
 
Second, the state is subject to constraints imposed by its relative bargaining power vis-
à-vis its key constituents. The bargaining power is determined by the extent to which 
one party controls resources on which the other party depends (Whiting, 2001, p.20). 
The concept of bargaining power is a relative term. As Levi (1988) points out, 
“[r]ulers will have more bargaining power the more they monopolize coercive, 
economic, and political resources. Rulers will seek to control the supply of resources 
or by eliminating rival suppliers. […] When others possess resources that the ruler 
needs or when they can successfully resist the ruler’s demands, their bargaining power 
is increased” (p.12). In the context of revenue extraction, the business sector provides 
proportionally more of a share of a needed tax resource, and holds more bargaining 
power than the state. 
 
1.3.4 Institutional Change in Rural Social Policy Implementation 
 
                                                 
14
 Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 will respectively examine principal-agent relationship theoretically and 
empirically. 
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The approach to institutional change developed here begins by examining how the 
incentives and constraints contained in the institutional frameworks in place at the 
beginning of the reform era led to the emergence and evolution of private dominated 
property rights. The evolving model of property rights has implications for the 
evolution of local institutions for extracting matching funds, redistribution and conflict 
mediation in the process of rural social policy implementation.  
 
Extending the developmental state model to the local level, the central task of this 
study is to analyze the dynamic implementation of the critical rural development 
project in Fugu County and subordinate towns, which is characterized by its 
substantial coal resource endowment and privately owned enterprises. Aggregate 
statistics show that the private sector has contributed to the lion’s share of the county-
wide economy since the end of the 1990s, a crucial period in which collectively 
owned enterprises were transformed to private ownership. In 2006, the Fugu County 
government immediately carried out CNSC implementation in response to the central 
state’s call, adopting the experimentation-based approach to financing and establishing 
ten model villages. However, constrained by the shortage of matching funds, the local 
state was unable to extend the model villages to a large extent, and expand their 
political and socioeconomic influences, which would affect local officials’ 
performance evaluation conducted by the upper authorities. As suggested by the 
institutional economic model, the shortage of matching funds has become the primary 
causal factor that most often determined the influence of transaction costs on the 
implementation of CNSC because the local state was faced with constraints in 
mobilizing and raising matching funds from outside public finance, which might 
extend the period of time for project implementation and increase the risk of 
implementation failure. In addition, the constellation of property rights determined to 
a large extent the level of information and transaction costs and the distribution of 
bargaining powers confronting local officials in Fugu County, which was initially a 
predominantly private ownership locality. In this sense, political and economic power 
was quite distinct as the private sector held more bargaining power than the local state. 
As a result, local officials faced high information and transaction costs governing 
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private firms and implementing CNSC. At the same time, the bargaining power of 
private capital constrained the ways in which local officials promoted the county-wide 
economy, retained private capital flow, and innovated in the design of extractive, 
redistributive and mediative intuitions to cope with high information and transaction 
costs.  
 
“Rulers must devise policies that lower their transaction costs. These are the costs of 
implementing and enforcing policies” (Levi, 1988, P.12). To mitigate the risk and 
reduce the transaction costs of CNSC implementation, the local state takes a shortcut, 
targeting the lucrative private sector as the source of extracting matching funds. 
Property rights evolve in response to the constraints of and incentives for local cadres 
to expand local tax base. In 2007, to retain private capital flow within its jurisdiction 
and harness the coal resources for their own political and economic purposes, the local 
state used some managerial strategies - Local State Entrepreneurial-Developmentalism 
- to change the ownership structure from private dominated to mixed ownership by 
regaining state ownership of the private enterprises gradually, under the national coal 
mine restructuring framework. The institutional change in the form of property rights 
reflects the apparent path dependence in the implementation of CNSC. Moreover, in 
contrast to Nee and Opper (2012) who argue that private entrepreneurs acted in an 
institutional environment characterized by weak property rights, this study will show 
that the private property rights remained relatively stable in the process of institutional 
change in the ownership structure. Even though the local officials controlled the 
private firms through creating beneficial conditions and enterprises of mixed 
ownership, the purpose was to attract and retain the private capital within its 
jurisdiction. To some degree, private entrepreneurs still held the secure and clearly 
defined rights to their assets and mobile private capital that allowed them to invest 
anywhere they wished to because the local government could not constrain the capital 
flow.   
 
Concurrently, the county and township cadres formed a “Strategic Group” (Evers, 
1966, 1973; Heberer and Schubert, 2012) to co-opt private entrepreneurs into the 
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“Double Hundred” project (shuangbai gongcheng) devised by the local state on 
purpose, which was consistent with the central framework of CNSC. Surprisingly, as 
this study will show, in addition to changing the ownership structure to extract the 
matching funds from tax revenues, the local state has used CSR
15
 as the second 
approach to raising matching funds and implementing the “Double Hundred” project. 
CSR is conventionally initiated by enterprises to “integrate social and environmental 
concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on 
a voluntary basis” (European Commission, 2001; 2002; 2006, as cited in Steurer 2010, 
p.50). Nevertheless, departing from the conventional wisdom that CSR is deemed as 
an enterprise-oriented neoliberal and voluntary concept, helping to downsize state 
regulations, this study shows that the local officials in Fugu County used CSR to 
justify their behavioral pattern of redistributing resources through direct compensatory 
fiscal transfer from the private sector to affected farmers and charity giving to the 
county as a whole, and town cadres raising the matching funds from the private 
firms/mines through pairing schemes (jiedui bangfu jizhi) that paired private firms 
with aided villages.  
 
In a nutshell, the process of institutional change at the local level is summarized in the 
analytical framework of CNSC implementation (see Figure 1.1), which will guide this 
study. The incentive contained in the fiscal reforms and the cadre evaluation system, 
interacting with the legacy of local private enterprise development, determines the 
private dominated economic structure. The substantial proportion of private firms 
contributing to the local economy gives rise to the high total information and 
transaction costs of governing the private firms and policy implementation and the 
high bargaining power of private capital. These two factors affect local officials’ 
                                                 
15
 The Chinese Government defines CSR as follows: “Corporations should carry out their social 
responsibilities by abiding by all relevant laws, regulations, and business ethics codes. While pursuing 
economic profits, corporations are held responsible by shareholders, employees, consumers, suppliers, 
communities, and other stakeholders. Moreover, corporations have responsibilities to protect the 
environment” (Foundation for Environmental Security & Sustainability, 2008). The notion of CSR 
comprises three pillars under the triple bottom line framework, namely, the economic, the social and 
environmental responsibilities (Fox et al., 2002; Elkington, 1998). This neoliberal ideology is in sharp 
contrast with the neoclassical shareholder view of CSR that asserts that a firm’s only responsibility is to 
do business and make a profit (Firedman, 1970; Henderson, 2001 a;b). 
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strategy of development, namely adopting a local state entrepreneurial-
developmentalist mechanism to regain the state ownership of private enterprises. As a 
consequence, the local state’s managerial strategies turn the private dominated 
economic structure into state dominated mixed ownership which has reduced the total 
information and transaction costs and the bargaining power of private capital. These 
two factors, in turn, further shape the nature of institutional arrangements for 
extracting matching funds, redistribution and conflict mediation. The process of 
institutional change reflects two research propositions: (1) local officials regained 
state ownership of private firms because they must lower the transaction and 
information costs and reduce the bargaining power of private capital; and (2) the 
formal and informal institutions interacted closely in the process of CNSC 
implementation, for example, in the formation of strategic group and in the 
process of extracting matching funds, redistribution (i.e. CSR) and conflict 
mediation through pairing schemes. The two research propositions at the core of 
this study focus on the apparently path-dependent development of property rights, 
extractive, redistributive and conflict mediative institutions used throughout the 
implementation of CNSC. 
 
Figure 1.1: Explaining Institutional Change in CNSC Implementation at Local 
Level 
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1.4 Research Design and Methodology 
 
The study was conducted as a comparative case study based on a qualitative inquiry 
strategy using in-depth interviews, field observations and extensive archival research. 
The objective of the study is to identify and explain the model of local government 
and the patterns that emerged in the evolution of property rights and extractive, 
redistributive and mediative institutions. Fugu County was selected to represent the 
concentration of private ownership form, and two subordinate towns were selected for 
variation in the resource endowment. The small sample of one county with 
subordinate towns in northwestern China is not intended to be representative of rural 
China as a whole. Instead, the study is intended to explain the institutional change in 
property rights and extractive, redistributive and conflict mediative mechanisms of 
social policy implementation, and show how these mechanisms interact with various 
informal institutions in the context of rural China. The empirical findings derived from 
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systematic analyses might be generalized to a larger context of similar institutional 
settings and served as benchmarks against which to compare the findings of other 
regions.  
 
The fieldwork was carried out in Fugu County and its subordinate towns. The nine-
month fieldwork period was divided into two time slots, from September 2012 to 
February 2013 and from September 2013 to November 2013. The selection of 
subordinate units was nested: two towns with a distinct coal resource endowment, one 
or two large private companies within selected towns, and administrative villages 
pairing with private companies. Qualitative data is comprised of 32 semi-structured 
interviews with three groups (local officials at county, town and village levels, local 
coal mine/enterprise managers, villagers in Fugu County) and government documents, 
internal reports, local history book (xianzhi) collected through substantial fieldwork. 
Additional interviews were conducted with officials and scholars based in Beijing. 
These open-ended interviews generally lasted for two hours. In conducting interviews, 
I encouraged the informants to answer questions freely, allowing interview subjects to 
offer as much information as possible, but attempted to cover the same content in each 
interview based on a standard interview outline for each of the three categorized 
groups. The standard interview outline of local officials at county, town and village 
levels included questions on the informant’s personal background, the motivations for 
and constraints of implementing CNSC, the strategy of development, the patterns and 
mechanisms of poverty alleviation practice and their understandings of CSR. At the 
enterprise level, the interview format included questions about a manager’s personal 
background, the company’s business operation information, their response to and 
interaction with local government’s pairing schemes, the patterns of poverty 
alleviation, conflicts management and their understandings of CSR. At the villager 
level, the interview format included questions about the patterns of poverty alleviation 
in the village, the changes in the village after program implementation and conflict 
issues.  
 
To address the concern of the reliability of interview data, I employed three strategies. 
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First, some questions across the three groups designed in the interview format are 
overlapped so that it is possible to cross-validate each informant’s statement. Second, I 
did a large review of secondary documentation to increase the accuracy of my 
interview data. Many of these government documents are only for internal use, not 
publicly accessible, including meeting minutes, government reports, “red-character-
titled documents” (hongtou wenjian), and land circulation and conflict mediation 
contracts. Third, field observation also facilitates the validity of my interview data by 
closely observing the actual interaction and engagement behavior of actors, including 
observations of a mobilization meeting of county and town cadres convened by the 
county Party secretary and a few company meetings that involved local cadres in them.    
 
In addition, to protect the informants from any latent harm resulting from the data they 
provided, I discarded the real names of my interview partners and companies. Instead, 
I developed a code system to refer to the interviews and to the companies and the 
government agencies, and used pseudonyms to protect the anonymity and 
confidentiality of my interview partners (see Appendix III). 
 
1.5 The Region of Fugu County in Flux 
 
Fugu County is a particular representative of the concentration of private ownership 
structure stemming from its distinctive resource endowment and historical legacies. It 
is located in the north of Shaanxi Province, where to the north it borders the Inner 
Mongolia Autonomous Region and the east Shanxi Province. Both neighboring 
regions are also filled with substantial coal resources. The region of Fugu County is 
situated in the interior of the Shenfu-Dongsheng coalfield that is China’s largest coal-
producing base, accounting for 25% of the country’s total coal reserves.
16
 There are 
20 billion tons of proven coal reserves in Fugu County.17 As described by the Local 
                                                 
16
 See China’s Largest Coalfield Curbs Ecological Deterioration. Website of People’s Daily. 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200107/06/eng20010706_74339.html. 
 
17
 See Jiben gaikuang (An Overview of Fugu County). Website of Fugu County Government. 
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History of Fugu County (Fugu xianzhi, p.319-320), during the period of Republican 
China, the handicraft industry had developed to a certain scale involving 1,000 
practitioners in cottage industries (jiating zuofang) run by local farmers, who 
combined production with sales. By the mid-1950s, before the Socialist 
Transformation of Industry and Commerce campaign,
18
 such small enterprises had 
rapidly developed from 97 households with 979 practitioners in 1950 to 180 
households with 1,236 practitioners in 1953. However, the Socialist Transformation of 
Industry and Commerce campaign in the mid-1950s transferred the ownership of the 
means of production into public ownership, “either as ‘ownership by the whole 
people’, that is ownership where the organs of the state manage the ownership on 
behalf of all citizens, or ‘ownership by the laboring masses’, that is where the workers 
own their means of production as a collective. Both forms were actually instituted in 
the mid-1950s and became the only legal forms of ownership” (Chrsitiansen and Rai, 
1996, p.76). Against this background, Fugu’s private handicraft firms and coal mines 
did not remain part of the rural economies until they reemerged after 1978. Fugu’s 
private industrialization took off in the mid-1980s. In 1984, following the far-reaching 
1983 Document One
19
 issued by the Central Committee, Fugu County’s government 
formulated a series of local rules to facilitate the development of “township and 
village enterprises” (TVEs, formerly “commune and brigade enterprises”-shedui 
qiye)
20
 run by townships, villages, individuals or in joint forms. These four different 
types of enterprises in the political jargon of the time epitomized development 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.fg.gov.cn/Category_233/Index.aspx (accessed 5 October 2015). 
 
 
18
 For a detailed discussion of the Socialist Transformation of Industry and Commerce campaign, see 
Lieberthal (1995, pp.86-96) and Chrisitiansen and Rai (1996, pp.75-76). 
 
19
 For the political and economic significances of 1983 Document One, see Christiansen (1989) and 
Christiansen and Rai (1996). 
 
20
 According to Christiansen and Zhang (1998), township and village enterprises (TVEs) are umbrella 
terms that refer to any non-agricultural enterprises located in rural areas. They include both enterprises 
owned collectively by the townships, the towns or the administrative villages and those owned privately 
by farmers, by partnerships and by shareholders. Also see the definition provided by the Ministry of 
Agriculture (1985). 
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“moving ahead on four wheels” (silun qudong).
21
 1989 became the tipping point of 
growth, as Fugu’s private sector for the first time exceeded the value of publicly 
owned enterprises. The total industrial output value reached RMB 91.682 million, of 
which private sector contributed with 54.57 million, accounting for 60% of the total 
output value and 1.5 times that of the publicly owned enterprises (Fugu xianzhi, 
p.321). Since then, coal-endowed private enterprises began to dominate the local 
economic structure and produced revenues very efficiently.   
 
Along with its success in rural industry, Fugu County earned substantial political and 
economic capital, ranking among the provincial top 10 counties and the national top 
100 counties respectively in terms of GDP and fiscal revenues for many years. In 2005, 
the county GDP reached RMB 2.25 billion, 2.6 times more than in 2002. It ranked 35
th
 
out of 83 counties in Shaanxi Province County Economy Comprehensive Assessment. 
By 2007, its GDP had reached RMB 4.67 billion, ranking 5
th
. Although Fugu County 
was in the grip of a long term economic crisis in 2008, the county GDP rocketed to 
RMB 11.64 billion, ranking 3
rd
.
22
 Notably, Fugu County has entered the ranks of 
“China’s top 100 counties” (zhongguo baiqiangxian) four times since 2010.
23
 Indeed, 
the coal-led private industry based on the huge coal endowment has apparently played 
an extremely important role in boosting the county-wide economy. By 2011, there 
were 1,016 corporations in total, in which 301 were industrial corporations. 88 coal 
companies and 99 coal-related companies accounted for 62% of total industrial 
corporations.
24
 In 2011, the private county economy reached RMB 47.4 billion, or 
66.5% of the county GDP. Furthermore, its contribution to the county tax revenues 
                                                 
21
 This was a pun on the development strategy of the 1950s “walking on two legs”, i.e. relying on both 
agriculture and rural industry for development. Chapter 4 examines the process of the privatization of 
rural industrial enterprises.  
 
22
 See Lu et al. (2010). 
 
23
 The evaluation and ranking of the “China’s top 100 counties” was formerly conducted by the State 
Statistical Bureau in 2004 and 2005 and a non-governmental research institute afterwards. For a more 
detailed analysis of China’s county-wide economy, see Ling (2003), Li and Zhu (2005). 
 
24
 See Minying jingji gaikuang (An Overview of Private Enterprise Economy). Website of Fugu County 
Government. http://www.fg.gov.cn/Item/6394.aspx (accessed 5 October 2015). 
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reached 69.3%.
25
 To put it differently, the coal-led private economy contributed more 
than two thirds of the county-wide economy.  
 
Nevertheless, since the turn of the new century, Fugu region underwent a profound 
socioeconomic transformation induced by coal mining, leading to the paradox of rich-
land-poor-community. A very recent census in 2010 showed that the population of 
Fugu County was 260,585, in which, the rural population was 111,711, or 43% of total 
population (National Bureau of Statistics, 2010).26 In fact, the rural polarization of 
wealth has been exacerbated by the coal-endowed economy. On the one hand, the 
magic “black gold” has not only generated substantial tax revenues from its robust 
county-wide economy, but also created a large number of billionaire coal mine owners, 
popularly called “coal bosses” (meilaoban)
27
 or “farmers-turned-entrepreneurs” 
(nongmin qiyejia)28 due to their indigenous, uneducated, and in some cases even 
completely illiterate background. Yet they were wise and audacious enough to seize 
the opportunities when the local state contracted coal mines to individuals in the 1980s. 
On the other hand, the local farmers in the poverty-stricken areas have suffered from 
direct and destructive structural damage to local livelihood, infrastructure and local 
biodiversity, inducing soil erosion, groundwater contamination and dust. As a result, 
the inequality and the form of rural polarization have triggered intensive distributive 
conflicts between the billionaires and the affected farmers. Furthermore, despite the 
fact that coal wealth has created a large number of billionaires, the low per capita 
annual income has affected the socioeconomic status as a whole. Fugu County has 
been on the list of national poor counties of China since 1994, the epithet of “poor 
                                                 
25
 See Minying jingji (An Overview of Private Enterprise Economy). Website of Fugu County 
Government. http://www.fg.gov.cn/Item/6394.aspx (accessed 5 October 2015). 
 
 
26
 See Tabulation on The 2010 Population Census of The People’s Republic of China by County, 
Beijing: China Statistics Press 
 
27
 Meilaoban is commonly quoted in most mainstream news reports, and literally refers to a coal boss 
or coal mine owner. I select coal mine owner in the study in a less aggressive and negative way. 
 
28
 It refers to the entrepreneur who was born in a farmer family and worked as a farmer before 
becoming an entrepreneur. 
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county” was removed only until 2012 (measured by the annual income per capita).
29
 
 
The location of research sites in the administrative hierarchy is shown in Figure 1.2, 
and its geographic location is shown in Maps 1.1 and 1.2.  
 
Figure 1.2: Administrative Hierarchy in the Research Sites. 
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Map 1.1: Map of China Showing Shaanxi Province 
 
                                                 
29
 The key measuring indicator of national poorest counties is the per capita annual income. In 2012, 
the criterion was RMB 2300. See 2012 nian guojia fupin kaifa gongzuo zhongdianxian mingdan 
quanguo gong 592 ge (List of 592 National Poverty Reduction and Development Counties in 2012). 
Website of China. http://www.china.com.cn/policy/txt/2012-03/19/content_24930336.htm (accessed 5 
October 2015). 
 
People’s Republic of China 
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Source: Own compilation 
 
Map 1.2: Map of Fugu County in Shaanxi Province. 
 
Source: Own compilation 
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1.6 Structure of the Dissertation 
 
The argument is presented in seven chapters. Chapter 2 provides the theoretical 
underpinning of this study. The first section introduces the concepts of 
developmentalism and the developmental state, and the role of the state in the 
socioeconomic development among countries and regions. The second section 
elucidates the various relationships between state and society, and between state and 
business. The third section considers the four universal implications of the 
developmental state. The fourth section discusses the experiences and lessons that 
China has learnt and applied to its policy making and what the universal implications 
in China have been. It further focuses on the center of the theoretical framework by 
delineating the patterns of developmental state at the micro level, and theorizing the 
“Local State Entrepreneurial-Developmentalism” in the analysis of the “county-wide 
economy”. Specially, it presents the local state and business relations and the agency 
problem of central-local relations. The last section explores the strategic group 
approach and its application to the analytical approach. 
 
Chapters 3 to 6 focus on the empirical analyses and findings of this study. Chapter 3 
considers the fiscal reform and cadre evaluation system as institutional incentives. The 
first section examines how CNSC implementation is constrained by the institutional 
arrangements (i.e. matching funds and cadre evaluation pressure). The second section 
elucidates how the institutional evolution contained in the fiscal reforms and cadre 
evaluation system from the late 1970s till the 2000s shaped local officials’ behavior. It 
argues that the revenue-sharing fiscal system and the cadre evaluation system have 
created powerful economic and political incentives for local cadres in Fugu County to 
promote rural industry which is served as the source of local public finance and the 
premise of matching funds of CNSC implementation.   
 
Chapter 4 centers on the rise of Local State Entrepreneurial-Developmentalism in 
Fugu County. The first section starts with a discussion of rural industrial evolution, 
which is seen as the strategies of local development. The following subsections review 
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the evolution of rural private sector from 1979 to 2003. Taking a case study of coal 
mine restructuring practice, the second section examines why local officials in Fugu 
County are incentivized to regain the state ownership of private enterprises and how 
they achieve this. The subsections delineate the specific administrative and economic 
control mechanisms in association with inducements in order to promote the county-
wide economy. The third and fourth sections discuss the consequences of the Local 
State Entrepreneurial-Developmentalism, respectively elaborating the state-business 
symbiotic relationship and principal-agent relationship. 
 
Chapter 5 focuses on the dynamic interactions between formal and informal 
institutions in the formation of strategic group and implementation of CNSC. The first 
section identifies the differences and features of three institutional structures: the Party, 
the state and the strategic group. The second section shows how strategic group is 
established by the leading county and town cadres in Fugu County. It further examines 
the strategic agency in the implementation of “Double Hundred” project in line with 
CNSC. In particular, the local coal mine owners/entrepreneurs are incorporated in the 
strategic group in order to effectively carry out the project. It also explains how the 
internal evaluation system functions as a strategic agency and shows how CSR is used 
as a redistribution mechanism in the project implementation.  
 
Chapter 6 focuses on the “Double Hundred” project implementation at town levels. It 
starts with the case of Xinmin Town and follows the case of Wujiazhuang Town, 
showing how the town cadres create institutional arrangements for extracting 
matching funds, redistributing resources and mediating conflicts. Both case studies 
demonstrate that the informal institutions (i.e. local customs, guanxi, prestige, skills, 
knowledge, affinity and mianzi) closely interact with the formal extractive, 
redistributive and mediative institutions. However, the case of Xinmin Town 
demonstrates that coal mines and corporations are voluntarily compelled to pair with 
local villages in the business operation areas as they are in face with the social and 
economic pressures exerted by the farmers. Town cadres have innovated a package of 
mediative institutions to coordinate the interests in order to resolve the conflicts 
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between the mines/corporations and farmers. The case of Wujiazhuang Town shows 
how one coal mine owner had already voluntarily carried out rural development 
practice in his home village prior to initiating CNSC. Thus local cadres in this town 
were faced with less tremendous pressure than the other.  
 
Chapter 7, in conclusion, reviews the core research findings and the research 
contributions, as well as reflections on and implications for future research.  
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Chapter 2. Developmental State and Local State Entrepreneurial-
Developmentalism 
 
2.1 Preamble 
 
This chapter focuses on the theoretical exploration of developmental state
30
 and the 
analytical strategic group approach. It first reviews the concepts of developmentalism 
and developmental state, and the role of the state in the socioeconomic development 
among countries and regions. Second, it examines the various relations between state 
and society, and between state and business. Third, it discusses the four characterizing 
features of the developmental state. Fourth, it elucidates the experiences and lessons 
that China has learnt and adapted to its policy making and how the universal 
implications of these have applied in China’s context. Furthermore, the section 
introduces the core of the study by identifying the patterns of developmental state at 
micro level, and conceptualizing the “Local State Entrepreneurial-Developmentalism” 
in the analysis of the “county-wide economy”. Specially, it presents the local state and 
business relations and the agency problem of central-local relations. The last section 
explores the strategic group approach and its application to the analytical approach. 
 
2.2 State and Developmentalism 
 
In the context of institutional arrangements in terms of powerful policy instruments 
and functional state structure, I follow Meyns and Musamba (2010, P.23-24), and 
argue that the bureaucracy goes well beyond the Anglo-Saxon model, and takes a form 
that enables the state to effectively harness markets. 
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 The developmental state has been widely studied. Among them, Bolesta (2012) conducts a 
comprehensive literature review of the concepts, political and economic conditionalities of 
developmental state. 
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Over the last three decades of economic reform and liberalization of markets, China’s 
rapid economic development at the dramatic rate of no less than 10% per annum has 
evinced that government intervention is one of the most salient determinates (Howell, 
2006; Knight, 2014; Oi, 1999; Whiting, 2001). What does fast economic growth 
amount to with regard to the role of the state? Which government interventions and 
which underlying political economy have led to the successful economic development? 
A host of scholarly works on China’s developmental trajectory and institutional 
reforms has suggested that China is a developmental state (Baek, 2005; Beeson, 2009; 
Bolesta, 2012; Knight, 2014; Nee et al, 2007; Oi, 1999; Whiting, 2001). This study not 
only contributes to the argument of China as a developmental state, but on top of that 
reinforces the argument by casting the local state in the lead role of the socioeconomic 
development process.  
 
2.2.1 Defining Developmentalism 
         
What is developmentalism exactly? According to Hill and Fujita, “[d]evelopmentalism 
is a body of political economic thought that advocates state-managed markets in the 
national interest” (Hill and Fujita, 2012, p.258). The concept emerged in the needs of 
late-industrializing nations attempting to catch up with advanced Western capitalist 
economies that were led by a neoliberalism “which advocates organizing society on 
the model of an idealized free market economy” (Hill and Fujita, 2012, p.258) since 
the late 1970s. The developmentalist notion explicitly rejects the tenets of classical 
economic liberalism that consists of self-regulating markets and individualism. On top 
of that, developmentalists also reject the neoliberal notion that government should not 
intervene in the economy. By rejecting the classical and neoliberal notions, 
developmentalists call for not only the state to take a lead in promoting economic 
development, international competition and industry expansion but also cooperation 
among government, business and labor under state leadership to speed up technology 
upgrades and reduce production costs (Hatch and Yamamura, 1996). Public ownership, 
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planning mechanism and growth-oriented objective setting are institutional means for 
achieving national economic growth.  
 
In contrast to the neoliberal economic policy in terms of free trade, financial 
deregulation, and privatization of state enterprises, developmentalists recommend 
selective approaches of state intervention to protect domestic markets from 
international economic competition, control over the capital market, and launching 
forceful industrial policies to improve manufacturing performance and boost exports 
(Hill and Fujita, 2012). Industrialization is seen by the developmentalists as the 
highest priority, and industrial policies are the state’s primary vehicles for achieving 
economic objectives. As Hill et al. (2012, p.6) put it,  
 
“[t]he government uses industrial policies and its powers over capital allocation to protect 
domestic industries, develop strategic industries, and adjust the economic structure to changes 
in the world economy. The state attempts to combine industrial policies with competition 
among private firms through the use of market-conforming methods of economic intervention. 
Bureaucrats have sufficient talent and autonomy to take initiative, make effective decisions, 
and deter the claims of interest groups that would undermine economic growth.” 
  
2.2.2 Defining the Developmental State 
 
Developmentalism is an economic form of catching up, and the developmental state is 
the prime mechanism for catching up. Originally, the concept of the developmental 
state was put forward in the early 1980s by Johnson (1982) and refined by Amsden 
(1989) and Wade (1990), who explained the rapid economic growth of the Four Little 
Tigers (Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea).
31
 It refers to the 
phenomenon of state-led economic development “in the context of the economic 
policies that were adopted in East Asia to generate rapid industrialization, and 
sometimes it is tied to a particular industrialization strategy” (Knight, 2014). The rival 
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 See Johnson (1982) in reference to Japan, Amsden (1989) in reference to South Korea and Wade 
(1990a) in reference to Taiwan and comparison. A detailed elaboration of their work will follow. 
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explanation of developmental state for the successful socioeconomic development of 
East Asian newly industrializing countries (NICs) has challenged the dominant 
neoliberal account that the market is the prime vehicle for the “economic miracles” 
and the role of a minimalist state in the economy. 
 
 The studies of the developmental state in the literature have been extensively 
conducted from various dimensions, such as ideological background, indicators, 
political, economic and social characteristics and institutional arrangements. For 
instance, Knight (2014) divides the classification of the developmental state into two 
criteria: one is that the country’s government gives the highest state policy priority to 
economic development; the other is that the government adopts institutional 
arrangements and incentive structures that will lead to unprecedented developmental 
achievements. Stubbs (2009) distinguishes three key ingredients of the developmental 
state: first, that is “essentially institutional […] a cohesive set of institutions with a 
relatively autonomous capacity to implement a planned strategy for capitalist 
economic growth.” Second, relational aspects that emphasize the interaction among 
the developmental state actors in political, economic and social dimensions as a 
“seamless web of influences” (Stubbs, 2009 as cited in Bolesta, 2012, p.21). Third, 
“the ideational aspects of the developmental state with particular attention being paid 
to nationalism, (neo)mercantilism, economic transformation, rapid industrialization, 
performance legitimacy or some amalgam of a number of these ideas” (Stubbs, 2009, 
p.6). Howell (2006, p.275) concludes that “the ideal-typical developmental state has 
the following key features: first, it has a political and policy elite committed to 
economic growth and transformation, with the power, authority and legitimacy to 
promote a developmental agenda. Often motivated by strong nationalist sentiments, 
such elites strive to modernize their countries, raise economic living standards and 
bridge the developmental gap. Second, complementing such a development-focused 
elite is a competent, authoritative state administration, particularly in the economic 
sphere, with the technical and managerial capacity to guide and steer economic and 
social development.” 
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2.2.3 The Role of State Interventionism 
 
As far as the role of an interventionist state in promoting economic growth is 
concerned, one first needs to understand what the definition of an interventionist state 
is, what the relationship between the developmental state and interventionism is and 
why the developmental state interventionism is different from the traditional 
interventionism present in continental Western Europe. According to Bolesta (2012, p. 
52), “[t]he interventionist state is understood as one which is characterized by the 
Keynesian economic model, where the arbitrary and inequitable distribution of wealth 
and income is being corrected by the government, to the extent that it is widely 
perceived to be interventionist. It is believed that the degree of interventionism can be 
measured by the size of governmental ownership, specific economic regulations and 
level of taxes”. The developmental state is closely connected to interventionism 
because the former is required to wield the interventionist power of the state to guide 
the process of the industrialization of national economies. In this sense, the 
developmental state is seen as a strong interventionist state that devises and reinforces 
the developmental strategies and trajectory, as opposed to a weak state. However, the 
effect and performance of developmental state interventionism is questioned by the 
experts of World Bank (1993, p.6), “[i]t is difficult to test whether interventions 
increased growth rates. […] We know that intervention did not significantly inhibit 
growth”. This report points out that the intervention of historical developmental states 
was “mild” and “careful” and free market mechanism would play a more effective and 
distributive role (World Bank 1993). 
 
In general, developmental state interventionism refers to the state’s crafted 
interventions in the economy with regard to guiding the development process through 
a set of plans, regulations, policies and additional incentives. What are the distinctive 
features between the developmental state interventionism and the contemporary 
Western European interventionism? First, the objectives of interventionism in two 
contexts are different. The primary goal of a developmental interventionist state is to 
build institutional arrangements to promote socioeconomic growth and development 
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and in the end, catch up with developed counties. The classical Western European 
interventionist state aims to protect and promote social well-being and the cohesion of 
its citizens. In this sense, the overall development goal is regarded as secondary 
(Bolesta, 2012, p. 55).  
 
Second, a traditional Western European interventionist state lacks economic 
bureaucracy as the pilot agency governmental structure, which is in charge of guiding 
and coordinating the economy by formulating growth-oriented objectives and 
institutions. In the East Asian developmental states, examples of the role assumed 
respectively by their economic agency include the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) in Japan, the Economic Planning Boards (EPBs) in South Korea and 
Singapore and the Council on Economic Planning and Development in Taiwan. As 
Waldner (1999, p. 41) observes, the central guidance agency is an imperative for the 
national economy, “because state-led industrial restructuring displaces market signals 
through mechanisms such as subsidies, the socialization of risk, and administered 
pricing”. These mechanisms are all features of a developmental interventionist state.   
 
Third, the degree of interventionism present in both interventionist states underlines 
that the “developmental state interventionism is not about the strict regulation of 
economic processes, but rather about governmental leadership over the facilitation of 
the development trajectory. This trajectory can only be achieved once the business 
sector enjoys an adequate free market environment in which to perform” (Bolesta, 
2012, p. 56). 
 
Finally, according to Bolesta (2012), the embodiment of a developmental state as 
opposed to classical Western European interventionism shows mainly in the state-
business alliance, where the state involves in the private sector in a less (South Korea) 
and more (Japan) subtle way, by granting incentives for achieving certain projects 
related to the overall developmental strategy. 
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2.2.4 Country and Region Specific Examinations 
 
The extensive scholarly enquiry of the concept of the developmental state and the role 
of the state in the economic development is country or region specific, considering 
their regional variation. For example, as for the applicability of the concept of the 
developmental state, Woo-Cumings et al. (1999) examine European countries 
including Austria, Finland, France and Germany, as well as Scandinavian countries, 
that are sometimes depicted as representing certain types of developmental states. 
Schneider (1999) portrays the states of Mexico and Brazil in Latin America as 
examples of developmental states. In Africa, Botswana is presented as the African 
example of the developmental state pattern (Bolesta, 2012). In Asia, a large number of 
countries have been examined in the context of the developmental state. Apart from 
the Four Little Tigers, China, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam and the 
Philippines, the so-called late developers compared to the established Western powers, 
have also been analyzed. Among them, for example, Park and Lepawsky (2012) 
examine the similarities and differences in the political-economic and spatial 
restructuring process in South Korea and Malaysia, while Hill and Fujita (2012) 
conduct an analysis of developmental policy in Thailand.  
 
As for the role of the state and the institutional arrangements in economic growth, 
Chalmers Johnson’s research on Japan demonstrates the high correlation between 
institutional arrangements and economic successes. His work attributes the average 
high growth rate of GDP (8% per annum) from 1952 to 1980 to the pivotal role of the 
state (Johnson, 1982). Following him, Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990) highlight the 
respective strategic role of the governments of South Korea and Taiwan in guiding the 
processes of industrialization and modernization that led in the former to economic 
growth of 9% per annum over the period 1965-90, and in the latter also by 9% per 
annum from 1960 to 1990 (Knight, 2014). Focusing on their respective developmental 
strategies, Haggard (1990) examines the examples of Mexico and Brazil with regard 
to society-rated conditions, including the legacy of rural society, the position of labor 
force and the benefit of capital. He suggests that developmental strategies were very 
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much an element of the Latin American developmental model, despite their regional 
variations. For example, the development of Mexico and Brazil was characterized by 
import-substitution industrialization, which ultimately resulted in the expansion of 
manufactured exports, however, not as deeply as was observed in East Asia (Bolesta, 
2012).  
 
Similarities and differences with developmental projects have been examined between 
various developmental regions and countries. For instance, Schneider (1999) conducts 
a comparative study between East Asia and Latin America and discovers the 
similarities: “Developmentalists in East Asia and Latin America are nationalists, 
believing in prime importance of national industrialization and in the state’s 
responsibility to promote it. Developmental state in both regions take a plan-rational 
approach to the economy, pursuing a form of political capitalism in which profits and 
investment depend upon decisions made in the state but in which property and wealth 
are mostly left in private hands. Developmental political projects in both regions also 
have a history of authoritarianism, being led by single-party regimes dominated by the 
military or by a centralized political executive” (Schneider 1999 as cited in Hill et al. 
2012, p.13). Meanwhile, “the sharpest contrast between Latin American and East 
Asian developmental states resides in the bureaucracy: Latin American bureaucrats do 
not have the embedded autonomy characterizing East Asian officialdom (Evans 1995, 
as cited in Hill et al. 2012, p.13). Unlike East Asian developmental states, “Latin 
American bureaucracies are bloated, weakly institutionalized, and unstable. State 
officials receive less training and lower salaries. Bureaucratic power is distributed 
through patronage rather than by merit and is more prone to corruption. Dependent 
upon political machines or the military, and subject to immediate dismissal, 
bureaucrats in Latin American states are less insulated from private interests than in 
East Asia, where a credentialed civil service helped create a professional and 
nationally committed phalanx of officials” (Schneider 1999 as cited in Hill et al. 2012, 
p.13). Gereffi and Fonda (1992) conduct a comparison of regional paths of 
development between four regions: Latin America, East Asia, South Asia, and sub-
Saharan Africa. It is argued that “East Asia comes out on top according to almost all 
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indicators of economic and social development, followed by Latin America, South 
Asia, and at a considerable distance from the rest, Africa” (Gereffi and Fonda 1992, 
p.419). Cummings (1984) conducts a country-to-country comparison and draws 
Mexico as the best analogy to Taiwan, and Argentina to South Korea in terms of 
political-economic arrangements (authoritarian system, strength of the state) and 
industrialization process (Bolesta, 2012). 
 
Though, it is argued, there are differences among developmental states and in the 
degree of system transformation in terms of democracy or dictatorship, the extent of 
state involvement in the economy and the strength of industrial policies, they all share 
an overriding growth-oriented policy objective by means of aggressive growth 
promotion by the state. 
 
2.3 Relations among State, Business and Society 
 
Developmentalism is an economic ideology that legitimizes power relations and 
resource distribution. The developmental state discourse has created a distinctive set 
of relational problems among three actors, namely, the state, the market and society, 
which are the characterizing features of the developmental state. These interrelations 
among the three actors under the framework of developmental state are examined in 
this section. 
 
2.3.1 State-Society Relations: Embedded Autonomy 
 
In examining the interplay and ties between the state and society in the process of 
industrialization, two types of states are defined, namely, predatory states and 
developmental states. Following Evans (1995), the predatory states refer to the states 
that “extract at the expense of society, undercutting development even in the narrow 
sense of capital accumulation” (Evans 1995, p.12). They are characterized by 
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ruthlessly extracting but providing nothing of value in return. The process of the 
extraction of goods or others from the society is by legal or illegal means. Zaire is 
seen as an example of a predatory state, because Evan (1995) explains that, “[t]here 
are clear structural differences between predatory and developmental states. Predatory 
states lack the ability to prevent individual incumbents from pursuing their own goals. 
Personal ties are the only source of cohesion, and individual maximization takes 
precedence over the pursuit of collective goals. Ties to society are ties to individual 
incumbents, not connections between constituencies and the state as an organization” 
(p.12).  
 
As illustrated in Evan’s (1995) comparative research on successes and failures of state 
intervention in the transformation of computer industries in Brazil, India, and Korea, 
the interrelation between the state and the society likely falls into two extreme patterns. 
In predatory states, for example, Zaire, the state elite pursues outright appropriation on 
the decreasing resources of the society, whereas in developmental states, Korea, for 
instance, the political-bureaucratic elite increases the resources in partnership with 
society for the benefit of both (Bolesta, 2012). The developmental state is seen as 
effective because of bureaucrats’ autonomy from political pressure. According to 
Evans (1995), the dual-dimensioned concept of “embedded autonomy” is adopted to 
identify the development-facilitating traits of the developmental state. It is argued that, 
on the one hand, the developmental state is in an “autonomous” form as its 
rationalized bureaucracy cannot be instrumentally manipulated by powerful rent-
seeking groups outside of the state. On the other hand, it is also “embedded” because 
state elites are connected to social networks and other relations that bring them in 
close contact with prominent players in society (Wright, 1996). By virtue of the 
combination of “autonomy” and “embeddedness”, the state gains the capacity to 
formulate long-term state policies and focus on the primary objective of economic 
growth, and yet is sufficiently constrained by forces from society so that its actions 
override the national interests instead of the state elites.   
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2.3.2 State-Society Relations: Weak and Subordinate Society 
 
However, Leftwich (2000) holds a different view from that of Evans (1995) by 
emphasizing the primacy of politics that determines the concept of the developmental 
state, and the developmental success or failure as well as the interaction between the 
state and the society in developing societies. First and foremost, he argues strongly in 
favor of the state and its role in promoting development, stating that “[i]t seems 
unlikely that it is possible in the modern world for any society to make a speedy and 
successful transition from poverty without a state that in some respects corresponds to 
this model of a developmental state” (Leftwich, 2000, p.169). He then defines six 
major factors that shape and consolidate the developmental state (Leftwich, 2000). 
First, the developmental state is ruled by a determined political elite that is growth-
oriented and demonstrates strong commitment and will in achieving economic 
development. Second, the developmental state is administered by a powerful, 
competent and professional and insulated bureaucracy. The state possesses a sufficient 
capacity to influence, set and direct the terms of operation for private sector. Third, the 
presence and role of civil society in the developmental state is weak and subordinate. 
Fourth, the developmental state demonstrates a high capacity for the effective 
management of private economic interests. Fifth, the developmental state exhibits an 
uneasy mix of repression and poor human rights records (in particular in the 
undemocratic developmental states). Six, the legitimacy of the political ruling elite is 
tightly linked to the state’s performance. Leftwich (2000) observes two aspects of a 
certain imbalance between the state and the society. On the one hand, there is a 
powerful state with a powerful bureaucracy that manages the private economic 
interests effectively. On the other hand, there is a weak society that has negligible 
influence on the ruling regime as it is subordinate to the latter.  
 
Amsden (1989) validates, to some extent, Leftwich’s opinion on the unbalanced 
relation between the state and the society by providing an example of South Korea to 
argue that the government is able to consolidate its power because competing social 
classes are weak: “Workers were a small percentage of the population, capitalists were 
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dependent on state largesse, the aristocracy was dissolved by land reform, and the 
peasantry was atomized into smallholders” (Amsden, 1989, p.52). 
 
2.3.3 State-Society Relations: Political Weakness of Rural and Working Classes 
 
Empirical studies further suggest that the political weakness of rural and working 
classes is a salient parameter involved in the developmental state-society relations. 
The weakness of the rural class was illustrated in the implementation of land reforms, 
which diminished the influence of the landlord class and the agrarian elite powers 
(Haggard, 1990). Rural reforms aimed at achieving two goals: eliminate rural elites as 
potential opposition towards state industrialization, and gain support from the rural 
class for state policy-making by empowering the less privileged class. Haggard (1990) 
argues that it is unlikely that eliminating rural elites was directly linked to the state’s 
capacity to implement industrialization, as the developmental state gained more 
freedom to manipulate without their involvement. 
 
As for the industrial working class concerning the participation in the political process 
of policy making, Cumings (1984) points out that laborers were excluded from the 
policy-making process in the 1950s and 1960s. Haggard (1990) further states that all 
NICs were characterized by the political weakness of the working class, due to an 
inherent lack of empowerment, such as Taiwan, or repression, such as South Korea. In 
contrast to the control on the rural class, one the one hand, the developmental state 
would ensure that labor forces do not exert an extensive influence on policy making. 
On the other hand, the state implemented industrial policies that reduced its foreign 
dependency through the local production of industrialized products in order to enable 
it to gain support from the working class. The control on the working class might have 
its political and economic reasons: “political-the proximity of communist states, and 
therefore a somewhat increased possibility of leftist political movements outbursts 
within the labor force; economic- keeping the wages low, thus increasing the 
international competitiveness of a domestic production base” (Bolesta, 2012).  
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Comparing the state’s dual attitude towards working and rural classes, Waldner (1999) 
concludes that rural and labor classes were both repressed due to a lack of political 
power to advance their propositions, but concurrently empowered by transferring land, 
making policies of important substitution industrialization. One the one hand, the 
developmental state has perceived that the rural and working classes needed to be 
controlled. On the other hand, it was seen to be very important to acquire their support 
for the development endeavor.  
   
2.3.4 State-Business Relations: State-Business Alliance 
 
The interlocks between the state and business are other prominent elements defining 
the developmental state, often described as state-business alliance (Robinson et 
al.,1998; Wade, 1990a; White,1988). Wade (1990a) examines the role of the state as 
the power center in fostering development via certain incentive structures, such as 
fiscal and tax incentives, and the alliance between markets and public administration. 
He argues that business goals were likely achieved only with state support, otherwise 
they would not be profitable or would be highly risky. Hall and Soskice (2001) divide 
national political economies into two types by referencing the way in which firms 
resolve the coordination problems they face when implementing business projects: 
liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs).
32
 They 
point out that the focus in CMEs is on strategic interaction with the state, “[f]irms 
depend more heavily on non-market relationships to coordinate their endeavors with 
other actors. […] These non-market modes of coordination generally entail more 
extensive relational or incomplete contracting, network monitoring based on the 
exchange of private information inside networks, and more reliance on collaborative, 
as opposed to competitive, relationships to build the competencies of the firm” (Hall 
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 Compared to CMEs, in LMEs, “Firms coordinate their activities primarily via hierarchies and 
competitive market arrangements. […] Market relationships are characterized by the arms-length 
exchange of goods or services in a context of competition and formal contracting. In response to the 
price signals generated by such markets, the actors adjust their willingness to supply and demand goods 
or services” (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p.8). 
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and Soskice, 2001, p.8). The state-business alliance is based on functional industry-
based criteria and the transparent environment in accordance with consistent rules and 
norms (Bolesta, 2012).  
 
According to Doner et al. (2005), state-business alliance is a salient factor of the 
developmental state, “in which expert and coherent bureaucratic agencies collaborate 
with organized private sectors to spur national economic transformation” (p.328). The 
state works closely with the business sector to achieve developmental goals. There are 
distinct tasks between the state and business in the collaborative relationship. The state 
formulates a comprehensive industrial development plan in the national interest, 
whereas the business sector implements and realizes the plan by effective and efficient 
production as well as organizational management of the development-oriented 
business operations. The state-business relations are of diverse models in the East Asia 
region, because various business opportunities and projects are created by the state, 
thus the models are shaped primarily by the political ideology and national business 
systems (Haggard, 2004).  
 
The dynamics of the partnership between the state and the business is articulated in 
different forms. As captured by Woo-Cumings (1999, p.16), who states that “the 
developmental state is not an imperious entity lording it over society but a partner with 
the business sector in a historical compact of industrial transformation.” Weiss (1995) 
contends that the remarkable industrial development relies on the theory of “governed 
interdependence.” This institutional arrangement “describes a system of central 
coordination based on the cooperation of government and industry. Policies for this or 
that industry, sector, or technology are not simply imposed by bureaucrats or 
politicians. They are the result of regular and extensive consultation and coordination 
with the private sector. Government’s developmental project does not lose out to 
clientelistic or sectional interests because of insulated policymaking; business does not 
lose out to remote and bumbling bureaucrats because of institutional connectedness” 
(p. 594). Likewise, Kong (2000) observes South Korea’s political economy in the 
1980s as characterized by an irreversible change of power in the state-industry alliance. 
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He captures this as the transition from “state dominance to interdependence” (p. 108). 
Nevertheless, Samuel’s (1987) proposition of “reciprocal consent” seems to challenge 
the notion of state dominance in the process of Japanese economic development. He 
argues that “[r]eciprocal consent is the mutual accommodation of state and market. It 
is an iterative process of reassurance among market players and public officials” (p. 8). 
He continues, stating that “[f]or the politics of reciprocal consent, negotiation and 
compact are the core of business-state relations” (P. 2).  
 
However, the state-business alliance in the context of developmental state is 
commonly blamed for extensive rent seeking and corruption as patronage relations are 
produced (Knight, 2014; Leftwich, 2000; Naughton, 2008). It is inevitable that the 
developmental state becomes corrupt because the role of the state in economic life is 
too intense to resist the huge temptations generated by fast economic growth 
(Leftwich, 2000). In the asymmetric relationship, the state, as the patron, provides 
selective access to physical goods, key resources and markets for the business sector 
that is subordinated and dependent. In return for receiving such benefits, the business, 
as the client, should provide loyalty and political support. According to Knight (2014), 
“[p]atronage extended beyond the state sector because private businesses had to 
maintain good relations with government and party officials” (p.1341).   
 
2.4 Four Defining Features of the Developmental State 
 
Having analyzed the overall definitions, implications of the developmental state, one 
needs to address the following issue: how does the debate extend to China’s growth 
trajectory after the reform era? Based on the theoretical contributions referred to above, 
I will briefly summarize the universal essence of four defining features of 
developmental state, then extend to the analysis of China’s development path by 
examining how these four universal aspects of developmental state map on the late 
catching-up developmental state since the economic reforms. 
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The developmental state is an institutional structure and policy arrangement, which 
aims to enable underdeveloped countries to effectively catch up developed countries. 
The developmental state is largely defined by the interplay between four actors, the 
political elite, the state economic bureaucracy, the society and the business sector. This 
actor-based approach is summarized as four defining features of developmental states, 
namely, “development-oriented political leadership, an autonomous and effective 
bureaucracy, a production-oriented private sector and performance-oriented 
governance” (Meyns and Musamba, 2010, p.21).   
 
2.4.1 Development-Oriented Political Leadership 
 
Many scholars have observed the necessity of development-oriented political 
leadership associated with a powerful economic and political ideology focused on 
development (Amsden, 1989; Beeson, 2003; Wade, 1990; Woo-Cumings, 1999). In 
traditional East Asian developmental states, the political elites were able to create 
functional state institutions conducive to both political stability and economic growth 
(Waldner, 1999). The development-oriented political leadership reaches a clear 
consensus within the political and administrative elites over the developmental pace 
and directions (Pempel, 1999; Weiss, 2000). These political elites’ high level of 
decisiveness combined with sound judgment and sufficient economic credibility 
enabled them to win the trust of and achieve collaborations with the bureaucrats as 
well as the business sector (Huff et al., 2001, as cited in Meyns and Musamba, 2010, 
p.22). As for the development motivation, Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990) suggest 
that interests of political survival and legitimacy give rise to a developmental-oriented 
political leadership. Fritz and Menocal (2006) further claim that “[i]n Asia, political 
leadership committed to development was often motivated by regional competition, 
nationalism and the desire to ‘catch up’ with the West. As a result, development was 
regarded as a ‘national project’ of the first priority. Such determined political elites 
were either relatively uncorrupted or limited personal gains to non-predatory 
corruption which did not impede investments and the expansion of national 
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productivity” (p. 8-9). In conclusion, the most important merit of developmental state 
is not only attributed to policy design and implementation but also largely the strong 
political commitment to promoting “government-guided development” in accordance 
with the long-term development strategy (Wade, 1990a, p. 487).  
 
2.4.2 Autonomous and Effective Bureaucracy 
 
In general, the autonomy of bureaucracy in developmental states is derived from a 
Weberian tradition that adopts a meritocratic recruitment approach, provides 
promotion incentives, creates rationality and guarantees high levels of prestige and 
legitimacy to bureaucratic officials (Evans, 1997; Johnson, 1982, as cited in Meyns 
and Musamba, 2010, p.23). The recruitment system associated with strong promotion 
incentives creates effective state bureaucracy that remains extensively insulated and 
independent in the process of economic and development policy making and 
implementation as well as institutional arrangements. To a large extent, the effective 
formulation of a long-term development strategy is by competent economic 
bureaucrats and technocrats. Most notably, although the state bureaucracy protects 
itself from particularistic private sector interests, it forges business alliances between 
the state and business sector in a productive manner (Beeson, 2004, as cited in Meyns 
and Musamba, 2010, p.23). In pursuit of the development objectives, the state 
bureaucracy creates both tempting incentives and tough penalties to promote private 
cooperation with national goals, which is referred to as “disciplined support” (Weiss, 
1995, p. 607)
 
or “carrots and sticks” approach (Leftwich, 1995, p.412). However, it is 
noteworthy that the state is self-disciplined to prevent predatory, disruptive rent-
seeking behavior or the abuse of power (Amdsen, 1989, as cited in Meyns and 
Musamba, 2010, p.23).  
 
More importantly, to maintain close control over the business, the state demonstrates 
great strength and capacity for institutional arrangements in terms of powerful policy 
instruments and functional state structure. These institutional arrangements effectively 
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enable the bureaucracy to intervene in the private sector and influence its decision 
making by setting short-term and long-term trade targets, tight regulations with regard 
to monitoring and evaluation systems, and providing industrial subsidies. As a result, 
the state gains enormous power from the business sector through the pervasive control 
of banks and other financial institutions (Chang, 2006). In summary, the 
responsibilities assumed by the state bureaucracy, as Amsden contends, “provide 
supporting evidence for the proposition that economic expansion depends on state 
intervention to create price distortions that direct economic activity toward greater 
investment” (Amsden, 1992, p.14, as cited in Meyns and Musamba, 2010, p.24). 
 
2.4.3 Production-Oriented Private Sector 
 
A production-oriented private sector is deemed to be central to accelerating the 
progress of industrialization and modernization that occurred in the East Asian 
developmental states (Booth, 1999, p.306). State intervention in these countries 
marked a different type of capitalism, in which the primary purpose of intervention 
was to promote the interests of the business sector, create conditions for capital 
accumulation and productivity improvement (Amsden, 1989, as cited in Meyns and 
Musamba, 2010, p.24). In order to achieve the objective, the states devise a broad 
range of state instruments to enhance the competitive capacity of domestic enterprises 
in domestic and global markets by upgrading manufacturing technology, research and 
development, and management skills between themselves and highly industrialized 
nations. Again, the analysis reflects the theory of the developmental alliance that the 
state creates partnerships between the state and private sector in the form of 
“reciprocal consent” (Samuels, 1987), “governed interdependence” (Weiss, 1995), 
“from state dominance to interdependence” (Kong, 2000, p.108) or likewise “from 
dominance to symbiosis” (Kim, 1997, p.45-6).  
 
2.4.4 Performance-Oriented Governance 
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The performance-oriented governance of the developmental state reflects not only the 
state’s embeddedness in the society (Bolesta, 2012), but first and foremost the 
commitment to promoting socioeconomic equity for both the ruling elites and the 
citizens (Meyns and Musamba, 2010). On the one hand, the institutional mechanisms 
enable the society to engage in the public participation in the creation of laws and 
regulations. In other words, the political legitimacy partly comes from the citizen’s 
influence on the process of policy making in developmental states (Bolesta, 2012). On 
the other hand, more crucially, the “growth with equity” (Ohnesorge 2007a; 2007b; 
Peng and Wong, 2004) approach has highlighted the ruling elites’ legitimacy derived 
from industrial modernization aspirations and performance, more precisely their 
achieved social outcomes. As captured by Chang (2006), “the achievements of the 
(East Asian) region’s economies do not stop at income growth. Their records in terms 
of improvements in infant mortality, life expectancy, educational achievements, and 
other indicators of ‘human development’ have also been very impressive, even 
considering their income growth” (p.1). Indeed, the state achieves a particular 
developmental legitimacy based on the developmental results evaluated by the citizens 
rising standards of living (Bolesta, 2012, p. 133; Johnson, 1987, p.143; Leftwich, 2008, 
p. 16). As observed by Meyns and Musamba (2010), the most significant indicator of 
evaluation is the ruling elites’ high levels of commitment to poverty reduction. The 
rapid industrial growth in East Asia was paralleled by a favorable pattern of growth 
with equity through a series of mechanisms, namely, income equality, low 
unemployment and the near elimination of grinding poverty (Deyo, 1987). As a result, 
despite having a poor human rights record, ruling regimes in developmental states 
tend to enjoy the widespread support of their constituencies and a high degree of 
legitimacy to stay in power. As Johnson (1999, p.53) concludes, “[t]he source of 
authority in the developmental state is not one of Weber’s ‘holy trinity’ of traditional, 
rational-legal, and charismatic sources of authority. It is, rather, revolutionary 
authority: the authority of a people committed to the transformation of their social, 
political, or economic order. Legitimation occurs from the state’s achievements, not 
from the way it came to power.” 
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2.5 China as a Developmental State  
 
As an emerging industrialized country, China’s development trajectory has been 
extensively examined, in particular the notable change in China’s political economy 
since the reform era. Compared to the historical East Asian developmental states, such 
as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the debates have focused on how China fits into the 
discussion on the concept of developmental state (Baek, 2005; Blecher, 1991; Bolesta, 
2012; Breslin, 1996; Howell, 2006; Huang, 2008; Knight, 2014).  
 
China’s contemporary growth trajectory has demonstrated that the state plays a very 
positive developmental role in achieving developmental objectives. In view of the 
nature and extent of state intervention in the overall socioeconomic development since 
the reform period, the prevailing argument is China is a developmental state (Baek, 
2005; Beeson, 2009; Knight, 2014; Nee et al, 2007; Oi, 1999; Whiting, 2001). 
However, Breslin (1996) challenges the argument by claiming that “China’s 
developmental trajectory has been to a large extent dysfunctional” (p. 689). He argues 
that three factors - political constraints, local initiatives, and external economic 
interests- explain the obstacles to effective long-term economic policy making that 
influenced the Chinese reform process.  Specifically, this includes the 
decentralization of fiscal responsibility and power grants autonomy to provinces to 
design their own development-related policies to respond to numerous and often 
conflicting new central initiatives. Moreover, the inter-elite discord result in a 
dysfunctional development, which in turn generated further unexpected developments 
that have militated against the adoption of any coherent program or model for reform- 
either internal or external (Breslin, 1996, p. 690). Howell (2006) further observes that 
“[t]he conjuncture of specific political, socioeconomic and institutional processes, 
both internal and external, undermines the case for China as a developmental state” (p. 
274). China’s transformation, characterized by a high degree of economic 
decentralization and intensifying global competition, has resulted in an empirically 
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observed phenomenon of competition among local authorities. “The intense rivalry 
between local economic actors for markets, resources, and foreign investment not only 
produces contradictory developmental outcomes - on the one hand, economic growth 
and rising average annual per capita incomes, and on the other hand exploitative 
working conditions, environmental degradation and increasing inequality- but also 
undermines the political and administrative capacity for fundamental social and 
economic transformation” (Howell, 2006, p. 274). Indeed, China is a polymorphous 
state, it lies between predatory and developmental states, like Brazil and India, 
because of the displayed elements of efficiency and inefficiency, control and chaos, 
relative autonomy and clientelism, and neoliberalism and neo-corporatism (Howell, 
2006, p. 274-5).  
 
However, the majority of analysts claim that China is a developmental state. Among 
them, White (1984) and White and Wade (1988) identify pre-reform China 
characterized by the state-command economy as a socialist developmental state. “The 
key features of the socialist developmental state are the virtual elimination of private 
industrial capital, all-pervasive controls over the economy, and a state that, at least 
initially, represents the interests of a revolutionary coalition” (White, 1984, p.103, as 
cited in Howell, 2006, p.276). However, the private sector that is deemed necessary in 
the production and state-industry alliance, to a large extent is absent in the pre-reform 
socialist economies. In fact, the state assumed considerable economic responsibilities 
by becoming the main economic actor involved in a wide range of activities that 
included not only social and economic institutions but also ownership and 
management of productive industry.
33
 In this sense, it is argued that China prior to the 
reform period is not a developmental state (Bolesta, 2012, p.52; Howell, 2006, p.276; 
Knight, 2014, p.1336). However, it is necessary to acknowledge that Mao Zedong’s 
socialist legacy of central planning enhanced the political capacity for the formation of 
a developmental state since the Dengist era. Indeed, China in the time of market 
economy reforms is definitely a developmental state even though it is reflected in 
                                                 
33
 For detailed analysis of China’s development process during the state-command period, see 
Christiansen and Rai, 1996, p. 121-148, 185-214; Bolesta, 2012, p.84-87. 
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proliferating alternative notions such as the entrepreneurial, corporatist, market-
facilitating, regulatory and rent-seeking state based on the analyses of particular local 
state formations.34 Concerning the growing complexity of power structures and 
central-local relations, Liberthal (1995) highlights the “fragmented authoritarianism’’ 
that on the one hand, “authoritarian in the discipline demanded from subordinates and 
the lack of real protections for the population or opportunity for them to articulate 
their interests; and (on the other hand), fragmented in that territorial and functional 
lines of command intersected in hopelessly complex ways” (p.82). Montinola et al. 
(1995) characterize the new political system as “federalism, Chinese style” that 
“provides considerable political protection for China’s reforms, including limits on the 
central government” (p.52). Using this term, they also explain the diverse effects of 
economic competition (p.65–66). 
 
2.5.1 Experiences and Lessons Learnt 
 
How does China form its growth strategy and policy making through learning from 
the aforementioned issues and how these four defining features of developmental state 
map on to China? According to Trubek (2008), the key feature of a developmental 
state is its ability to foster the process of learning and discovery as the central element 
for a successful developmental state. In fact, China’s successful development path in 
terms of transition to the market system since the late 1970s is greatly attributed to its 
gradual and incremental strategy (Miller, 1996; Naughton, 2008; Svejnar, 2008; Wong, 
2003). Compared to the dismal performance of the economic reform programs of the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries which are characterized by the 
political regime change process, China adopted a gradualist approach to promoting the 
economic reform. In particular, the lessons derived from the transformation 
experiences of Soviet Union suggest that “at a certain primitive level of political 
institutionalization, democratic politics, such as that currently prevailing in Russia, 
                                                 
34
 These competing notions will be analyzed in the subsequent section of Local State 
Developmentalism. 
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can be a double-edged sword for the practitioners of reform. The defeat of Yeltsin’s 
supporters in the parliamentary elections of December 1993 reinforced this picture of 
the weakness of democratic politics in Russia” (Miller, 1996, pp.93-94). Indeed, China 
has followed closely the East Asian tradition of “economic growth first and political 
change later.” Successful economic growth is used to boost the legitimacy of the 
political leadership, which is in turn under strong pressures to achieve good economic 
performance. As a result, it has avoided the reform failures encountered by former 
Soviet Union and Eastern European countries (Wong, 2003, p.128).  
 
Concerning China’s industrial policy making, it has largely learned from the 
experiences of its small neighbors, the traditional East Asian developmental states in 
terms of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. As Lieberthal (1995) 
notes, China’s leadership “has pursued an exported-led growth strategy since the 
reforms got well under way. It has developed labor-intensive industries, primarily 
along its eastern coast, to process items that are then sent into the international market. 
The profits from this export sector have paid for the technology and other imports 
have played a major role in accelerating the country’s economic growth” (p.259). The 
implications of this new approach to gaining technology, capital, managerial 
knowledge, and access to markets through participation in the international economy 
were far-reaching. The special economic zones (SEZs) have been developed at 
selected places along the coast. These zones, utilizing a mix of the models developed 
in South Korea and Taiwan, offered exceptional tax treatment and other concessions to 
foreign firms to invest in those areas (Lieberthal, 1995, p.150). 
 
2.5.2 Application of Four Defining Implications 
 
This study suggests that China is a developmental state since the reform era and is 
characterized by ultimately far-reaching state-led development endeavors. China’s 
industrialization has been guided by developmentalism: a political creed that 
advocates state-guided markets in the national interest. The developmentalist creed 
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explicitly rejects the self-regulating market ideal, and the noninterventionist state, 
calling instead for cooperative relations among government and business within the 
framework of a developmental state. I will examine the applicability of the four 
defining features illustrated in the preceding section, namely development-oriented 
political leadership, an autonomous and effective bureaucracy, a production-oriented 
private sector and performance-oriented governance since China’s reform era. 
 
Development-Oriented Political Leadership. The Chinese political system is 
characterized by its authoritarian form of a rather strongly coercive feature. There are 
three reasons why Deng Xiaoping’s new leadership becomes development-oriented 
after December 1978. “First and foremost, the loss of political legitimacy during the 
years of economic stagnation and political upheaval required an improvement in living 
standards to restore and solidify political support for the CCP. Failure to promote rapid 
economic development would mean economic stagnation, social tension, and political 
decline” (Knight, 2014, p.1336).Thus the top leaders crafted policies that were 
consistent with both their own political strategies and the overriding political 
imperative of regime survival (Naughton, 2008, p.106). Among these policies, 
economic reform is an attempt to regain the hegemonic authority of the CCP by 
abandoning the Maoist notion of development as a political struggle and attempting to 
accelerate economic growth. Consequently, it would provide a new form of legitimacy 
for the regime, based on its ability to deliver rapid improvements in social services 
(White, 1993, p.11). Second, the catching up ideology drives the new leadership to 
catch up with the Western capitalist powers and its advanced neighbors as well, such 
as, Japan, South Korea and Singapore (Bolesta, 2012; Knight, 2014). Third, the chaos 
of the Cultural Revolution had weakened the capacity for central planning (Naughton, 
1995, as cited in Knight, 2014, p. 1336). Consequently, developmental state ambitions 
with regard to specific growth-oriented objectives were pursed by the political elites in 
order to restore social order and maintain political legitimacy. Ever since, China has 
embarked on the successful transformation, for example, price liberalization, banking 
system institutionalization, private property and private means of production 
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legalization.
35
 Indeed, the transformation project was supported by sustainable visions 
of development. The main strength was the overriding policy objective to achieve 
rapid economic development by means of active statist intervention in the economy.  
 
Autonomous and Effective Bureaucracy. Other than power dispersal and regularization 
of political life, one important characteristic of Deng Xiaoping’s reform project is 
reflected in the professionalization of administration (Christiansen and Rai, 1996, 
p.106). In fact, the state (economic) bureaucracy reflects the fact that the state not only 
assumed a huge economic role, but also had the professional manpower, regulatory 
capacity and administrative ability to efficiently carry out the tasks at hand. The 
nomenklatura system has introduced greater professional economic bureaucrats and 
technocrats through the use of educational qualifications, cadre training and 
performance evaluation as an incentive system that rewards the achievement of state 
objectives and career promotion.
36
 On the one hand, although predatory behavior in 
terms of corruption or rent-seeking greatly undermined the insulation at administrative 
levels, to some extent, the state is in the process of achieving Evans’ embedded 
autonomy by enjoying extensive autonomy from the society and certain groups of 
particular economic interests (Bolesta, 2012). On the other hand, the state has created 
a strong, reliable, predictable and competent state (economic) bureaucracy in policy 
making and implementation, which is the central key attribute to the state assumed 
control of development and national economic planning. For instance, the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)
37
 as the most powerful form of pilot 
economic bureaucracy assumes the role of a paramount government institution 
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 For detailed analysis of China’s transformation during the reform period, see Christiansen and Rai, 
1996, p.216-250. 
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 The cadre evaluation system will be analyzed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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 According to Bolesta (2012), “NDRC finally took its present shape after the State Planning 
Commission had been renamed as the State Development Planning Commission (SDPC) (1998) and 
had merged with a part of the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) in 2003. […] NDRC is a 
macroeconomic management agency under the State Council, which studies and formulates policies for 
economic and social development, maintains a balance of economic aggregates and guides the overall 
economic system restructuring” (p. 152). The main functions of NDRC, see Guojia fazhan gaige wei 
zhuyao zhize (National Development and Reform Commission). http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zwfwzx/jj/ 
(accessed 5 October 2015). 
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supervising the developmental directions and modernization efforts and enjoys a 
relatively privileged position. On top of that, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) 
is considered to be another crucial agency that intervenes and controls certain 
developmental aspects by formulating development strategies, guidelines and policies 
of domestic and foreign trade and international economic cooperation.
38
 Indeed, as 
Christiansen and Rai, (1996) conclude, “with increasing autonomy and assertion of 
sectoral and local interest following the reforms in the 1980s, the large heavy 
industrial ministries, […] and the provinces constitute important and powerful 
constituencies to whose interests the top leaders in the Political Bureau are 
accountable” ( p.110).  
 
Production-Oriented Private Sector. Although privatization of ownership
39
 was never 
considered seriously by the Chinese leadership, the private sector has grown in a 
parasitic coexistence with the state sector since the economic reform era (Christiansen 
and Rai, 1996, P.225). However, it is noteworthy that the state adopted active policies 
to support the emerging private economy and promoted great incentive mechanisms to 
encourage private investment. As observed by Haggard and Huang (2008), “[t]he 
party made a strategic decision in the early 1980s to liberalize the domestic private 
sector and orient state-owned banks toward supporting the domestic private businesses, 
at least on the margin” (p.368). Consequently, despite the state sector continues to 
occupy an important role in the Chinese economy, the private sector has played a 
significant role in the national development process, “the rate of return on investment 
in privately controlled industrial firms has been higher than in state-controlled 
industrial firms and that marginal private investment has contributed more to growth” 
(Knight and Ding, 2012, as cited in Knight, 2014, p.1341). Although the private firms 
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 MOFCOM is the descendant of The Ministry of Trade (1949-1952). It then went through several 
phases of transformation: the Ministry of Foreign Trade (1952-1982), the State Import and Export 
Administration Commission, the State Foreign Investment Administration Commission (1979-1982), 
the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation and Trade by merging the State Import and Export 
Administration Commission, the State Foreign Investment Administration and other two ministries 
(1982-1993), renamed as the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (1993-2003) and 
finally MOFCOM (2003). The main functions MOFCOM, see Ministry of Commerce. 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/column/mission2010.shtml (accessed 5 October 2015). 
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 A detailed study of the privatization of ownership will be presented in Chapter 4. 
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are more effective agents for implementation of the state’s development strategy in 
delivering the development results, as they have more clearly defined targets and 
beneficiaries, China, at least at state level, seems to ignore this fact by choosing to 
forge alliances with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in a state-guided industrialization 
because they are easier to control and influence (Bolesta, 2012) and the political logic 
of reform aimed to safeguard and promote the public ownership economy (Nee and 
Opper, 2012, p.8). 512 large SOEs were designated as priority companies by 
government industrial policy in the mid 1990s (Baek, 2005, p.489). In this sense, the 
frames for the state-private business alliance may not be yet fully formulated in China 
and the close interplay between the state and SOEs is often blamed for the rampant 
corruption of this institutional arrangement. However, it is argued that the emergence 
of private enterprises has the tendency to “result in them taking over the targeting 
policy implementation in, at least some less politically sensitive sectors, once they 
have gained the authorities’ consent. The policy of building the national economy’s 
innovation capacities, very important for the successful contemporary development, 
can be realized (under state guidance) via private companies” (Bolesta, 2012, p.193). 
Indeed, the state-private sector alliance beyond the abstract macro level unfolds a 
dynamic and divergent interaction as captured by Oi (1999) as “mutual dependence” 
(p.98) and “private-public symbiosis” in localities (p.134).
40
 
 
Performance-Oriented Governance. Due to the lack of democratic procedures, China, 
to some degree, seems to have maintained a relatively high level of insulation from the 
society. However, the level of the state’s embeddedness in society seems to be 
increasing, partly as a result of the fact that consultative and deliberative institutions 
have been developing in China. Among the consultation channels, an increasing 
number of public hearings have provided citizens with opportunities to express their 
opinions on a wide range of issues. This practice derived from village 
meetings/discussions held by village representatives in the middle and latter 1990s has 
spread into urban residential communities and finally developed at the national level. 
                                                 
40
 The state-private sector relationship will be examined in more detail in the following section. 
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Since 1996, several national laws have introduced public hearings into the process of 
decision-making on regulations and laws.
41
 As a result, more than 50 cities have held 
legislative public hearings (Fishkin et. al, 2008, p.463). In 2005, the first far-reaching 
experiment of deliberative institution was successfully invented in Zeguo Town, 
Wenling City of Zhejiang Province which “represents a systematic public decision-
making mechanism that consists of expert feasibility studies, public participation 
through Deliberative Polling, government consultation, and a final decision made by 
Zeguo’s People’s Congress” (Fishkin et. al, 2008, p.472). This deliberative institution 
as a form of democratic consultation does not change the political structure and 
threaten the one-party state, but has a broad implication for the central leadership. 
Hence it was officially recognized in the 18th CCP National Congress Report 
(November 2012).
42
 As a whole, the public consultation process is strongly evidenced 
in the increasing embeddedness in China, which is undergoing institutional 
transformation, although the influence might be limited, it allows the nation’s high 
level of mass participation in systemic institutionalization.  
 
In addition to mass participation in decision-making, social development is another 
important indicator to measure the developmental state’s governance outcome by their 
constituencies. Indeed, China has achieved a staggering degree of poverty reduction 
since the rural reforms which dismantled Mao Zedong’s egalitarian policy and 
promoted China’s economic development. The World Bank estimates the number of 
people living in poverty has declined from roughly 270 million in 1978 to 97 million 
in 1985. To address the poverty problem, the state launched a series of programs, for 
example, the 8-7 Poverty Eradication Program in 1994, which aimed to solve the issue 
of 80 million people in poverty within seven years. By the end of 2000, the target was 
                                                 
41
 According to Fishkin et. al (2008), for example, “[i]n 1996, the first national law on administrative 
punishment-a law that regulates the imposition of fines-introduced an article on holding public hearings 
before punishments are imposed. Article 23 of the Law on Price passed by China’s National Congress 
in December 1997 specified that the price of public goods must be decided through public hearings. The 
Law on the Legislature, passed in 2000, followed Article 23 and required public hearings as an integral 
part of the decision making on all legal regulations and laws in China” (p.463). 
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 The full text of the report, see Xinhuanet. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-
11/17/c_131981259.htm (accessed 5 October 2015). 
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mostly fulfilled, with only 27 million people living in poverty, located mostly in very 
poor geographical and climatic conditions (Wang, 2007, p.218-9). As captured by the 
World Bank (1983), “[n]onetheless, and despite slow growth of the average level of 
consumption, China’s most remarkable achievement […] has been to make low-
income groups far better off in terms of basic needs than their counterparts in most 
other poor countries. They all have work; their food supply is guaranteed through a 
mixture of state rationing and collective self-insurance; most of their children are not 
only at school, but being comparatively well taught; and the great majority have 
access to basic health care and family planning services. Life expectancy-whose 
dependence on many other economic and social variables makes it probably the best 
single indicator of the extent of real poverty in a country [at 64 years]-is outstandingly 
high for a country at China’s per capita income level” (p.11).  
 
However, both the increase in welfare and reduction in poverty have been extremely 
uneven, inducing the income disparities among different groups and regions. The 
World Bank (1997) “estimates that, in 1981, China’s Gini coefficient was 28.8, but by 
1995, it was 38.8. It was still lower than in most Latin American, African and East 
Asian countries, and similar to that in the United States, but higher than in most of the 
transitional economies in Eastern Europe and many high-income countries in Western 
Europe” (as cited in Zheng, p.27). Consequently, the rising disparities between the 
rural and the urban and across the regions have weakened the state’s social governance 
capacity. Recognizing the issue of economic imbalance, the ruling elites responded 
with developmental strategies under the leadership of Hu Jintao. “Indeed the concept 
of ‘scientific development’ and ‘people-centered development’ (yi ren wei ben) 
introduced at the 3rd Plenary session of the 16th Chinese Communist Party Central 
Committee (October 2003) marks not only a commitment to economic development 
but also a shift away from a unitary focus on growth to a ‘balanced’ approach which 
takes into account environmental and equity issues” (Howell, 2006, p.283). The 
balanced approach is reflected in the form of five coordinated development strategies 
(wuge tongchou), including: (1) coordinating development between urban and rural 
areas; (2) coordinating development of regions; (3) coordinating between economic 
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and social development; (4) coordinating economic development and environmental 
sustainability and (5) coordinating domestic development with opening up to the 
outside world.43  
 
In a nutshell, it is argued that the outcome-oriented governance in China has greatly 
bolstered the ruling elites’ power and, more importantly, facilitated them to establish 
developmental rule. In turn, the leadership in such regimes that depends on the support 
of their constituencies ensures the rational allocation of huge amounts of public 
resources for development purposes conducive to performance-oriented governance, 
enhancing development endeavors in the process.  
 
2.5.3 Local Interventionist State: Local State Entrepreneurial-
Developmentalism 
 
Having acknowledged the prominent interventionist role of the central government in 
guiding to China’s successful economic and social development, this section will 
extend the application of the concept of the developmental state beyond the abstract 
macro level by casting local government in the lead role of the development process. 
This is the focus of the present study, and investigating the micro-level institutional 
arrangements is urgent because: “the standard definition of a developmental state 
assumes the central state to be the prime actor. All accounts of developmental states 
focus their analyses on central policy elites, particularly in the economic domain. Such 
an approach removes from view the politics of local governments and their relations to 
the centre, presumably because it is assumed that they are inconsequential to the 
realization of central objectives and/or that they will automatically comply with 
directives from above” (Howell, 2006, p.283). In fact, after recognizing its inability to 
steer growth from the center, the Chinese state has gradually decentralized information, 
policy powers and authority to local governments since the early 1980s (Chung,1995). 
                                                 
43
 See Zhongguo gongchandang dishiliujie zhongyang weiyuanhui disanci quanti huiyi gongbao (Full 
Text of the Communiqué). Website of China.com. 
http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/sljszqh/421625.htm (accessed 5 October 2015). 
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In particular, the inherited institutional constraints contained in the fiscal 
decentralization and cadre evaluation system have greatly reshaped local 
government’s behavior and the relations between central and local. Indeed, local 
governments were able to retain a greater portion of their revenues and mobilize 
resources outside of the budget through private and foreign investment and various ad 
hoc charges, were thus less dependent on the central state (Whiting, 2001).  
 
It is noteworthy that mounting alternative notions have emerged in the analysis of the 
concept of the developmental state in the local state formations during the reform 
period, such as the “developmental state” (Blecher, 1991), “entrepreneurial state” 
(Blecher, 1991; Duckett, 1998), “local corporatist state” (Oi, 1995;1999), “the 
regulatory state” (Shue, 1995), “the dual developmental state” (Xia, 2000), “ the 
clientelist state” (Pearson, 1997; Wank, 1995), “the market-facilitating state ” (Howell, 
1993), the “rent-seeking state” (Wedeman, 2003) and “the predatory state” (Bernstein 
and Lu, 2000). The multiplicity of terms reflects less the perspectives of different 
schools of political economy and more empirical observations of the changing nature 
of local states, their relations and the extent of these to the economy and society, as 
well as relations to the central state and finally the growing complexity of state 
structures and processes in the context of global integration, interest pluralization and 
decentralization (Howell, 2006, p.279).  
 
Baum and Shevchenko (1999, p.345) develop a matrix to classify the local state’s 
intervention in local economic activity into four modes, namely, entrepreneurial, 
clientelist, predatory and developmental. In accordance with the four modes, this 
section first conceptualizes the four formations of local states in China, simultaneously 
classifying the above mentioned alternative notions into the four modes and then 
developing the theoretical framework to examine the core of the case studies of this 
thesis, which focuses on the relationship between local states and the private sector. 
  
Entrepreneurial states describe the behavior of local states that are profit-seeking 
oriented, and more crucially, the state agents and bureaucrats that intervene in business 
60 
 
directly and independently. In other words, the state itself becomes an economic actor, 
engaging directly in risk-taking business and investment, creating new enterprises, 
procuring finance and competing for business with other bureaux (Blecher, 1991; 
Duckett, 1998). In entrepreneurial states, officials’ orientation to market activity would 
cause them to ignore or even exacerbate inequality and developmental imbalance 
because officials simply use the resources or profits at their disposal for their own 
purposes such as maintaining the bureau by covering administrative and salary costs. 
As Blecher (1991, p.288) observed, “[t]he [government building] was brand new, and 
sported automated doors, a mirrored, gold-lit lobby, carpet, modern furniture, and a 
television and refrigerator in each room. And [the] motor pool [is] full of Japanese 
cars”. The outcome of entrepreneurialism could occur either because of the pure 
operation of market forces or because state bureaux could exercise more market power 
than the more autonomous enterprises with whom they might compete (p.269). To 
some extent, the entrepreneurial state connects to private enterprises, and its incentives 
are tied tightly to increased output/productivity. 
 
In clientelist states, officials, acting as powerful patrons, promote and participate in 
the benefits of profit-making activity through personalized connections and 
particularistic exchanges with entrepreneurs in their localities (Blecher and Shue, 2001, 
p.368). Relations between patrons and clients have been stably established over time, 
which “involves an imbalance of power between official patrons and entrepreneurial 
clients, [and][…] the exercise of discretion by officials in allocating resources and 
opportunities, and it is embedded in personal ties” (Wank, 1995, p.155). In addition to 
access to profits, local bureaucracy interferes with or obstructs private business in 
many ways, such as the administrative measures, sanctions and policy formulations 
that emanate directly from the central state. In this respect, local officials make 
discretionary decisions as to whether to protect entrepreneurs from these hazards. 
Wank (1995) further distinguishes dependent clientelism from “symbiotic clientelism”: 
“Dependent clientelism was the foundation of what Michael Mann would call the 
state’s ‘infrastructural power’: its ability to penetrate and coordinate society. Clients 
helped officials mobilize compliance with central policies and directives. Clientelist 
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networks also created social cleavages between clients and nonclients, inhibiting the 
development of organized opposition to the state. […] The key change from the earlier 
form of [dependent] clientelism is that the degree of client dependence is greatly 
reduced, as the entrepreneur-clients have resources upon which officials now also 
depend” (p. 153-5). In other words, entrepreneurs depend on local governments for 
licenses, tax benefits, access to resources, protection from predators, and so forth; 
cadres, in turn, get kickbacks, favors, jobs for relatives, and access to profits. 
Obviously, symbiotic clientelism undermines the institutional authority of the state 
(Baum and Shevchenko, 1999, p.350). In summary, as a powerful patron, the 
clientelist state closely connects to private enterprises but its interests may not be 
strongly tied to increased output/productivity, compared to the entrepreneurial state. In 
other words, the developmental alliance between local states and the business sector is 
very weak or negligible, if applicable.  
 
Predatory states are usually connected to the behavior of rent-seeking or corruption. 
Officials in this context do not intervene in business either directly or indirectly but 
utilize their powers instead to extract unproductive rents from producers and 
entrepreneurs through exorbitant fees, levies and fines (Blecher and Shue, 2001, 
p.368). The primary objective of the predatory state is to bolster the local ruling elites’ 
power and to facilitate their self-enrichment or predatory interests. Regimes under 
predatory rule are based on intense personalized ties and thus are not conducive to 
independent private business growth. Obviously Wedeman’s (2003) “rent-seeking 
state” resembles the notion of the predatory state. He argues that “institutional anarchy 
and bureaucratic rent seeking, manifested in the form of local protectionism, crippled 
many of the monopoly and monopsony structures left in place during the first two 
stages of reform. […] Local governments, mostly at the subprovincial level, usurped 
the monopsony and monopoly authority granted them as agents of the center and 
which were supposed to control the setting of prices and allocation of rent-producing 
commodities and used their power to ‘steal’ the center’s rents” (Wedeman, 2003, p.18).  
As a result, local governments engage in extensive predatory rent seeking to enrich 
themselves either by selling undervalued commodities on the black market or setting 
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up processing plants locally under their own sponsorship (p.74-5). Another ultimate 
predatory case is identified in a thriving locality, Daqiu Village, which rose to become 
a national model because Yu Zuomin, as the paramount Party secretary, took 
advantage of reforms to turn what had been an extremely poor village during the 
Maoist era into one of China’s richest villages during the 1980s (Lin and Chen, 1999). 
However, the predatory abuses are evidenced in the local elite’s ultimate control of the 
assets of all enterprises and through flagrant corruption. As representative of the Party 
and village, Yu abused his political power to control economic and social resources, 
even though his village provided the best social welfare at that time. This predatory 
behavior led to the further erosion of local government power (Lin and Chen, 1999, 
p.166). In a nutshell, the predatory state has a very weak connection with the business 
sector, simply through intense personalization of authority and its incentives are not 
tied to development outcomes. There is thus no developmental alliance between local 
governments and the business sector. 
 
The developmental state seems to comprise a large number of alternative notions, such 
as the market-facilitating state (Howell, 1993), the dual-developmental state (Xia, 
2000) and the regulatory state (Shue, 1995). In addition, Baum and Shevchenko (1999, 
p.350) even included Oi’s (1995; 1999) model of “local corporatist state” as a variant 
within the category of developmental state to take account of. These terms further 
refined the concept of the developmental state to take account of the changing 
politico-economic circumstances at the local level. Compared with the entrepreneurial 
state, the developmental state does not engage in economic activities directly, instead 
it is devoted to creating an enabling and facilitating environment for independent 
economic enterprises and is more likely to be capable of pursuing goals of balanced 
growth and economic equality. For instance, Blecher and Shue (1996) demonstrate the 
commitment of county cadres to, and how they use, local resources in terms of county 
institutions and the relationships between higher-level authorities and the townships 
and villages below them for the purpose of balanced local economic growth (Blecher 
and Shue, 1996). It is argued that local developmentalism is a result of a combination 
of ideological and historical factors that in turn underpin a deep-seated resistance to 
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entrepreneurial profit-making either for self-gain or on the part of state institutions 
(Blecher and Shue, 1996, p.42, as cited in Howell, 2006, p.280). 
 
As far as various patterns of the developmental state are concerned, the “dual 
developmental state” highlights the combination of a central reformist leadership and 
developmentalist governments at the provincial level which both had a mutual interest 
in fostering rapid growth (Xia, 2000). While in a “market-facilitating state”, the 
Chinese state appears to have evolved to enable itself to maintain the control or 
supervision of, and participation in, the process of opening up by improving the 
technical proficiency and professional skill of its bureaucrats (Howell, 1993). “The 
regulatory state” is also seen as the developmental state, but reflects the extent to 
which the state intervenes or involves in economic development is very small or 
minimal. Rather, it engages in the attempt to wrest the control of business sector by 
exercising various forms of statutory regulation. In Shue’s (1995) case study of Xinji 
City, “[l]ocal state authorities move out […] in greater force to apply newly crafted 
regulatory and administrative-coercive controls in the very social spaces that were so 
lately liberated from direct state command in respond to the uneven economic growth, 
social strain, and urban sprawl” (p.112). In the regulatory mode, the local state adopts 
a political strategy to control and co-opt private traders, coping with the challenging 
consequences of economic reform. In all respects, the state apparatus used by the 
locality is not directive, but primarily regulatory in nature (p.97).  
 
Oi’s (1995; 1999) “local corporatist state” reflects a powerful pattern of “local 
decentralized developmental state” (1995, p.1149) and “entrepreneurial developmental 
state” (Oi, 1995, p.1139). She makes use of the analogy that compares the roles and 
behavior of two dimensions: leadership and resources of county, township and village 
governments to that of corporate and regional headquarters and companies, as one 
component within a larger and diversified corporation (Oi, 1995, p.1138-1139; Oi, 
1999, p.103-115). Based on this “corporate-like organization” (Oi, 1995, p.1132), 
local officials are able to foster local economic growth by supporting local collective 
industrial enterprises through the provision of information, access to materials and 
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technology, and through the selective redistribution of resources from wealthier sister 
enterprises to start-up enterprises or to less successful village enterprises that absorb 
local surplus labor force or the enterprise carries prestige thus gives “face” to the 
village (Oi, 1995, p.1139–1141).  The term of “local corporatist state” is in fact akin 
to the concept of “entrepreneurial developmental state”. As Oi (1995) points out, 
“[t]he degree to which officials get involved in product development, market research 
and the acquisition of technology suggests that this is not the usual provision of 
bureaucratic service, but the activity of an entrepreneurial developmental state” 
(p.1139). They both highlight the combination of entrepreneurial and governmental 
roles of local governments. However, the former reflects the dynamics of a “large 
multi-level corporation” governmental structure; the latter underlines that local state is 
driven not only by economic and profit motives but also by social interests, such as 
the considerations of employment provision (Oi, 1995, p.1142). Moreover, Howell 
(2006) suggests that it is more appropriate to use the term “corporate state” rather than 
“corporatist state” because the latter refers to a specific system of interest 
representation, usually contrasted with pluralism (p.281).  
 
Building on the theoretical formations of local state, in particular inspired by Oi’s 
“local corporatist state”, I suggest “Local State Entrepreneurial-Developmentalism” as 
a concept with which to account for the role of local cadres in leading the 
socioeconomic development and dynamic interactions between local state and private 
sector in the case study of Fugu County. There are three reasons that justify why I 
discard Oi’s “local corporatist state” rather than develop the local state 
entrepreneurial-developmentalism for further analysis of local cadres’ behavior. First, 
“local corporatist state” was embedded in the ambiguous property rights context that 
granted local governments new vested rights over fiscal surplus extracted from the 
collective-dominant rural industries beginning in the 1980s. Nevertheless, the 
transformation of collective property rights to private ownership has fundamentally 
reformulated local governments’ strategy of socioeconomic development since end of 
the 1990s. The relatively clearly-defined private ownership has deprived the local 
cadres of property rights over fiscal surplus but enhanced their motives for expanding 
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the local tax base due to the revenue-sharing fiscal system.
44
 Second, the “local 
corporatist state” was built on large and multi-level governmental organizations that 
consisted of county, township and village governments in the 1980-90s. However, the 
fiscal division system took effect in 1994, and the privatization of TVEs throughout 
the 1990s have greatly hollowed out the township and village governments as “fully 
fledged economic actors” (Oi, 1995, p.1137) in the 1980s.
45
 Unlike the township and 
village cadres who held prominent positions in the township/village-run corporations 
during the collective ownership period, the power of township and village cadres has 
shrunk considerably, leaving room for private enterprises. They have little direct 
control over the management of economic activities. Furthermore, as the legacy of 
decollectivization of agricultural production characterized by the household 
responsibility system for agricultural production adopted in the early 1980s, the 
abolition of agricultural taxes in the early 2000s has dramatically intensified the 
township and village governments’ financial difficulties. Indeed, the township and 
village cadres are tightly constrained to rely on the transfer payments and fund 
appropriation from upper authorities through the fiscal system.
46
 Under this 
circumstance, township and village cadres are less engaged in economic activities but 
enhance their capacity to provide bureaucratic services for socioeconomic 
development. As a consequence, the three-layer corporate-like hierarchical structure 
has collapsed in the evolving institutional environment characterized by private 
ownership. Indeed, in the case of Fugu County, a new economic intervention structure 
is emerging horizontally. The strong grip of power on the private sector is aggregated 
primarily among the county level officials. Third, I use local state entrepreneurial-
developmentalism, which best blends together entrepreneur-like profit-seeking 
behavior and balanced socioeconomic development consideration, to examine the 
development model and the relations between the local state and the private sector. 
According to the matrix created by Baum and Shevchenko (1999), both the terms 
                                                 
44
 Chapter 3 will examine the fiscal reforms and their impacts in more detail.  
 
45
 For a detailed study of how township governments become “hollow shells”, see Smith (2010). 
 
46
 In addition, village cadres are not state officials and therefore not part of the nomenklatura system. 
Legally, they are representatives of villages that aim at governing their villages. Village committees are 
served as the organizational unit and perform certain governmental functions. 
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entrepreneurial and developmental are strongly oriented toward the goal of increasing 
economic output and productivity. However, an entrepreneurial state denotes a direct 
involvement in economic activities, and has vested individual economic interests in 
particular enterprises and clients. Developmental state has indirect intervention in the 
economic growth but is more concerned with public socioeconomic interests (p.345-6). 
Indeed, unlike the entrepreneurial state of Guanghan County that seeks opportunities 
for personal self-gain or for departmental expansion described by Blecher and Shue 
(1996), local officials in Fugu County become economic players, directly engaging in 
economic activities, such as reorganizing the private coal-endowed industrial cluster, 
creating new enterprises, and designating officials to manage enterprises. In this sense, 
it is argued the local cadres, acting as entrepreneurs, strategically intervene in the 
private sector to ensure smooth economic growth and thus facilitate effective social 
development through the implementation of a set of rural development programs. 
 
 
2.5.4 Local Developmental State-Business Relations  
 
Concerning the relationship between local developmental state and the business sector, 
Oi (1999) illustrates the best case of the “local corporatist state” to highlight that the 
relationship between the two actors has not been a zero-sum game during the reform 
eras. Indeed, mutual dependence rather than predation is a more apt description of the 
relationship. This explains why large extractions of revenue have not negatively 
affected economic growth. However, the subtle changes between the periods of 
collective economy and private economy are noteworthy. Regardless of whether a 
collective or private economy, a contracting system has come into the play that 
connects the local governments and enterprises as mutually dependent on each other. 
During the 1980s, a revenue-sharing system granted local governments the right to the 
fiscal surplus from collectively owned enterprises as a form of profit-taking to pay for 
collective expenditures and reinvestment (Oi, 1999; p.97-98).   
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Since the 1990s, the effects of privatization either spurred by local state intervention 
or by outright state-sponsored privatization of formerly collectively owned enterprises 
have incorporated private entrepreneurs into the public sector-both state and 
collectively owned enterprises. Furthermore, it has created two important implications 
for the relationship between the local state and private enterprises. First, the state and 
the collective sectors have become significant sources of wealth for the private sector. 
Second, the growing private entrepreneurs are unlikely to be capable of usurping the 
power of local officials. On the contrary, the relationship between the local state and 
the private sector has become increasingly mutually dependent and symbiotic through 
the provision of production contracts by large state and collective factories to rural 
private enterprises. Rural private entrepreneurs have become part of, and in some 
cases reliant upon, the state and collective sectors in order to reduce risks while 
pursuing their economic interests. The relationship between the local state and the 
private sector is no longer likely to be adversarial. In addition, the importance of 
established personal connections with the public sector is also seen in the market 
behavior of private entrepreneurs. Just like those in the state sector, private 
entrepreneurs try to minimize risks, reduce transaction costs and engage in 
relationships with the public sector that offer profitable business opportunities (Oi, 
1999, p.134-137). In return, the private sector plays a prominent role in generating tax 
revenues for the local state to pay for the public services devolved from the upper 
authorities. Thus, the symbiotic nature of the relationship between the local state and 
the private sector has kept predatory behavior, if found, to a minimum (Oi, 1999, 
p.202).  
 
2.5.5 Central-Local Relations: Agency Problem 
 
As far as the relations between central and local states are concerned, the agency 
problem is the most prominent issue which has been extensively examined (Baum and 
Shevchenko, 1999; Huang, 1996; Oi, 1999; Shirk, 1995; Wang, 1995; Whiting, 2001; 
Wong, 1991; Yang, 1994). Theoretically speaking, the agency problem rests on 
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information asymmetries and conflicts of interests contained in the incentive structure 
which is created by information asymmetries. First, the inevitable asymmetrical 
knowledge allows agents to always have an advantage over the principal in their 
knowledge of the true level of implementation and operation performance. Second, as 
a consequence, the inevitable information asymmetries create adverse selection, moral 
hazard and incentive problems, “among which, moral hazard and adverse selection are 
general problems whose potential is inherent in all contracting and hierarchical 
relationships” (Moe, 1984, p.755). Once moral hazard is involved, the agents are 
likely to use that knowledge to serve their own rather the principal’s interests. 
Therefore, to mitigate the asymmetry or its consequences, it is necessary and rational 
for the principal to devise sufficient incentives that induce the agents to reveal as 
much of their privately held information as possible and fulfill the principal’s interests. 
“Hierarchical control is facilitated by a number of interrelated mechanisms, among the 
most important of which is the ‘residual’. The more general principal-agent models of 
hierarchical control have shown that, under a range of conditions, the principal’s 
optimal incentive structure for the agent is one in which the latter receives some share 
of the residual in payment for his efforts, thus giving him a direct stake in the 
outcome” (Moe,1984, pp.762-763). Monitoring devices can be used as the second 
institutional arrangement by the principal to oversee and regulate the agents’ behavior 
and performance. However, the process is costly and less effective if the agents 
collude with partners to deceive the principal. Finally, it is necessary to bear in mind 
that (a) except for the ultimate principal and the ultimate agent, each actor in the 
hierarchy assumes a dual role in which he serves both as principal and as agent (Moe, 
1984, p.766); and (b) a complicating but quite essential fact of politics emerges: 
political control is undermined by multiple-principal/agent arrangements. To put it 
differently, “any given bureau is likely to have multiple principals [and] bureaus are 
‘partial agents’ of various governmental principals, without being under the complete 
authority of any one in particular, and without any common understanding of how 
authority is legitimately divided among the competing principals. [Likewise,] […] 
each principal has various bureaus to oversee, but this complication may not be of 
great significance, since principals in fact have their own specialized hierarchies for 
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monitoring each bureau and, in many cases, no coordination is even desired” 
(Moe,1984, p.768-769). 
 
The Chinese case illustrates that fiscal reforms are the most important mechanism to 
facilitate hierarchic control between the central state (principal) and local governments 
(agents) (Baum and Shevchenko, 1999; Huang, 1996; Oi, 1999; Wang, 1995; Whiting, 
2001; Wong, 1991; Yang, 1994). The prevalent view is that fiscal and administrative 
decentralization in the 1980s granted provincial and sub-provincial governments broad 
discretionary authority to raise and allocate resources and revenues, but major 
concerns remain over how the decentralization reforms affected the power of the 
central state and reshaped the central-local relations. For instance, one suggestion is 
that the decentralization and deregulation reforms have so tilted the balance of fiscal 
and administrative powers and facilitated the growth of extrabudgetary funds in favor 
of the provinces, thus contributing to the decline of central state capacity to effectively 
control over China’s economic activities (Wang, 1995). Nevertheless, one claim is that 
decentralization has neither diminished the central government’s extractive capacity 
measured by the ratio of central government revenues to Gross National Product (GNP) 
nor undermined China’s unitary political system evaluated by the degree of central 
control over key provincial appointments (Huang, 1996; Yang, 1994). The third 
argument holds that “central leaders have not so much ‘lost’ control as they have 
chosen not to exercise it because provincial officials are a powerful bloc in the process 
of selecting top Communist Party leaders” (Shirk, 1995, as cited in Baum and 
Shevchenko, 1999, p.335).  
 
Wong (1991) focuses on three types of strategies that local governments used to 
respond to the constraints and incentives contained in the revenue-sharing fiscal 
system prior to the1994 tax division system and their implications for the reform. 
Specifically, first, local governments passively negotiate with higher levels in the 
fiscal hierarchy for an adjustment in the division of revenues and responsibilities, in 
the hope of obtaining a more favorable revenue-sharing ratio, a bigger subsidy from 
the higher level, or a reduction in expenditure responsibilities. Second, local 
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governments actively promote the expansion of the local tax base by supporting local 
economic growth through direct investments. Third, local governments reach outside 
the budget process to tap extrabudgetary funds to finance government expenditures 
(p.707-708). She points out that the second and third responses run directly counter to 
efforts at reform because local government control of enterprise funds outside the 
formal system of taxation obviously violates the spirit of enterprise reform, which is 
aimed at increasing enterprise autonomy and insulating their operations from 
government interference. The second strategy of promoting local industrial growth is 
even more problematic, because of distorted prices and an unreformed tax structure. 
As a consequence, it is argued that local strategies of development have affected 
structural reform. First, they all adversely affect allocative efficiency. Second, the rise 
of regional protectionism has hindered the development of a national market and 
shielded enterprises from competition. Finally, tax-evasion and avoidance behavior 
defeats the original intention of fiscal decentralization: that of revenue mobilization 
and improving local collection efforts (p.709-710). 
 
Beyond the provincial and municipality level, Oi (1999) and Whiting (2001) extend 
the analysis of central-local relations down to county and township governments by 
examining the behavior of local tax, finance and audit bureau cadres, and provide 
similar findings showing that local officials try to retain the tax revenues to swell their 
coffers. They both claim that the agency problem stems from the conflicting interests 
of principals and agents and from the information asymmetry which is intensified by 
the dual role and multiple-principal arrangements. Among these, Whiting (2001) 
argues that township officials are both principals and agents in the process of revenue 
extraction. They are principals with respect to the extraction of revenue for local 
coffers and agents of the central government in a nested hierarchy of subnational 
governments with respect to extraction of revenue for central coffers. The monitoring 
system clearly comes into play in the agency relationship. Where monitoring is lax, 
local officials succeed in diverting more revenue (particularly revenue from collective 
firms) from centrally controlled to locally controlled channels. Apart from this, the 
existence of collective organizational structures at the township level hinders the 
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mobilization of revenue from collective enterprises into channels controlled by the 
central state. As a consequence, all township officials have incentives to try to retain 
as much revenue as possible at the township level (p.25-8).  
 
Again, Oi (1999) uses “local state corporatism” to examine the multiple-principal 
arrangements contained in the agency relationship. There are many different principals 
and agents at the county level and below. The interests of the local regulatory agents 
are only partially tied to the principal mandating the investigations - that is, the central 
state. Their positions are dependent on the goodwill of the central state through the 
nomenklatura system, but their salaries and general economic well-being depend on 
those whom they are investigating within the county. For tax, finance, and audit 
bureau officials, the principals who count are the county leaders: the Party secretary 
and the county mayor. Hence, when conflicting interests are involved, county and 
township regulatory officials choose to fulfill their immediate principal’s interests 
rather than the central state (p.153). Furthermore, she points out that the fiscal reforms 
have induced a separate set of incentives that leads local officials to provide minimum 
rather than maximum levels of compliance primarily in the assessment and collection 
of national taxes - that affects local economic growth and the revenues generated at 
the local levels. The emergence of local state corporatism has intensified the moral 
hazard problem in central-local relations by encouraging local officials to try to first 
protect the locality and only second the center when implementing central tax laws 
(p.159-60).  
 
2.6 Strategic Group Approach and Strategic Group Analysis 
  
Strategic group approach was firstly formulated and refined by Hans-Dieter Evers 
(1966; 1973) and his colleagues at the Bielefeld School of Developmental Sociology. 
Based on large empirical examinations of social changes in Southeast Asia, the 
developmental sociologists developed this approach as a device to understand social 
actions and processes in fast developing countries, by reducing complexity. The 
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strategic group approach is an approach based on rational choice because it assumes 
that human actions are governed primarily by an interest in maximizing material and 
immaterial gains and profits and, secondarily, by motives such as love and hate, envy 
and admiration (Evers and Gerke, 2009, p.1). A strategic group is a quasi-group which 
possesses group or network characteristics. The members are not necessarily members 
of a network or members of an organization, but are united by one common interest: to 
secure present and future chances to gain access to resources; to share chances of 
appropriating resources and their distribution. Unlike individuals that may act for 
immediate gain, strategic groups follow long-term strategies and aim to create social, 
political and economic structures and institutions that enhance the chance to 
appropriate resources (Evers and Gerke, 2009, p.2).  
 
As group conflict is inherent in a society structured by strategic groups, how can a 
strategic group be kept coherent? “Common values, ideologies and common interests 
are powerful binding forces and help to develop real groups out of quasi-groups. 
Strategic groups typically transcend social boundaries and encompass leaders and 
followers. They may cross class boundaries and its members may belong to different 
social strata. Kinship networks could also be a binding force of strategic groups” 
(Evers and Gerke, 2009, p.5). In this sense, strategic groups are fluid, but may be 
powerful and long lasting. The feature of fluidity is also manifest in the tendency for 
strategic groups to seek effective alliances to secure or enhance their chances of 
resource surplus. Nevertheless, this enhanced chance of appropriation does not mean 
that it is a zero-sum game by reducing the absolute income of other strategic groups or 
the population in general (economic growth with increasing inequality) (Evers and 
Gerke, 2009, p.7). 
 
Strategic group analysis is used as a tool to examine the shift of power structure in a 
given social/geographic setting, specifically at different power groups which are 
competing for different resources. This analytic framework typically helps us to 
understand the group member’s behavior, interactions and the process of strategic 
group formation and strategies development when new resources become available.  
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Building on the strategic group approach, Bourdieu’s theory of capital formation and 
the garbage can model from organization theory, Thomas Heberer and Gunter 
Schubert (2012) further extend the strategic group analysis to China’s local states, 
conceptualizing county and township cadres as a strategic group and substantiating 
how the local cadres use their strategic agency to carry out effective policy 
implementation.  
 
Strategic group denotes a group of actors who develop strategies for securing or 
pushing through group-related common interests. Berner (2005) underlines that 
strategic groups are not “actual groups in the sense that each member has contact with 
all others” and “are not a factual, observable object of research but rather an 
instrument of analysis” (as cited in Heberer and Schubert, 2012, p.225). The 
denotation reinforces the characteristics of a strategic group as an informal and open 
group that has shared interests which the members pursue strategically; operates 
through formal organizations; maintains mutual awareness and a collective identity 
through drawing boundaries to incorporate other social constituencies; and possesses a 
common life-style patterns (Bourdieu’s habitus) related to the similar positions of its 
members in a given social field (Heberer and Schubert, 2012, p.226). Based on the 
above factors: common interests, close positions in the political system, similar social 
status and life-style patterns and a powerful organizational structure (eg. the local 
branch of the Communist Party), the internal coherence of leading county and 
township cadres as a strategic group is enhanced greatly in the process of local 
decision-making and policy implementation. Positional closeness in the political 
system exposes the local cadres in the strategic group to pressure from both higher-
level authorities and the rural populace and forces the group core leaders and all other 
members into strategic alliance and cooperation. Only in this way can the strategic 
group members maximize their benefits. As a result, county and township cadres form 
“a symbiotic relationship of mutual dependence” (Heberer and Schubert, 2012, p.228).  
 
Why are village cadres, or cadres from prefectural and provincial levels above, 
74 
 
excluded from becoming the members of a strategic group? First, village cadres are 
not state officials and hence not part of the personnel system. They generally enjoy 
very little autonomy from township authorities. Even though the introduction of 
village elections since the late 1980s has created more deliberation and negotiation 
between the township and village cadres, the differences between them in terms of 
power and status perception are still significant. It is unlikely that they would form an 
alliance against the county government. On top of that, township cadres depend on the 
county government for the appropriation of funds to pay salaries and administrative 
expenditures, as well as career promotions. Second, provincial and city-level 
(prefectural) authorities exercise control over the county government through 
delegation, monitoring and evaluation systems, therefore county government has 
relative discretion to carry out development plans in accordance with local 
circumstances. The county-wide project implementation and evaluation further 
reinforces the collective identity and interests of county and township cadres. Finally, 
the common interests and identity of leading county and township cadres is usually 
limited to the jurisdiction where they work (Heberer and Schubert, 2012, p.229-232). 
 
County and township cadres do not by any means form a homogeneous group. In fact, 
they compete for career promotion, factional affiliation, bureaucratic power and status 
in the hierarchical system. However, they form a strategic group that encompass 
officials ranking from vice-bureau head (fukeji) upwards at county level led by a core 
group (lingdao banzi) that is topped by the county Party secretary, who makes all the 
final decisions. As the “paramount leader” of the strategic group and its core role, the 
county Party secretary in fact acts as a political entrepreneur in the sense that he, on 
the one hand, has to be responsible for the formulation of local development; on the 
other hand, he has to ensure group unity and the compliance of all members to follow 
the leading core’s decision. In this sense, Bourdieu’s economic, cultural, social, 
symbolic capitals and newly introduced structural capital as formal and informal 
institutions contribute to establishing the shared identity and group cohesion. For 
instance, the Party branch and Party school and official meetings are seen as formal 
institutions, reputation, prestige, personal relationships (guanxi) and networks as 
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informal institutions (Heberer and Schubert, 2012, p.232-238).  
 
To explain the diverging patterns of strategic agency within the strategic group, 
Heberer and Schubert (2012) suggest that extrinsic and intrinsic incentive structures 
play a crucial role in the process of policy implementation by the group members. The 
extrinsic incentives include material and immaterial items (such as remuneration and 
bonuses, promotion prospects and demotion threats). The intrinsic incentives refer to 
value orientations, personal background and past experiences, etc. However, the 
incentive structures are insufficient to account for the diverging patterns and policy 
outcomes in rural China. “Organized anarchy”, therefore, is introduced as a concept to 
explain the variation in local policy processes. “Organized anarchy” is attributed to 
institutional uncertainty and ambiguity, where multiple choices are available for 
solving a problem. When local cadres implement the ambitious rural development 
projects or solve the “big problems” (social welfare, education, infrastructure, 
sanitation) devolved from upper authorities, they have relative autonomy to formulate 
the details of project implementation and therefore, the project outcomes remain 
subject to their interpretations and preferences of the deliberately obscured central 
policy (Heberer and Schubert, 2012, p.239-244). 
 
Following Heberer and Schubert (2012), this study will use strategic group analysis as 
an approach to examine local cadres’ behavior in Fugu County, specifically how 
county and township cadres form a strategic group and co-opt local coal mine owners 
into the strategic group in order to successfully implement the rural development 
program formulated by the central government. As a result, local coal mine owners 
become part of the strategic group formed by local cadres. The alliance is effectively 
formed based on the symbiotic relationship between the local state and private sector.   
 
2.7 Summary 
 
This chapter has reviewed a broad variety of approaches to the developmental state, 
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including the definitions, notions, and relations among the developmental state, 
society and business and the political and economic conditional effects. Based on 
theoretical explorations of these issues, I have summarized four defining features of 
the developmental state: development-oriented political leadership, an autonomous 
and effective bureaucracy, a production-oriented private sector and performance-
oriented governance. Furthermore, this chapter has examined the application of four 
defining features in China and developed Local State Entrepreneurial-
Developmentalism to analyze the local officials’ behavior presented in Chapter 4. I 
have additionally discussed the consequences of local the developmental state with 
regard to state-business relations and central-local relations respectively, and the 
strategic group approach. 
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Chapter 3. Fiscal Reform and Cadre Evaluation System as Incentives 
 
3.1 Preamble 
 
This chapter reviews the evolution of local non-agricultural economic organization in 
Chinese counties and their subordinated jurisdictions from the beginning of the 
reforms till the emergence of the county as an “entrepreneurial-developmental state.” 
The core elements of institutional evolution from the late 1970s till the 1990s are, I 
claim, contained in two policies, one relating to fiscal and public finance reform and 
the other to cadre evaluation. These policies combined to create powerful incentives 
for local cadres to achieve economic growth, and gave direction to their efforts. The 
core resources the local officials could access were the revenues of non-agricultural 
enterprises, in the case of Fugu County, mainly enterprises in coal-related sectors. In 
essence, the evolving fiscal and public finance regimes accordingly forced local 
officials to extract budgetary revenues (i.e. “matching funds”) from locally-owned 
enterprises to finance social welfare and rural development programs devolved from 
central and/or upstream authorities (Xu and Xie, 2009; He, 2006). The cadre 
evaluation system with its emphasis on maintaining a peaceful social order gave local 
cadres a strong incentive to increase revenues to compensate disadvantaged villagers 
through evolving redistribution mechanisms. 
 
In order to contextualize this process, the first section of this chapter briefly outlines 
the institutional prerequisites for the rise of the local “entrepreneurial-developmental 
state” (based on the “county-wide economy”) and the fiscal/financial and cadre 
evaluation regimes it involved. In the subsequent sections, the evolution of 
fiscal/financial and cadre evaluation practices since the beginning of the reforms are 
sketched out. In the next chapter, the evolution of rural industry as a basis for the 
formation of the local “entrepreneurial-developmental state” in Fugu is analyzed. 
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3.2 Institutional Constraints of CNSC Implementation  
 
Like most rural social policy implementation, CNSC follows the fiscal system of 
“money passed down by the central government through the fiscal system, either as 
general transfer payments (yibanxing zhuanyi zhifu) or as earmarked funds 
(zhuanxiang zijin)” (Schubert and Ahlers, 2012, p.73).
47
 According to the rules, local 
administrative hierarchies from province to county are all involved in the practice of 
raising matching funds for national rural development programs. Some programs 
explicitly state in their documentation the portion of matching funds to be provided by 
local governments, while other programs grant local governments discretion over the 
proportion of matching funds. For example, the Measures on the Management of the 
State Budgetary Poverty Relief Funds issued in 2000 explicitly announced that local 
governments must provide no less than 30% of matching funds. If provinces, 
autonomous regions and municipalities
48
 fail to meet the matching funds imperative 
set by the center, they might face economic punishment like a reduction in next year's 
budget allocation, as well as political punishment in the form of administrative 
sanctions against the cadres directly in charge.49 The proportion of matching funds 
                                                 
47 
According to Schubert and Ahlers (2012, p. 73), “[t]ransfer payments can be used by county 
governments at their own discretion, whereas earmarked funds must be allocated according to pre-
determined purposes.” 
 
48 
There are currently four municipalities in China, namely Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing. 
Their administrative status is similar to that of a province, dealing directly with the central government; 
they govern the counties within their jurisdictions directly without any prefecture-level authorities 
involved. The five autonomous regions (of national minorities) are also at the provincial level of 
administrative status. In addition, a small number of large cities and special economic zones are “direct 
planning cities” (jihua danlie shi) which for the purpose of planning, budget and tax administration are 
handled separately from the provinces in which they are situated. 
 
49 
The policy was issued jointly by Ministry of Finance, Leading Group of the State Council for 
Development-Oriented Poverty Relief and former State Planning Commission. For details, see Guanyu 
yinfa caizheng fupin zijin guanli banfa (shixing) he caizheng fupin xiangmu guanlifei guanli banfa 
(shixing)de tongzhi (Circulars Concerning the Experimental Measures of Fiscal Funds for Poverty 
Alleviation and Project Management Fees). Website of Ministry of Finance. 
http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengwengao/caizhengbuwengao2000/caizhengbuwengao200
04/200805/t20080519_21529.html (accessed 5 October 2015). 
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required by local governments for centrally assigned earmarked funds varies 
regionally. As a general rule, provincial governments enjoy full discretion to 
determine the proportion of matching funds that prefectural city and county 
governments must raise in order to receive program fund allocations. The matching 
funds required from wealthy counties tend to be larger than those to be raised from 
poor or underdeveloped localities; this is often referred to as a “meal ticket” (chifan 
caizheng). For instance, Shaanxi Provincial Government stipulated that the top 20 
counties in terms of fiscal revenue per capita must provide 50% of matching funds for 
financing under CNSC.
50
 Fugu County has fallen into the top 20 counties list since 
2007.
51
 
 
The centrally assigned tax refunds (shuishou fanhuan) and transfer payments 
(including general transfer payments and earmarked funds)52 bound by the tax 
division system (fenshuizhi) in late 1993 fall into the local governments' budgetary 
revenue, and the matching funds provided by local governments are similarly 
extracted from their budgetary revenue as well.
53
 On the one hand, the tax division 
                                                 
50 
See Shaanxisheng guanyu cujin pinkun diqu shehui zhuyi xinnongcun jianshe de yijian (Opinions 
Concerning Shaanxi Province Promotes CNSC in Underdeveloped Areas). Website of the Communist 
Party of China. http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/67507/5597596.html (accessed 5 October 2015). 
 
51 
Fugu County ranked 35
th
 of Shaanxi Province County Economy Comprehensive Assessment in 2005, 
23
rd
 in 2006, 5
th
 in 2007 and 3
rd
 in 2008. See Shanxi fugu tuidong xianyu jingji shixian kuayue fazhan 
(From Being Middle Reaches to Pacesetter: Fugu County Achieved Sound and Rapid Development of 
County-Wide Economy). Website of Shaanxi Daily. 
http://www.sxdaily.com.cn/data/jjxsd/20090707_9905600_0.htm (accessed 5 October 2015). 
 
52 
See Shuishou fanhuan he zhuanyi zhifu zhidu (Tax Refund and Transfer Payments Systems). Website 
of Ministry of Finance of PRC. 
http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhuantihuigu/czjbqk2010/2cztz/201110/t20111031_603357.html (accessed 5 
October 2015). 
 
53 
Financial income is officially divided into three types, budgetary revenue (yusuannei shouru), extra-
budgetary revenue (yusuanwai shouru), and contributionary revenue (zhiduwai shouru). As a rule, 
budgetary revenues account for 50% of the government's total revenue, extra-budgetary and 
contributionary revenues each account for about 25% (Wang and Zhao, 2006, p. 83). For specific 
classification and evolution of China’s financial management spanning the years 1950-94, see Oi (1999, 
Appendix B, p. 213-216). For the full text of the Budget Law of the People’s Republic of China enacted 
on January 1, 1995, see Zhonghua renmin gongheguo yusuan fa (Budget Law of the People’s Republic 
of China). Website of National People’s Congress. http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-
12/05/content_5004614.htm (accessed 5 October 2015). 
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system divided the tax revenue into three categories: central, local, and central-local 
shared taxes. It fundamentally reduced local governments’ budgetary revenues 
(Whiting, 2001). On the other hand, the tax-and-fee reform (shuifei gaige)54 from the 
early 2000s abolished the agricultural taxes and eased the “farmers’ burden” (nongmin 
fudan) by decreasing the annual taxes and fees paid by farmers by more than RMB 
100 billion, compared to 1999.
55
 A derived effect was that it further eroded local tax 
revenues in particular in localities that primarily relied on agriculture (Kennedy, 2007; 
Wang and Zhao, 2006; Zhu, 2002). The tax-and-fee reform thus caused local 
governments, in particular the township governments, to face even greater fiscal 
constraints when raising matching funds (mainly to be extracted from local tax 
revenue) for CNSC. 
 
I argue that incentives and constraints contained in the institutional arrangements of 
the fiscal reform in the 1990s and the tax-and-fee reform in the 2000s, associated with 
the cadre evaluation system fundamentally affected local officials’ behavior. They 
were driven by political as well as economic incentives to boost rural industry in order 
to generate revenue for local government coffers, finance the provision of public 
goods and social welfare, and create jobs. In the case of Fugu, the pressures felt in 
terms of funding CNSC were an example of this. First, the revenue-sharing fiscal 
system has created a revenue imperative for local officials by requiring that local 
governments to extract matching funds from budgetary revenues (mostly tax revenues). 
However, most counties in China are faced with extracting matching funds from 
                                                                                                                                            
 
54 
The tax-and-fee reform, initiated by the central government, eliminated all non-tax local fees as well 
as animal slaughter tax, agriculture-animal husbandry tax and special agricultural product other than 
tobacco tax. See Guojia shuiwuju: mianzheng nongyeshui huiji 8 yi zhongguo nongmin (State 
Administration of Taxation: Abolishing Agricultural Taxes Benefits 0.8 Billion Farmers). Website of 
People. http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1027/4069907.html (accessed 5 October 2015).  
 
55 
Jin Renqing, the former Minister of Finance (2003-2007) claimed that 0.8 billion farmers in China 
would be gaining benefits from the abolition of agricultural taxes in 2006. See Dali zhichi shehui zhuyi 
xinnongcun jianshe (Greatly Support CNSC). Website of Ministry of Finance. 
http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhuantihuigu/2006ysbgjd/bjzl/200805/t20080519_23243.html (accessed 5 
October 2015). 
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budgetary revenues. As the Deputy Director of Research Institute for Fiscal Science, 
Ministry of Finance claimed:  
 
It is estimated that 80% of counties are poor, because the personnel cost already accounts for 
60%-80% of budgetary revenues, coupled with administrative expenses, there is little left for 
matching funds at county level.
56
 
 
Furthermore, county governments are required by the central government to provide 
public goods and social welfare, which are called hard expenditure targets (fading 
zhichu, including spending on education, science and technology, agriculture, culture 
and health care).
57
 The hard expenditure accounts for a lion’s share of local 
government’s budgetary spending. For instance, the 2010 Audit Results showed that 
fading zhichu of 54 counties accounted for 77.23% of total public fiscal expenditure.
58
 
As a consequence, local governments are left with very limited leeway and autonomy 
to harness the budgetary revenues, and some are even likely to fall into a deficit. In 
order to fulfill the tasks devolved from upper authorities, local governments must 
channel certain portion of extra budgetary incomes into the budgetary revenues.59 
Indeed, this fully explains why Fugu County is still faced with the strong constraint of 
matching funds extracted from budgetary revenues though it has generated fiscal 
                                                 
56 
See Ruguo peitao zijin meigenshang (If Matching Funds Are Not Kept Up). Website of Observation 
in Economics. http://www.eeo.com.cn/2013/0331/242044.shtml (accessed 5 October 2015). 
 
57 
Since the 8
th
 Five Year Plan was implemented in 1991, central and local governments have set up a 
specific portion of expenditure on education, science and technology, agriculture, culture and health 
care. In addition, the central government promulgated that the growth rate of government spending 
must be higher than the growth rate of budgetary revenues. See Jiaoyu keji nongye deng caizheng 
zhichu buzai niannian zeng (The Public Fiscal Expenditure Will Not Grow Every Year). Website of 
Caixin. http://m.economy.caixin.com/m/2013-11-17/100605835.html (accessed 5 October 2015). 
 
58 
See 2012 nian di 26 hao gonggao: 54 ge xian caizhengxing zijin shenji diaocha jieguo (2012 No. 26 
Announcement: The Audit Results of 54 Counties’ Financial Funds). Website of National Audit Office 
of PRC. http://www.audit.gov.cn/n1992130/n1992150/n1992500/3043614.html (accessed 5 October 
2015). 
 
59 
See Yusuanwai shouru difang zhengfu yunxing bukehuoqu (Extra-Budgetary Revenues: Indispensible 
for Local Governments Function). Website of Sina. 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/review/20070330/02413455437.shtml (accessed 5 October 2015). 
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revenues efficiently by virtue of the coal-endowed private sector. Finally, local 
governments are unlikely to provide matching funds because they intend to develop 
their own characteristic industry (teshe chanye). Indeed, it is rational and ideal for 
local governments to receive the transfer payments from upper authorities but keep 
their budgetary revenues untouched.
60
  
 
Against this background, raising matching funds from outside the budgetary revenues 
has become another prerequisite for CNSC implementation. In fact, the center has 
expected and encouraged localities to support CNSC with profits from rural industry, 
under the schemes for “using industry to promote agriculture” (yigong cunong) and 
“using urban areas to promote rural areas” (yicheng daixiang).
61
 The schemes have 
accordingly inspired local cadres to raise matching funds directly from the rural 
industry in a situation where Fugu County happened to have an ample endowment of 
coal resources that made this easy.
62
 In sum, the powerful constraint of matching 
funds has created two methods for local governments: one is to extract from budgetary 
revenues by expanding the tax base, and increasing tax revenues; the other is to raise 
funds directly from the business sector.     
 
Second, as argued in Chapter 1, the cadre evaluation system has powerfully shaped 
local cadre behavior by linking both their material gain in terms of remuneration and 
rewards, and immaterial goods in terms of their career advancement, social status, 
prestige, respect, and mianzi (lit. “face”: esteem, dignity, recognition) to performance 
                                                 
60 
See Ruguo peitao zijin meigenshang (If Matching Funds Are Not Kept Up). Website of Observation 
in Economics. http://www.eeo.com.cn/2013/0331/242044.shtml (accessed 5 October 2015). 
 
61 
For “using industry to subsidize agriculture” (yigong bunong), i.e. using TVE profits to support 
agriculture, see Study on China’s Policy Direction of TVE Industry Development (Zhongguo xiangzhen 
gongye fazhan de zhengce daoxiang yanjiu) pp. 125-127. For “using industry to promote agriculture” 
(yigong cunong), see Guowuyuan fazhan yanjiu zhongxin nongcunbu buzhang tan xinnongcun jianshe 
zijin (An Interview with Han Jun, the Director of Research Department of Development Research 
Center of the State Council Concerning CNSC Funds). Website of Chinese government. 
http://www.gov.cn/zwhd/2006-02/27/content_211797.htm (accessed 5 October 2015). 
 
62 
In the local context, self-collected funds by local governments are also put in the broader category of 
matching funds. 
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in economic as well as sociopolitical dimensions (Feng, 2013; Heberer and Trappel, 
2013; Landry, 2008; Yang, 2004; Zhou, 2008). Economic dimensions centered on the 
promotion of industrial development, while sociopolitical dimensions mandated the 
financing and provision of public goods devolved from center to local governments 
and maintaining social stability (weiwen) thus have reinforced the revenue imperative 
facing local leaders. 
 
In order to fully explain why the fiscal revenue system and cadre evolution system 
after 2006 created such an impetus for local officials to extract and raise matching 
funds for CNSC implementation from rural enterprises in this way, it is necessary to 
trace the relationship between local government and local enterprises back to the 
situation under the people’s commune system before the reforms commenced in 1978. 
The historical legacy of state policy towards enterprises played an important role in 
shaping the behavior of local officials in Fugu County. 
 
3.3 Rural Industrialization as a Source of Local Public Finance 
 
The intense debates on rural industrialization during the Maoist period had as a main 
focal point the fact that the “command economy” dominated by the state plan and the 
fiscal system provided localities with little incentive to increase revenues (Oi, 1995, 
1999; Whiting, 2001). “[L]ocalities were required to turn over all or most of their 
revenues to the upper levels, which in return provided budget allocations for 
expenditures. The use of whatever surplus that remained within the locality was 
subject to higher-level approval. Rather than initiate growth, localities had incentives 
to try to extract as much bureaucratic slack as possible from the upper levels in the 
form of larger budget allocations” (Oi,1999, p. 6). Yet, as Whiting (2001, p.40) 
observes, “[t]he legacy of rural industrial development during the Maoist period has 
had profound implications for the subsequent development of rural industry during the 
reform period.” This dissertation agrees that the commune and brigade enterprise 
(CBE) legacy had such implications, and focuses on one significant aspect of rural 
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industrial development, namely their function in local fiscal and public finance 
practices during the reforms. Faced with the imperative of self-financing in the early 
1980s, local cadres suddenly had strong incentives to promote local industrial 
development. The cadre evaluation system, officially introduced in 1979, shaped local 
officials’ behavior as they sought to maintain and reinforce their positions of power. 
They did this by securing social stability and the provision of public goods based on 
mandated financing. From the start of the reforms and well into the 1980s the central 
government encouraged China’s coal mining industry to shed its total domination by 
the state sector and mandatory state planning and to diversify in terms of ownership 
structure and responsiveness to the market (Wang, 2006). After the revenue-sharing 
system had been put in place in 1980, local officials in Fugu began to rely on the 
extracting budgetary and extra-budgetary revenues from the large local endowment of 
coal resources. In the following I shall outline how local cadres in Fugu responded to 
the incentives to generate coal-led tax revenue for local political purposes and 
eventually the policy at the center of the study-CNSC. 
 
3.3.1 Fiscal Incentives for Rural Industrialization 
 
As explained in Chapters 1 and 3, the changes in the fiscal system and the cadre 
evaluation systems reshaped, in particular at the township level, the “property rights” 
to government revenues and also created a strong incentive for township officials to 
pursue rapid rural industrialization; these were, in fact, two sides of the same issue. Oi 
(1999, p. 27) points out how the fiscal reforms in the 1980s granted county and 
township governments new rights to appropriate revenues and dispose of, manage, and 
collect incomes and surpluses from them in ways that resembled the role of owners 
rather than that of public servants.  
 
The main reason for this was that central/upper-level government no longer made 
budgetary funds available to meet local expenditures. As Oi (1999, p. 28) notes, 
“[C]hina converted a vertical (tiao) apportionment system that had allocated revenues 
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from the upper to the lower levels into a system in which localities had to rely 
primarily on horizontal flows (kuai)- that is ,on income that they generated 
themselves.” To put it differently, local governments from the 1980s were forced to 
generate financial income themselves (self-financing). The fiscal reforms of the 1980s 
also granted local governments control over (local) surpluses, in particular enterprise 
profits. This reassignment of property rights provided local authorities with a positive 
inducement to promote rapid economic growth in order to generate additional 
revenues. 
 
The revenue-sharing system, also referred to as the “fiscal contract system” (caizheng 
baogan) and metaphorically referred to as “eating at separate stoves” (fenzao chifan), 
required local governments down to the level of the township to collect all national 
taxes and then turn over a portion of this revenue to the next higher level (Oi, 1999; 
Whiting, 2001; Wong, 19991). In general, the more a locality collected, the more it 
could retain. The portion of revenue sharing was formalized in fiscal contracts 
between the administrative hierarchies from central to townships in accordance with 
local revenue situations. The terms of the contracts varied. For instance, Yulin 
Prefecture, as the next higher level of Fugu County, together with another five poor 
prefectures, retained their fixed revenues and industrial-commercial taxes, and if the 
income was less than expenditure, Shaanxi Province provided fixed subsidies to 
compensate for the shortfalls.
63
 
 
Historically, Fugu County had enjoyed a “meal ticket” financial status for a rather long 
period due to its geographical location and poor agricultural harvest. The financial 
                                                 
63 
See Shaanxisheng renmin zhengfu guanyu shixing huafen shouzhi, fenji baogan caizheng guanli tizhi 
de tongzhi (Circular Regarding “Divide Revenue and Expenditure, Contract by Different Administrative 
Levels” Issued by Shaanxi Provincial People’s Government). Website of Legislative Affairs Office of 
the State Council, PRC. http://fgk.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/dfgz/198004/19800400290457.shtml# 
(accessed 5 October 2015). Based on the financial income and expenditure plan of 1979, the locality 
prescribed a ratio to determine how much of a locality's income and other revenues was to be retained 
in 1980. Oi (1999, p. 31) further explains, “[w]hen the local set revenue and the central-local shared 
revenue together are not sufficient to cover expenses, the center will give a fixed subsidy to the locality. 
Once this is established, it will not change for five years.” 
 
86 
 
income generated by Fugu County barely sufficed to cover essential expenditures (i.e. 
administration, education and health care), not to mention the investment in economic 
growth. Instead, it relied heavily on fixed subsidies from upper levels, which 
accounted for 69% of the total budgetary revenues between 1978 and 1989 (Table 3.1). 
As a listed poor county, it had since 1949 received large subsidies from upper levels. 
Specifically, it received a fixed subsidy of RMB 3.44 million per year spanning the 
years 1980-85.
64
  
 
The 1985 fiscal contracts turned Shaanxi Province into a net subsidized locale because 
it had to remit 70% of product tax, value-added tax and business income tax extracted 
from central-government-owned enterprises to the center. As a result, Shaanxi 
Province received more than RMB 0.27 billion per year as fixed subsidy from the 
center and Fugu County received RMB 4.378 million per year from upper level 
spanning the years 1985-1990.
65
 Oi (1999) relates that, in 1991, fourteen out of thirty-
five listed provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities, received fiscal transfers 
from the center. Thus the question of whether the localities that receive subsidies have 
an incentive to develop arises. Oi’s (1999, p. 31) study indicates that “[w]hile local 
budget constraints are softened by the existence of subsidies, the pressure to increase 
revenue remains strong.” Table 3.1 underpins this argument. Although statistics show 
that the subsidies accounted for 69% of the total budgetary revenues from 1978 to 
1989, Fugu County pursued economic growth and increased income in particular 
when the “tax for profit” (ligaishui) reform was instituted in the mid-1980s to provide 
the state with revenue and to create an incentive for SOEs to become more efficient 
and profitable. In 1984, the SOEs in Fugu earned RMB 1.23 million in profits and 
contributed with RMB 0.81 million to the income tax, which accounts for 66% of 
profits. Table 3.1 also illustrates that local government relied primarily on the 
                                                 
64 
See Fugu xianzhi, p. 441. 
 
65 
For Shaanxi Province’s fixed subsidies, see Shaanxi Shengzhi, p.757-758. For Fugu County’s 
subsidies, see Fugu xianzhi, p. 441. 
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industrial-commercial tax, which accounts for 82% of the sub-total revenue generated 
in the locality and 26% of total revenue spanning the years 1978-89. In addition to the 
fixed subsidies, Fugu County, as one of the underdeveloped areas, was qualified to 
receive earmarked funds in order to facilitate the economic growth and lift the area out 
of poverty. Between 1978 and 1989, Fugu County received RMB 17.36 million as 
development funds and local officials invested 18.1% of the funds in industry, 2.4% of 
the funds in TVEs.
66
 
 
Table 3.1: Total Budgetary Revenues in Fugu County (RMB Million) (1978-89) 
 
Year  Enterprise 
Income Tax 
Industrial & 
Commercial 
Tax 
Agricultural 
Tax 
 
 
Other 
Income 
 Sub- 
Total 
 
 
Fiscal Transfers & 
Subsidies 
 
1978  -1.155 1.148 0.131  0.058  0.182  9.221 
1979  -0.212 1.183 0.138  0.002  1.111  5.140 
1980  0.068 1.100 0.012  0.011  1.191  5.892 
1981  -0.04 1.026 0.040  0.043  1.069  6.933 
1982  0.151 1.132 0.109  0.078  1.470  5.941 
1983  0.748 1.274 0.229  0.026  2.277  6.393 
1984  0.199 1.471 0.219  0.095  1.984  8.086 
1985  -0.937 3.119 0.206  0.071  2.459  7.929 
1986  0.320 3.368 0.318  0.134  4.140  8.387 
1987  0.569 4.817 0.305  0.168  5.859  8.916 
1988  0.511 6.676 0.391  0.242  7.820  9.481 
1989  3.435 8.002 0.470  0.250  12.157  9.762 
Total  3.657 34.316 2.568  1.178  41.719  92.081 
Note: In order to compare the subsidy with financial income, I have left out the balance of previous 
years that accounts for only a tiny percentage of the total annual budgetary revenues.  
Source: Adapted from Fugu xianzhi, p.446. 
 
However, as argued earlier, the subsidies are usually insufficient ways of paying 
expenses, especially in poor areas, where the subsidies are difficult to cover all 
essential expenditures. As shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, over a 12-year period, the 
subsidies received by Fugu government were always less than the budgetary 
expenditures, other than in 1978. The shortfalls had to be compensated by local 
governments themselves. In this sense, the pressure of self-financing system imposed 
                                                 
66 
See Fugu xianzhi, p. 449. 
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on local officials creates powerful incentives to increase revenues in order to 
maximize the surplus. 
 
Table 3.2: Total Budgetary Expenditures in Fugu County (RMB Million) (1978-
89) 
 
 
Year  Econ. Development 
Investment 
 
 
Educ. & 
Health Care 
 
 
Admin. 
Expend. 
 Other 
Expend. 
 Remittance  Total 
Expend. 
1978  5.497  1.807  0.944  0.112  0.493  8.853 
1979  3.103  2.310  1.160  0.334  -  6.907 
1980  2.162  2.227  1.253  1.451  0.005  7.098 
1981  1.467  2.744  1.065  2.125  0.425  7.826 
1982  1.653  2.645  1.391  1.486  0.014  7.189 
1983  1.776  2.871  1.625  1.473  0.469  8.214 
1984  1.930  3.125  2.136  2.496  0.502  10.189 
1985  2.558  3.141  2.161  2.811  0.159  10.830 
1986  2.188  4.332  2.705  3.173  0.193  12.591 
1987  3.675  4.835  3.260  2.017  0.204  13.991 
1988  4.726  5.494  3.129  3.972  0.239  17.560 
1989  5.808  7.843  4.216  3.894  0.054  21.815 
Total  36.543  43.374  25.045  25.344  2.757  133.063 
Source: Adapted from Fugu xianzhi, p.447. 
 
Officials at county level generate extra-budgetary revenues primarily from local taxes 
that are allowed by the center as belonging exclusively to the localities. Table 3.3 
shows the categories of local taxes. In addition to the local taxes, county government 
swells its coffers with contributionary funds from the following sources: 
1.income belonging to local finance and tax bureaus 
2.income of functional and administrative departments not counted in budgetary funds 
3.various funds from outside of the budgetary and extra-budgetary channels held by 
publicly owned enterprises and their leading organs
67
 
4.profits transferred from locally and collectively owned enterprises 
5.profit retention and management fees 
 
Table 3.3: Major Budgetary Taxes and Extra-Budgetary Revenues, Pre-1994 
                                                 
67 
Publicly-owned enterprises refer to state-owned and collectively owned enterprises, in contrast to 
privately-owned enterprises and foreign and joint venture enterprises. 
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Budgetary Taxes Extra-Budgetary Revenues  Contributionary Revenues 
Income Tax 
Industrial-Commercial & 
Circulation Taxes 
-Product Tax 
-Value-Added Tax 
-Turnover & Business Tax 
 
Local Taxes 
-Agriculture & Animal Husbandry Tax 
-Special Agricultural & Forestry Products Tax 
-Property Tax 
-Land-Use Tax 
-Animal Sales Tax 
-Animal Slaughter Tax 
-Collective & Individual Enterprise Sales Tax 
-Collective & Private Enterprise Income Tax 
-Stamp Tax 
-Urban Maintenance & Construction Tax 
-Other 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-tax Levies & Revenues 
-Contracted Profits 
-Management Fee 
-Ad Hoc Charges 
-Loans & Voluntary Contributions 
-Enterprise Retained Profits 
Source: Adapted from Oi (1999), p.39. I put the non-tax levies and revenues under the category of 
contributionary revenues. 
 
Among them, the state-owned profit retention and contracted profits from enterprises 
grew enormously nationwide. As Oi (1999, p. 43) notes, “[n]ationwide, retained 
enterprise funds increased almost nineteenfold from 1978 to 1987.” In Fugu County, 
government agencies owned and oversaw the enterprises. For example, in 1989, the 
Economic Commission (jingji weiyuanhui) managed 10 enterprises in sectors ranging 
from coal mining to carpets, while the Light Industry Bureau (qing gongyeju) 
managed 13 enterprises. Due to the profit retention and tax-for-profit reform, these 
local state-owned enterprises increased the financial income of the county agencies. 
Other large contributionary funds consisted of management fees and profits of 
companies set up by county agencies. As a rule, TVEs were required to pay 
management fees to the Rural Enterprise Management Office (xiangzhen qiye guanli 
bangongshi) established in the townships, the management fee was shared with the 
Rural Enterprise Management Bureau (xiangzhen qiye guanliju). Moreover, the 
companies set up by the county agencies were required to turn over after-tax profits to 
the agencies as well (Oi, 1999, p. 46). 
 
At the township level, the main non-tax revenues stemmed from a share of gross 
income of all township-owned TVEs. As Christiansen and Zhang (1998, p. 6-7) note, 
“[e]nterprises owned by the towns and townships, however, were not normally 
privatized or made totally autonomous from the townships but were subordinated to 
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them in various contractual relationships. […] These enterprises were obliged to pay a 
share of their profit to their owner (the town, township or administrative village) and 
taxes to the government.” Oi (1999, p. 46) further explains how the non-tax payments 
were made within a township government and its agency respectively. The township 
government received a fixed percentage of the profit of all township-owned 
enterprises before any taxes were extracted. Some townships exceeded the rate of 10 
percent stipulated by the center. The township economic commission first levied a 
management fee on total sales, and the fee varied from region to region. Second, it 
collected a contract fee (“lease,” chengbao fei) from all township-owned enterprises. 
The contract fee paid by the contractor (i.e. factory manager) varied and made 
differently in contacts. “Similar arrangements were made for the enterprises owned by 
the administrative villages” (Christiansen and Zhang 1998, p. 6). Other sources of 
surplus transfers included “three extractions and five fees” (san ti wu tong).68 
However, the primary source of township contributionary revenues was collectively 
owned TVEs that paid various non-tax fees and ad hoc surcharges. For instance, 
township governments collected various fees from collectively owned TVEs under the 
rubric of “raising capital” (jizi), “voluntary contributions” (juankuan) and 
“unsanctioned levies” (tanpai) in order to provide public goods and services, and 
finance particular projects. The amount of fees and surcharges extracted from the 
collectively TVEs varied substantially by locality and from year to year. 
 
In sum, the 1980s fiscal reforms enhanced the localities’ fiscal autonomy and granted 
the localities a right to the economic residual that created a powerful incentive for 
local officials to generate local residuals in order to grow extra-budgetary and 
contributionary funds. However, from the perspective of the central state, its share of 
total revenues diminished. As Whiting (2001, p. 279) points out, the “[b]udgetary 
revenue as a share of GDP declined steadily from the late 1970s through the mid-1990, 
                                                 
68 
Three extractions and five fees were all collected from farmers and managed by township 
governments, including public reserve funds, public welfare funds, management fees, education 
surcharges, family planning fees, etc. They were abolished during the tax-and-fee reforms in the early 
2000s. 
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while the center’s share of budgetary revenue declined over much of the same period. 
[…] Indeed, budgetary revenue as a share of GDP fell from 34 percent in 1978 to 12.7 
percent in 1994, while officially reported extra-budgetary revenue as a share of GDP 
climbed from 2.6 percent to 4 percent in 1994.” To resolve the fiscal dilemma, the 
center introduced a tax division system to control extra-budgetary and contributionary 
funds by taking more in taxes from the localities in 1994 (see Appendix I). It 
reclassified categories of income and rearranged more revenue for revenue sharing 
and made a claim on profits retained by enterprises that was a key portion of 
contributionary revenues. Nevertheless, the 1994 fiscal reforms did not change the 
fiscal landscape dramatically, since many features of fiscal contracting remained, and 
at the local levels, the old contracts with the townships still continued to function (Oi, 
1999, p.54). Without doubt, the 1994 tax division system resulted in a substantial 
increase in the amount that the localities had to pay to the center. More importantly, 
the 1994 reform, like its predecessors, granted the localities exclusive rights to extract 
a clearly defined surplus (profit). Appendix I shows that the sales tax, local enterprise 
income tax, profit turnover from local enterprises, personal income tax (geren suode 
shui), real estate tax (fangchan shui), animal slaughter tax, along with nontax revenues 
still belonged to the localities. From the perspective of local authorities, the 1994 
system has had a significant impact on local finances. Oi (1999, p. 55) points out that, 
“[t]he obligation of localities to pay substantially more revenues to the center has 
caused massive problems for some of them, as they now face difficulties in paying for 
basic expenditures, including basic wages. But some localities are taking 
countermeasure to ensure that local revenues increase.” The new fiscal constraints, 
accordingly, created a strong incentive for local officials to reconsider the 
development strategy in order to ensure the economic growth in accordance with local 
conditions. 
 
3.3.2 The Cadre Evaluation System 
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The cadre evaluation system
69
 has a powerful influence on local cadre behavior 
because it has created strong constraints on and incentives for local cadres. On the one 
hand, local cadres seek to maintain and expand their positions of power in terms of 
career advancement and political legitimacy. On the other hand, the system has linked 
local cadre performance to material goods in terms of remuneration (bonuses) and 
rewards. The first cadre evaluation document was formulated in 1979 by the 
Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee calling for the establishment 
of a new system of cadre evaluation. According to the initial document, the new 
evaluation system should cover political and policy thought (zhengzhi sixiang 
shuiping), organizational and leadership competence (zuzhi lingdao nengli), 
familiarity with substantive issues (shuxi yewu de chengdu), implementation of 
democratic centralism (zhixing minzhu jizhongzhi), and actual achievements (gongzuo 
de shiji chengxiao). Furthermore, the evaluation system linked both material rewards 
(i.e. bonuses) and immaterial rewards in terms of promotions. In turn, penalties were 
to be included in the system as well, for example, demotion or transfer (Whiting 2001, 
p. 101). In 1988, an official guideline for the annual evaluation of Party secretaries, 
mayors and other leading officials at county level was issued by the CCP Organization 
Department.70 Table 3.4 illustrates that the evaluation criteria covered a range of 
indicators of local economy, rural industry, commerce, agriculture, family planning, 
education, infrastructure and forestry. Among the standardized and systematized 
evaluation indicators, local economy, industry and agriculture are apparently in critical 
positions, in particular the fiscal income and gross output value. These indicators 
reflect the critical importance of local economic performance contributing to the 
                                                 
69 
China’s cadre evaluation systems are divided into three categories. The first is carried out by the 
Organization Department to assess the cadres’ behavior based on five dimensions: moral quality (de), 
capability/skills (neng), work attitude/diligence (qin), achievements/efficiency (ji) and integrity (lian); 
the second builds on target responsibility system to assess the administrative units within the vertical 
hierarchy; the third also builds on the comprehensive target responsibility system but to assess the 
performance of the “Core Group” (lingdao banzi) and is mostly used for cadres at county and township 
levels. See Tao et al. (2009). 
 
70 
The cadres subjected to evaluation include Party secretaries, mayors and the members of the County 
Party Standing Committees (xian dangwei changwu weiyuanhui) that compose the “Core Group”. 
Chapter 5 will further examine the group in Fugu County. 
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county leaders' career prospects and material rewards. 
 
Table 3.4: National Guidelines for Performance Criteria of Local Party and 
Government Leaders (1988) 
 
Category 
Local Economy 
- Gross National Product (GNP) 
-National income per capita 
-Rural income per capita 
-Local budgetary income 
-Local budgetary expenditures 
- Fiscal income      
-Taxes and profits remitted 
Industry 
-Gross value of industrial output (not including any output below the village level) 
-Gross value of output of township-and village-run enterprises 
-Labor productivity of state and collective enterprises 
Agriculture 
-Gross value of agricultural output (not including any output below the village level) 
-Procurement of agricultural and subsidiary products     
-Grain output    
Commerce 
-Retail sales 
Family planning 
-Natural population growth rate 
Infrastructure 
-Infrastructure investment realized 
Education 
-Nine-year compulsory education completion rate 
Forestry 
-Forested area 
Source: Adapted from Whiting (2001), p.103. 
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As a rule, at the township level the criteria of cadre evaluation system were set by 
county offices of management and administration (xian jingying guanli bangongshi). 
The system took the form of key indicators and aimed to make party and government 
leaders responsible for the performance of the township in economic and 
sociopolitical norms (Whiting 2001, p. 103). Economic norms focused on industrial 
growth, while sociopolitical norms mandated the social order and provision of public 
goods. The indicators, on the one hand, reflected the priorities of county leaders and 
thus were a means of conveying the priorities to township cadres. On the other hand, 
they also helped county leaders to compare and identify the most competent township 
cadres for promotion and transfer within their county. My field observations validate 
Whiting’s (2001) findings that township cadres face intense competition; promotions, 
demotions and transfers across townships within the county are very common for 
township leaders who are normally not tied to their township of origin. By contrast, 
village leaders usually served in their home villages. 
 
County and township officials were all state cadres who received a basic salary from 
the state payroll. Their bonuses were contingent upon the completion of specific tasks 
and targets set by their upper level authorities and accounted for a large share of their 
incomes. The townships and their enterprises were measured each year primarily by 
the targets of rural industry in the form of output value, profits or sales and the 
provision of public goods additionally. Local cadres were rewarded with bonuses in 
accordance with the fulfilled or over-fulfilled targets. As Oi (1999, p. 49) demonstrates, 
“[i]f a branch of the Agricultural Bank, for example, went over its quota for growth of 
savings deposits, it was recognized at the prefectural level and its officials rewarded 
with a bonus. The size of the bonuses varied.” The overall performance evaluation was 
recorded in cadres’ personnel files and therefore could affect their career advancement 
(Whiting 2001, p. 104). 
 
Similar arrangements were set in the administrative villages. However, the village 
leaders and collective enterprise managers were usually not state cadres and thus did 
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not receive any salary from the state payroll. Their performance was primarily 
measured by the gross value of industrial output and industrial profits, which 
determined their entire incomes. In particular, the contract for collective enterprise 
managers contained many specific targets, of which the most prominent were 
industrial output value and profit indicators. As Whiting (2001, p. 107) claims, “[b]y 
directly linking income and industrial performance, the cadre evaluation system 
created a very direct incentive for local cadres to take a personal interest in economic 
management.” In sum, the incentive structure contained in the cadre evaluation and 
fiscal systems impelled local cadres to promote rural industry in order to increase 
revenue and concurrently finance the social welfare programs and public goods 
devolved by the central state. 
 
In 2006, the cadre evaluation system with its emphasis on actual achievement 
expanded to the social and political sphere. From then on, the GDP was not the only 
indicator with which to assess local officials' performance, and social development, 
public order and environmental protection became important criteria in the evaluation 
system as well.
71
 In particular, nationwide maintenance of social stability became one 
of the most important factors of new strategic goal of building a “harmonious Socialist 
society” (shehuizhuyi hexie shehui). That being said, pursuing high economic growth 
to maintain social stability became the best choice to solve the current problems, 
because robust economic growth improves living standards and creates new 
opportunities to promote general optimism and acceptance of the current system 
(Lieberthal, 2003). In my field research, quite a number of grassroots cadres 
complained that maintaining the stability contained in the cadre evaluation system 
imposed tremendous pressure on them, and could entail massive negative impacts on 
their career prospects. Thus, local cadres had to balance concerns about public order, 
                                                 
71 
See Zhongzubu yinfa shishi difang lingdao banzi he ganbu kaohe shixing banfa (Trial Measures for 
Evaluating Local Core Group and Leading Cadres Issued by the Organization Department of the 
Central Committee). Website of People. http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1027/4567774.html (accessed 
5 October 2015). 
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social welfare, environmental protection and economic efficiency.
72
 In this sense, the 
concern about social and political targets could be seen as creating even greater 
demand for revenue in localities in order to finance social welfare programs, central 
policy implementation and comfort disadvantaged groups through redistribution 
mechanisms. 
 
The “one item veto” rule (yipiao foujue) plays a crucial role in the cadre evaluation 
process. It formulates periodical “hard” targets that must be successfully accomplished 
by any means and imposes strong constraints on local officials’ overall achievements. 
As Heberer and Trappel (2013, p. 6) note, “[i]f one of the targets is not accomplished, 
all other achievements of the local leadership will be void, hence, a county or 
township leadership could not be classified as ‘advanced’, and promotion of the 
county and township party secretary or mayor is almost impossible.” The hard targets 
may vary across regions, but some common targets are established and applied 
nationwide, for example, improving the Party’s work style and building a clean and 
honest government (dangfeng lianzheng jianshe), birth control (jihua shengyu), 
maintaining social stability as assigned by the center. In these regards, Fugu County’s 
cadres were confronted with four hard targets, including improving the party’s work 
style and building a clean and honest government, birth control, maintaining social 
stability in terms of social order (shehui zhi'an), dealing with complaints from the 
public (xinfang gongzuo), and production safety (anquan shengchan). Among them, 
preserving social stability is explicitly placed at the top of the county and town 
governments’ political agenda. In particular, the leadership responsibility system 
(lingdao zerenzhi), associated with target responsibility system (mubiao guanli 
zerenzhi), reinforces the responsibility pledges (zeren shu) of maintaining social 
stability work signed between a county and its subordinating agencies. The evaluation 
                                                 
72 
For example, on the one hand, local cadres are faced with growing pressures of complaints from the 
public induced by land use (i.e. acquisition) and resettlement compensation. On the other hand, they are 
faced with the rising protests against the construction of chemical plants. These social complaints and 
unrest not only affect local cadres’ performance evaluation but also impede local economic 
development in a preferable environment. 
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of maintaining social stability is conducted every half year and the overall evaluation 
takes place at the end of each year. The compliance with preserving social stability is 
strictly checked according to the “one item veto” rule. Thus, it has a direct impact on 
the outcome of evaluations with regard to career advancement and bonuses, or 
punishment.
73
 
 
3.4 Summary 
 
In summary, the powerful fiscal constraints, associated with maintaining social 
stability have created enormous incentives for local officials to generate revenues. 
These are intended to finance rural development projects designed by the center or 
provincial authorities, social welfare programs devolved from the center, and 
compensate the disadvantaged populace through redistribution mechanisms so as to 
maintain a peaceful social order in the case of Fugu.
                                                 
73 
See Changzhi caineng jiuan:fugu heyi kuaru zhongguo baiqiangxian xilie baogao zhiba (Assuring A 
Long Period of Stability: Serial Report Eight on How Fugu County Steps into “China’s top 100 
counties”). Website of Fugu County Government. http://www.fg.gov.cn/Item/3788.aspx (accessed 5 
October 2015). 
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Chapter 4. Strategies of Growth: The Rise of Local State 
Entrepreneurial-Developmentalism 
 
4.1 Preamble 
 
This chapter first reviews the institutional background of rural private sector growth after 
the reform period, and the evolution of rural private industrialization in particular, the 
coal sector in Fugu County and the contribution of coal-endowed industry to the county’s 
revenues in the institutional context. Then it examines how local officials in Fugu County 
use entrepreneurial-developmentalist mechanisms to protect and foster the county-wide 
economy. They have adopted both administrative and economic controls: granting 
licenses, ownership and capital control, designating commissioners, as well as 
inducements: providing credit and financial consulting, market and technical assistance, 
tax breaks and support funds and mediation. The last section examines the consequences 
of local state entrepreneurial-developmentalism: the state-business symbiosis and the 
shift of principal and agent roles. 
 
4.2 Strategies of Development: Evolution in Rural Industry 
 
In response to the incentives embedded in the fiscal reforms and cadre evaluation systems, 
local cadres crafted management strategies in accordance with local conditions. This led 
to substantially different development outcomes from one locality to another. As Oi 
(1999, p. 58) argued, “[o]nly a portion of the countryside has successfully developed 
rural industry. Some areas have been left out of the overall trend of industrial growth and 
the prosperity that has come with it.” Geographic location and natural endowment are 
among the main reasons for effective rural industrialization. Fugu County owns an 
enormous coal deposits. Since the 1990s, Fugu has therefore produced lucrative coal-
endowed revenues, a trend which began to sky-rocket in the 2000s. Moreover, the 
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evolution of privatization of rural enterprises in Fugu greatly reinforced the generation of 
government revenue. 
 
4.2.1 The Rise of Rural Private Sector in China 
 
The revitalization of private businesses has been one of the most controversial reforms 
introduced in the post-Mao era. Private enterprises and their entrepreneurs were strictly 
prohibited during the past two decades prior to the reforms because it was difficult for the 
CCP to tolerate the existence of private enterprises in a socialist economy. However, the 
private sector arose among the individual small businesses that were permitted in tandem 
with the inception of the household responsibility system (jiating lianchan chengbao 
zerenzhi) after 1978. Without question, the private sector proved an enormous success in 
China’s development, in particular in the Chinese countryside, and became one of the 
most dynamic forces in Chinese economic growth. Yet the private economy was officially 
regarded as a “supplement” to the publicly owned economy and subjected to 
discriminatory policies and regulations, even after it gained legal recognition in 1988. In 
summary, the policy formation of the private sector has been involved in very 
sophisticated reforms: “the private business was first allowed discretely, at the local level, 
and worked into official policy only after it had proved itself and become a fait accompli” 
(Young and Yang 1994, p. 24). 
 
The great success of the rural private enterprises may be attributed to free market forces, 
the entrepreneurial spirit of individual farmers and business people. Local governments 
and their cadres, as “local state corporations,” however, also played a crucial role in 
initiating and facilitating rural enterprises, “using their organizational strength and 
superior access to resources and markets to become a dominant factor in rural industrial 
growth and allocation of investments and profits” (Oi 1998, p.ⅹ). It is therefore 
important to understand how centrally formulated institutional arrangements reshaped the 
local cadres’ behaviors in the course of rural privatization. 
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The following section reviews the institutional background of rural private sector growth 
after the reform period, and then examines the evolution of rural private industrialization, 
in particular the coal sector in Fugu County, and the contribution of the coal-endowed 
industry to the county’s revenues in the institutional context. The focus now will be on 
how local officials in Fugu County use entrepreneurial-developmentalist mechanisms to 
foster the county-wide economy. 
 
4.2.1.1 Evolution in the Rural Private Sector 
 
According to official Chinese definitions, the private sector encompasses “individual 
enterprises” (getihu or geti qiye)74, i.e. non-agricultural businesses with fewer than seven 
employees, run by individuals or households, and “private enterprises” (siying qiye) that 
employ eight or more workers, owned by individuals, partnerships, or up to 30 
shareholders (Young and Yang, 1994, p. 25). One of the primary drivers for the rapid 
development of individual enterprises was credited to the national inception of the 
household responsibility system (jiating lianchan chengbao zerenzhi)75 at the end of 
1970s, which became the first step in Chinese economic reform and replaced the 
production teams which had been contained in the commune and brigade systems of pre-
reform China (Young and Yang, 1994). The household responsibility system, on the one 
hand, led to substantial agricultural production growth. On the other hand, it created labor 
surplus as the labor hours needed for agriculture were shortened. Therefore, agricultural 
laborers were encouraged to leave farming and diversify their economic activities by 
                                                 
74 
The registration of individual enterprises was first permitted in the policy paper of “The Report on the 
National Meeting of Directors of The State Bureau of Industry and Commerce” dated March, 1978. 
According to Young and Yang (1994, p. 25), “The State Bureau of Industry and Commerce” (guojia 
gongshang xingzheng guanliju), the State Council bureau responsible for the registration and administration 
of private businesses, began to list statistics for rural individual enterprises from 1981, and by 1981 
Provisional Regulations on Non-Agricultural Individual Businesses were also to apply, ‘in principle,’ to 
rural businesses.” 
 
75 
The household responsibility system and its impacts have been extensively examined by scholars, for 
example, Christiansen and Rai (1996), Jacobs (2009). 
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entering more lucrative industries and selling their surplus output in the market on more 
liberal conditions than before. Thus the small-scale production activities that had taken 
place in the household sideline production (jiating fuye shengchan) underwent 
“exponential growth” (Christiansen and Rai 1996, p. 221). For example, the number of 
individual enterprises increased from 560,000 in 1980 to 961,000 in 1981, 1,504,000 in 
1982, 4,195,000 in 1987, and 9,201,000 in 1988 (Lu 2003, p. 10).
76
 
  
According to one policy paper, the small business category included a wide range of 
economic activities, including agriculture, industry, commerce, service and transport.
77
 
Another reason for the fast growth of individual businesses was in consideration of the 
employment of a large number of rural youths after returning to the cities. Some received 
further education, some became state employees, and others became private 
entrepreneurs (Christiansen and Rai 1996, p. 232). Yet the capacity of the officially 
categorized rural household sideline to absorb the surplus rural labor force was ultimately 
limited (Cai and Wang 2012, p. 220). 
 
While small private businesses initially developed quietly and inconspicuously in rural 
China, the number of employees working in the larger private enterprises run by 
individuals or households (some cases, e.g. involving a fish pond contractor or the owner 
of a sunflower seed factory, gained some notoriety)
78
 became a controversial topic in 
public discourse and finally entered the central policy agenda: whether enterprises 
employing eight or more workers were to be allowed. Historically, larger private 
enterprises employing eight or more workers were believed to engage in the exploitation 
                                                 
76 
According to the statistics of the State Bureau of Industry and Commerce, the private enterprises were 
listed independent of the individual enterprises until 1988, thus the statistics showed above included the 
total of both sectors. (Large-scale private enterprises were during that period listed in statistics as 
“collective enterprises,” see discussion of this on Young and Yang, 1994, p. 25) 
 
77 
The main decision to carry out the reforms was made at the 3
rd
 Plenary Session of the 11
th
 Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China, in December 1978. 
 
78 
For a discussion of the private economy, see Lu (2003, p.8) and Rosen (1987). 
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of labor.
79
 In 1983, the Central Committee’s so-called Document One introduced the 
rural reforms that not only endorsed the “individual enterprises,” but also endorsed, in a 
paragraph that was not made available to the general public and only enforced “secretly” 
by cadres in charge of this policy, enterprises consisting of more than eight workers, i.e. 
private enterprises.
80
 Only in 1988 were these larger private enterprises officially 
recognized and given legal status.
81
 
 
4.2.1.2 The Emergence of TVEs and Rural Private Industrialization (1979-1983) 
 
In fact, the privatization of rural production that began in the period 1979-1983 saw many 
small private businesses emerge, run by the most successful local farmers - a new 
entrepreneurial class in rural China (Christiansen and Rai 1996). As a result of the 
unpublished endorsement in 1983, the vast majority of these private enterprises were not 
officially registered as such, but contained or hidden in the category “township and 
village enterprises” (TVEs),
82
 which had evolved from the “commune and brigade 
                                                 
79 
According to Whiting (2001, p. 36), “[t]he distinction between the individual household firms and 
private enterprises is based on the notion that owners of individual household firms are themselves directly 
involved in labor, while owners of larger private firms that employ eight or more workers, are engaged in 
the exploitation of labor. The cutoff of eight employees is derived from Marx.” 
 
80 
See Christiansen (1989) and Christiansen and Rai (1996). 
 
81 
The legal status is recognized in the Amendments to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China 
passed at the First Session of the Seventh National People's Congress on April 12, 1988. See Zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo xianfa xiuzhengan (The Amendment to the Constitution of the People's Republic of 
China). Website of Chinaonline. http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/SFKSZN-c/80704.htm (accessed 5 
October 2015). 
 
82 
According to Christiansen and Zhang (1998), township and village enterprises (TVEs) are an umbrella 
term that refer to any non-agricultural enterprises located in rural areas. They include both enterprises 
owned collectively by the townships, the towns or the administrative villages and those owned privately by 
farmers, by partnerships and by shareholders. Also see the definition provided by the Ministry of 
Agriculture (1985). 
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enterprises” (shedui qiye) and “sidelines” (fuye) of the People’s Commune system.
83
 The 
unexpected upsurge of TVEs was, in other words, a key trigger in the process of 
institutional change in the past three decades.84 
 
In addition to the inception of the household responsibility system which freed large 
quantities of labor from agriculture, another important aspect concerning TVE origins 
was the restrictive rural labor policy of “encouraging farmers to leave their farmland but 
not their hometown” (litu bulixiang), and “enter the factory without going to the city” 
(jinchang bujincheng), which the central authorities and experts issued in order to resolve 
the rural labor surplus problem (Li 2012, p. 220; Cai and Wang 2012, p. 219). For this 
reason, the then existing commune-and-brigade-run enterprises (shedui qiye)
85
 were 
revitalized to absorb the surplus rural labor force. These precursors of TVEs were 
considered to be rural collective enterprises owned by production brigades or people's 
communes, and were required to increase rural employment opportunities and transfer 
their profits to the communes and brigades, respectively. Initially, an important feature of 
the TVEs was to provide local non-agricultural incomes for farming families. 
 
In 1983, following the central policy, most rural enterprises became independent of the 
                                                 
83 
The literature on TVEs has been extensively studied by economists and political scientists. For example, 
some economists argue that TVEs accelerated the speed of China's rural industrialization (Park 2001), 
fostered rural entrepreneurship (Huang 2010; Xu 2009, 2011); while others stress that TVEs contributed to 
China’s overall economic performance by forcing the SOEs to join the market competition (Naughton 
1995), pushing structural change in terms of labor shifting from the agricultural to the non-agricultural 
sector (Park 2001), playing a “catalytic role” in economic transformation (Naughton 2007, p. 271). 
 
84 
Deng Xiaoping noted that for the Chinese leaders the rapid growth of TVEs came as an unexpected 
surprise in the rural economic reform, see Deng (1987b). Whiting (2010) and Oi (1999) argue that the 
problems produced by the pre-1994 system, associated with TVEs became an impetus for the 1994 reforms. 
 
85 
Towns and townships replaced the people’s communes and became the lowest-level jurisdiction of the 
Chinese state in October, 1983. See Sange zhongyao wenjian yu xinshiqi zhongguo xiangcun zhengzhi de 
biange (Three Important Documents and Political Transformation in China’s Countryside during the New 
Era). Website of Peopleonline. http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/68742/69115/69120/4684361.html (accessed 5 
October 2015). Following the reform of commune system, the term of TVEs officially replaced the 
commune-and-brigade-run enterprises in a central policy document dated March 1984. See Document No. 
4, 1984. 
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collective structures. Christiansen and Rai (1996, p. 230) noted that, “[s]ome were based 
on contracts with the director, who leased the enterprise, paying a fixed lease to the 
collective; others were based on appointment of directors, who had to transfer part of the 
profit to the collective; others were based on joint management between a number of 
persons; and yet other [mainly small] units were auctioned off or sold directly.” Under 
these circumstances, a broad range of TVE ownership forms emerged, encompassing 
individual, joint household (lianhu), shareholding cooperative (gufen hezuo), private, 
village-owned collective, township-owned collective, neighborhood-committee-run, and 
town-owned collective enterprises. The TVEs were registered at county level and 
managed by the industrial and commercial administrations established by township and 
town governments. 
 
The range of forms of ownership falls mainly within the broad categories of collective 
and private. In the collective category are township-run, and village-run enterprises; 
domestic state-collective joint ventures (jiti lianying qiye); the government-run variant of 
shareholding cooperatives (jiti gufen hezuo qiye); and individually contracted collectives 
(geren chengbao jiti qiye), the assets of which originated in collective investment. In the 
private category are individual household firms, private enterprises, joint household 
enterprises (lianhu qiye), and the private variant of shareholding cooperatives (siren 
gufen hezuo qiye). Individually contracted “fake collectives” (jia jiti) were based on 
investment by private individuals, but falsely registered as “collectively-owned.” 
 
In theory, the ownership of collective enterprises was directly retained by and subordinate 
to the towns and townships. In any case, these enterprises were not controlled by the state 
plan,
86
 but constrained by policies and rules completely different from those regulating 
the state sector and urban collective enterprises (Christiansen and Rai 1996). However, 
the many diverse enterprises and new, vaguely defined ownership forms of TVEs initially 
caused problems. The primary problem was the fact that many enterprises were privately-
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In particular, they were not subject to output quotas; in reality, the state plan authorities had since the 
early 1970s set aside quotas for supplying raw materials and other production factors for TVEs. 
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owned but officially registered as collectively-owned, often referred to as “red cap” 
enterprises (hongmaozi qiye) (Christiansen and Rai 1996; Sachs et al. 2002; Woo 1996). 
The registration of these “fake collective” (jia jiti) enterprises (and the associated practice 
of “doing business under pretense” (guahu jingying), for example by borrowing official 
stamps and collective company registration papers to conduct private business) has been 
interpreted by some as an effort to disguise their true private ownership in order to benefit 
from “lower tax rates, easier approval procedures, less restrictions on the size and 
operations of the enterprises, and shelter against possible reversal in the political fortunes 
of the reformers. And it is commonly believed that the number of red-capped private 
enterprises is greater than the number of registered private enterprises” (Woo 1996, 
p. 315). The collective enterprises were indeed granted very attractive preferential 
policies from the state authorities, including initial 3-year tax holidays, access to bank 
loans, and other measures, yet it is important to point out that the registration of rural 
private enterprises in the “collective” category was mandatory until 1988, and that the 
benefit accruing to them seemed to be viewed positively by their “real” private owners, 
local authorities and the central policy makers alike, serving the purpose of local 
employment of “surplus laborers.” 
 
4.2.1.3 Turning Point and Fast Growth (1984-1991) 
 
The tipping point in TVEs fast growth was mandated in two policy papers from 1984. 
Document No.1 in January 1984, as the watershed, clearly gave permission not only to 
small individual businesses, but also to larger private enterprises, albeit under the “red 
cap,” as long as they created profits and, even more importantly, employment. It also 
listed specific directives that guided local governments to promote private enterprises. In 
March 1984, the Central Committee and the State Council jointly approved the “Report 
on Creating a New Situation in Commune and Brigade-Run Enterprises”
87
 that officially 
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See Zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan zhuanfa nongmu yuyebu he budangzu guanyu kaichuang shedui 
qiye xin jumian de baogao de tongzhi (Document No. 4, 1984: Circular Concerning the Report on Creating 
a New Situation in Commune-and-Brigade-Run Enterprises). Website of Xinhuanet. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-02/07/content_2558311.htm (accessed 5 October 2015). 
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renamed the commune and brigade-run enterprises as TVEs. The policy report reaffirmed 
the former collective enterprises, now run by township and villages, together with the 
joint/cooperative and private undertakings that had grown up since 1978 and were set to 
become the center of the integrated rural development. It emphasized that TVEs provided 
inputs for agriculture, absorbed rural laborers, raised rural incomes and generated tax 
revenues. The document also noted that the enterprises were responsible for their own 
profits and losses, and urged local governments at all levels to support and guide the 
development of TVEs. The change in policy was thus an important factor in promoting 
the fast growth of rural enterprises, in particular the joint household enterprises, the 
private variant of shareholding cooperatives and individual household undertakings. 
 
Joint and cooperative enterprises were within an opaque bracket of private ownership, but 
the surplus (or profit) generated by them was de facto privately owned and controlled by 
more than one household. It is therefore significant that a policy document from 1990 
stipulated that they should be treated as real cooperatives under the general rules aimed to 
safeguard them as long-term enterprises with a strong commitment to their workers. 
According to the document, a minimum of 60% of after-tax profits should be reinvested 
in the enterprise in the names of the investors, in which 50% should be committed to 
public accumulation (gonggong jilei), and the remaining portion (40%) be used for the 
share of profits that was divided among investors (no more than 20%), and collective 
welfare within the enterprise (jiti fuli), and worker bonuses.
88
 Public accumulation refers 
to obligatory investment capital that cannot be claimed as the individual property of the 
investors. The local government had no official claim on the assets and profits, but the 
enterprise itself as a cooperative enterprise did (Whiting, 2001, p. 160; Young and Yang 
1994). 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
88 
The specific portion of after-tax profits distribution was decided by local governments and varied from 
place to place. See Nongmin gufen hezuoqiye zanxing guiding (Provisional Rules on Peasant Shareholding 
Cooperatives) issued on December 25, 1997. Website of Ministry of Agriculture of PRC. 
http://www.moa.gov.cn/zwllm/zcfg/qtbmgz/200601/t20060123_540345.htm (accessed 5 October 2015). 
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The joint/cooperative household enterprises were, in other words, considered part of the 
collective economy and treated differently from the individual and private enterprises. 
They were taxed at collective rates, enjoyed tax holidays and preferential policy (tax 
deductions, exemptions and reductions), as well as bank credits. The explanation of the 
collective nature of these firms may be similar to the private enterprises that were 
registered as “red cap” collectives, i.e. to allay political fears of attacks on private 
enterprises and justify their legitimate role in the socialist system before private 
ownership was legalized. 
 
The evolution during this period (1984-1991) of individual and joint/cooperative 
household enterprises involved a substantial growth, although the economic rectification 
campaign from 1989 to 1991 led private enterprises to again disguise their private nature 
(see Table 4.1).  
 
Table 4.1: The Share of Rural Township, Village and Private Enterprises in the 
Annual Growth in Gross Value of Output, Employment and the Number of 
Enterprises, 1978-91 (%) 
 
 
Year 
 
Growth of Number of 
Enterprises 
 Growth of Employment  Growth of Gross Value of Output 
Township Village Private  Township Village Private  Township Village  Private 
            
1979 0.3 -3.7 n.a.  4.5 1.7 n.a.  6.7 10.9 n.a. 
1980 5.3 -6.7 n.a.  6.0 0.7 n.a.  8.7 7.9 n.a. 
1981 -0.6 -7.4 n.a.  1.7 -3.4 n.a.  6.8 1.2 n.a. 
1982 0.8 2.2 n.a.  5.5 4.2 n.a.  9.8 9.1 n.a. 
1983 0.1 -1.5 n.a.  4.8 3.1 n.a.  11.0 9.1 n.a. 
1984 18.8 44.9 n.a.  19.9 26.1 n.a.  -5.6 3.9 n.a. 
1985 4.5 -2.1 146.9  12.4 5.4 116.3  2.3 3.1 14.3 
1986 1.4 -9.0 29.4  7.7 2.3 28.0  5.4 2.8 24.9 
1987 -1.3 -10.7 18.6  5.4 2.4 20.4  9.5 8.6 28.9 
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1988 0.8 0.3 8.6  3.9 3.6 13.8  13.5 15.8 32.0 
1989 -4.2 -3.1 -0.8  -4.3 -2.8 -0.1  1.0 4.6 32.8 
1990 -4.4 -5.7 -0.6  -2.1 -3.3 0.6  4.6 4.7 34.6 
1991 -1.6 -0.6 3.5  4.2 3.4 3.6  16.1 14.4 35.8 
Note: n.a.= not available 
Source: Adapted from Young and Yang (1994), p.27. 
 
According to the official statics, the number of TVEs in 1984 increased from 1,346,400 
(1983) to 6,065,200, among which, those run by joint/cooperative and individual 
households accounted for 69.3%, the total income reached RMB 153.708 billion, which 
increased by 65.5% (Liu 2001). Furthermore, they have made up over 90% of the rural 
enterprises since 1987 (see Table 4.2). Nevertheless, Table 4.2 also illustrates that despite 
the rocketing growth in number, the private sector was still eclipsed by the collective 
sector in producing output value and providing employment before 1987. 
 
Table 4.2: The Share of Rural Township, Village and Private Enterprises in the 
Number of Enterprises, Employment and Gross Value of Output, 1978-91 (%) 
 
 
Year 
Share of Number of Enterprises  Share of Employment   Share of Gross Value of Output 
Township Village Private  Township Village  Private  Township Village  Private 
              
1978 21.0 79.0 n.a.  44.5 55.5  n.a.  57.0 43.0  n.a. 
1979 21.6 78.4 n.a.  45.2 54.8  n.a.  56.1 43.9  n.a. 
1980 23.7 76.0 n.a.  46.5 53.5  n.a.  56.2 43.8  n.a. 
1981 25.1 74.9 n.a.  47.7 52.3  n.a.  57.6 42.4  n.a. 
1982 24.8 75.2 n.a.  48.0 52.0  n.a.  57.7 42.3  n.a. 
1983 25.1 74.9 n.a.  48.4 51.6  n.a.  58.1 41.9  n.a. 
1984 6.6 24.1 69.3  6.1 40.4  23.5  47.8 37.9  14.3 
1985 3.4 11.7 84.9  30.3 31.7  38.0  41.7 33.4  24.9 
1986 2.8 8.6 88.6  28.7 28.6  42.8  39.9 31.1  28.9 
1987 2.4 6.6 91.0  27.2 26.4  46.4  38.3 29.6  32.0 
109 
 
1988 2.2 6.2 91.6  26.1 25.2  48.7  37.5 29.6  32.8 
1989 2.2 6.0 91.8  25.4 24.9  49.6  36.0 29.4  34.6 
1990 2.1 5.8 92.1  25.2 24.4  50.4  35.3 28.9  35.8 
1991 2.0 5.6 92.4  25.3 24.3  50.4  36.8 29.6  33.6 
Note: n.a.= not available 
Source: Adapted from Young and Yang (1994), p.27. 
 
4.2.1.4 Restructuring and Privatization of TVEs (1992-2003) 
 
Private TVEs contributed notably to the national economy, and provided a much needed 
source of employment. By 1987, they produced one-third of the total output value and 
employed one-half of the workers in rural enterprises (see Table 4.1). The state 
recognized its significance and sought to mitigate the negative impact of the national 
economic austerity program (1989-1991). It therefore issued a package of policy 
measures to accelerate a further market-oriented privatization process, famously signaled 
by Deng Xiaoping on his “South China tour” in 1992. The relaxation meant that the “red 
capped” private TVEs removed their collective guise and became real private ones. An 
official press release formulated it in this way: 
 
As China heads toward a market economy, an increasing number of private companies are no 
longer feeling the need as register as “red cap” or collectively-owned ventures…because the 
difference in preferential treatment between private and public units has been narrowed. […].But 
there is a problem. The collective units are now arguing that private firms could not have 
developed without their help. As the so-called “owners” of the companies, the state firms usually 
ask for high compensation for the “divorce”or ask the companies to merge with them (China Daily, 
November 4, 1994 as cited in Woo 1996, p. 318). 
 
Concurrently, the state restructured the ownership of TVEs. The reform involved various 
practices in order to resolve problem reported in connection with the TVEs, such as 
“capturing the market share of the large SOEs, wasting resources, creating pollution in 
rural areas, providing poor-quality products, distorting the market by rent-seeking actives. 
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TVEs also suffered from a slowdown in growth rate and deterioration in main 
management indicators” (Zou, 2003). 
 
The conflict between local governments and the TVEs became a prominent problem in 
rural areas due to the vaguely-defined property rights. As noted earlier, the fiscal reform 
in the 1990s imposed heavy burdens on the collective TVEs by local governments. As the 
owner of the collective TVEs, local cadres extracted heavy taxes and profits to generate 
revenues, referred to as “killing the hen to get the eggs” (shaji quluan) or “draining the 
lake to catch fish” (jieze eryu). As a result, many TVEs were on the edge of bankruptcy. 
Under these circumstances, a restructuring and an explicit justification for the ownership 
was urgently needed. The ownership of TVEs was shifted from collective to private in 
various forms. They became shareholder companies or shareholder cooperatives; they 
were sold or half-sold-half-leased; they were auctioned off; they were merged into 
enterprise conglomerates (qiye jituan) that combined several corporations led by a 
“backbone enterprise” (gugan qiye), or a “leading enterprise” (longtou qiye).
89
 Most 
local governments preferred the shareholder company or shareholder cooperatives 
patterns. In these types of enterprises, the owners equally issue shares or bonuses to 
employees (Young and Yang 1994; Zou 2003). Unlike the common shareholding 
company where the minority who own the dominant shares are the sole decision makers, 
the shares owned by the employees in the shareholder company or shareholder 
cooperatives are non-voting shares which cannot be traded in stock market, but which 
afford the employees decision making power based on their posts in the enterprise. 
Although employee shareholder companies and shareholder cooperatives have the 
hallmarks of private ownership, their official status is ambiguous, and their owners, in 
practice, comply with this vague definition to preclude any negative effects on business 
(Fan and Chen 2005). 
 
Collective-converted-shareholder TVEs are assumed to be independent legal persons, but 
still have to fulfill the obligations of employment, financing public goods and social 
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The terms are used interchangeably. See Fan and Ma (1994, p. 132); Zhang (1990, p. 180). 
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programs. The practice of directly restructuring TVEs into shareholder/cooperative 
enterprises turned out to be not as successful as expected. As the restructuring of TVEs 
went on, the drawback of the collective-converted-shareholder model became obvious. 
One explanation claims that the worker-owned, i.e. cooperative, ownership brought about 
inefficiency in the TVE management and development because the vaguely mixed 
ownership put the managers in disadvantaged positions when they managed the so-called 
“owners,” in actuality the employees (Fan and Chen, 2005). On top of it, the fiscal form 
in 1994 caused the TVEs to shrink. The fiscal policy regulated that all enterprises must 
pay value-added taxes that dominated the rural enterprises’ tax categories. Moreover, 
central and local governments shared the value-added taxes in the ratio of 75:25 (i.e. the 
central government received 75% of the value-added tax, and the local retained 25%). 
However, the central, not the local governments, bore the risk of business losses and/or 
bankruptcy. Local governments, as a consequence of the tax reform, took higher risks but 
enjoyed fewer benefits from running collective TVEs, while collective TVEs lost their 
tax advantage and became a burden for the local government, since the surplus accruing 
to local governments from their collective TVEs was radically reduced. In 1996, the 
number of loss-making TVEs reached 1,970,000 or 8.4% of the total TVEs (Fan and 
Chen, 2005). Therefore, the local governments were motivated to further restructure the 
collective TVEs by either selling out the big and efficient ones or transferring the small 
and inefficient ones to the ownership of the existing managers. By end of the 1990s, the 
restructuring of the collective TVEs was completed and collective TVEs were 
consequently transformed into private enterprises. 
 
Following the privatization of TVEs, the development of TVEs created the conditions for 
institutional change towards a freer market. During the transformation, market 
mechanisms became increasingly active, and the financial institutions relaxed restriction 
on the private sector. In the meanwhile, the legal protection of private property rights was 
also improved90 and the state eliminated the tax discrimination in order to encourage the 
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See Article 13, in the Amendments to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China passed by the 
Second Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress on March 14, 2004. Website of the National 
People’s Congress of PRC. http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm (accessed 5 
October 2015). 
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growth of private enterprises. The success of TVE reform laid the foundation for the later 
SOEs reforms.
91
 The positive roles of TVEs and the entire private sector played in the 
economic transformation persuaded the government and public to improve the policies 
and attitudes towards the private sector. All of these, in turn, created the conditions for 
further development of TVEs. 
 
4.3 Fugu’s Strategies of Growth: Local State Entrepreneurial-Developmentalism 
 
China’s localities had adopted corporatist systems to foster the growth of rural enterprises 
in the 1980s as the local state held the rights to the surpluses generated by collectively 
owned TVEs. The evolution of the local state from a corporatist state to an 
entrepreneurial-developmentalist state since the late 1990s took place against the 
background of privatization and fiscal reforms. The privatization of TVEs and small-
scaled SOEs fundamentally altered the role of local officials from owner of enterprise to 
tax collector. Local governments therefore resorted to inducing investments (zhaoshang 
yinzi) through, for example, preferential policies as a significant strategy to expand the 
tax base. The tax division system that took effect in 1994 allocated the lion’s share (75% 
of the value-added tax) to central government leaving only 25% for local public budgets. 
The local state retained the sales tax and local enterprise income tax, fiscal incomes from 
which local governments had to finance the devolved obligations to provide social 
welfare and public goods in their jurisdictions. The local state, accordingly, discovered 
that extracting tax revenues from local enterprises was an important strategy for 
promoting the growth of the rural economy. 
 
Under the framework of local state entrepreneurial-developmentalism, China’s local 
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In 1995, inspired by the efficiency of TVEs, the state issued a policy to focus on retaining major SOEs, 
and let go of minor ones (zhua da fang xiao). The restructuring of SOEs was carried out in various forms. 
Some became shareholder companies or shareholder cooperatives; some were sold or half-sold-half-leased; 
some were auctioned off; some were merged into enterprise conglomerates; some were contracted by or 
leased to individual entrepreneurs. 
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development strategies varied across localities. Local cadres adopted various strategies in 
accordance with local conditions and natural endowments. Taken as a whole, “[c]ounties, 
townships and villages in China’s countryside have shown impressive flexibility and an 
ability to face problems and adopt timely development strategies that are suited to 
changing political and economic conditions” (Oi 1999, p. 93). Fugu is such a county: 
local cadres have adopted coal-endowed development strategies to boost the county-wide 
economy through financing its public goods and raising funds for rural development 
projects. 
 
Before China's economic reform began, coal mines “were largely state-owned, state-run, 
and exempted from market competition. There were small mines operated by 
townships/towns (formerly the communes gongshe) and villages (formerly the brigades 
dui) from the beginning, but their overall output was generally below 5% of the total 
production before 1970” (Wang 2006, p. 6). In the mid-1970s, small-scale coal mines run 
by township and village (TVE coal mines) began to grow and their output reached the 
level of 15% of the total due to the rise of local industry. TVE coal mines began to 
skyrocket in the 1980s when the rapid economic growth and development of TVEs 
increased demand for coal. In response, the central government loosened control over the 
coal sector and issued policies of “turning on the tap” (you shui kuai liu) to encourage 
coal mining activities, in particular in TVE coal mines wherever possible and by 
whatever means.
92
 As Wang (2006, p. 7) notes, “[f]ollowing the central agenda, local 
governments gave the green lights to just about anyone who wanted to sink a shaft: 
townships, villages, individual cadres and farmers. The rush for coal resulted in a rapid 
proliferation of TVE mines. Whereas there had been only around 10,000 TVE mines in 
1980, the number swelled to over 100,000 by 1991.” 
 
                                                 
92 
Between 1983 and 1985, the central government had issued a series of policies to promote the 
development of TVE coal mines. For example, the State Council issued Eight Countermeasures to Develop 
TVE Coal Mines. Following the policies, local governments, township and village collectives, and 
individuals were encouraged to mine coal from large to small scales by all means. See Nengyuanye 60 nian 
(60 Years of Energy Industry). Website of Chinaonline. http://www.china.com.cn/news/60years/2009-
07/29/content_18229811.htm (accessed 5 October 2015). 
 
114 
 
At the same time, the central government decided that Shenhua Group, a SOE, should 
start to develop and mine the Shenfu-Dongsheng coalfield.
93
 The fiscal reform and cadre 
evaluation system incentivized local cadres to generate new sources of revenues. The 
specific resources and local conditions determined how local officials responded. 
Standing on the enormous coal field, local cadres in Fugu County greatly encouraged 
local people to engage in coal mining by granting mining licenses at the symbolic cost of 
RMB10.
94
 These TVE coal mines were run in various forms, for instance, by county, 
township and village governments, government departments, individually as joint 
individual or collective enterprises. The general relaxation of control over coal mining 
during the middle and late 1980s facilitated Fugu County’s entry into a golden age of 
TVE coal mining. There had only been 103 coal mines in 1985. By 1989, the number had 
surged to 248, among which 162 mines operated by individuals or as individual joint 
enterprises, accounting for 65% of the total number of TVE coal mines (see 4.3).95 
 
Table 4.3: Ownerships of TVE Mines in Fugu County (1989) 
 
Ownership  Number  Percent of Total 
County  3  1% 
Township  38  15% 
Village   28  11% 
Administrative Unit  12  5% 
Collective Alliance  5  2% 
Individual Alliance  2  1% 
Individual  160  65% 
Total 248 100% 
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On June 3rd, 1986, the State Council issued the Decision on Promoting the Development of Coal 
Industry. See Fugu xianzhi, p. 335. 
 
94 
See Wang (2013). 
 
95 
See Fugu xianzhi, p. 325-329. 
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Source: Own Compilation. See Fugu xianzhi, p.325-329. 
 
In rapid succession, the massive increase in coal mining, associated with local officials’ 
incentives, catalyzed a sudden escalation of coal-led TVEs in, among others, the chemical 
and transportation sectors during the middle and late 1980s. In the 1990s, the emergence 
of private ownership of rural industry was associated with an emergence of local state 
entrepreneurial-developmentalism. The local state’s rights to the economic surplus from 
private enterprises ended. The role played by the local developmental state in the rapid 
growth of the private sector is a key to understanding, for it was obviously not “a 
manifestation of laissez-faire capitalism” (Oi 1999, p. 99). Instead, local cadres 
conducted positive interventions in the private sector. 
 
This case study will focus on the case of coal mine restructuring implemented in 2007 
and the emergence of local state entrepreneurial-developmentalism, explaining how local 
government in Fugu County used entrepreneurial-developmentalist institutions to regain 
ownership and control of the private sector in order to foster the county-wide economy in 
the 21st century. 
 
4.3.1 Coal Mine Restructuring in Fugu County: Regaining State Ownership of 
Private Enterprises 
 
The coal mine restructuring policy launched in 2007 is an energy strategy designed by the 
National Development and Reform Commission, aims to promote 13 large-scaled nation-
wide coal field bases. It is a strategy that has changed the ownership structure of coal 
enterprises, in other words, the local state has regained the ownership of private 
enterprise after the privatization of TVEs in the 1990s. The key point of the restructuring 
policy is using the large-scale coal mine to buy out, merge and ally with small mines. In 
reality, however, it’s the state, province or local owned coal companies that take 
advantage to control the ownership of mines. For example, in the end of 2008, the 
piloting restructuring project was launched in the neighboring Shanxi Province that is 
adjacent to Fugu County in Shaanxi Province. The coal resource restructuring project in 
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Shanxi Province generally has not only reduced the shafts from 2,598 to 1,053, but more 
importantly turned the private coal mine sector into a state-dominated mix of private and 
public enterprises.96 
 
However, unlike the policy of “one-size-fits-all” (yidaoqie) in neighboring Shanxi 
Province, the implementation of the TVE restructuring in Fugu County was based on 
entrepreneurial-developmentalist mechanisms to regain the ownership of private coal 
mine companies in order to control the private sector and serve the local state’s purpose 
of extracting tax revenues. In this sense, it argues that the property rights remain 
relatively stable in this region. 
 
4.3.1.1 Administrative Controls: Granting Licenses 
 
In China, granting licenses is a regulatory measure to monitor business applicants and 
decide whether to give permission to certain business operations according to the political, 
economic and social atmosphere. As Oi (1999, p. 129) notes, “[t]he process of licensing 
in China reflects the corporatist nature of the relationship between business and the 
state.” Local cadres from county to village can all affect whether an application of license 
is approved. First, the applicant needs a residential certification (juzhu zhengming) and 
good standing from his or her village Party branch. Second, the applicant must apply to 
the branch office of the industrial and commercial administrative management bureau at 
the township level. To get the approval, the applicant needs bank verification of 
investment capital including minimum amounts of fixed and circulation capital. After the 
industrial and commercial administrative management bureau at the township level 
investigates and approves the application, the applicant can approach the county-level 
industrial and commercial administrative management bureau that finally decides 
whether to grant the license. 
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For more details of the Shanxi coal mine restructuring project, see Chen et al. (2010). 
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Against the political and economic background of the “turning on the tap” (you shui kuai 
liu) approach of the 1980s, Fugu County government had granted the mining licenses in a 
swift and cheap manner in order to promote the rapid expansion of TVE coal mines and 
thus to generate revenues. Once the license expired and was due for renewal, local 
officials in Fugu County, in order to gain control of the coal-led private sector, began to 
use other mechanisms to decide whether a license should be renewed. For example, they 
evaluated the input that the coal mine owners, the farmer-converted entrepreneurs, had 
contributed to the local state-led rural development program or fund-raising projects. Mr. 
Shao and Mr. Tian put it in almost identical terms, stating that the enterprises could get 
better access to the resource allocation (i.e. approval) than those that don't actively get 
involved in the ‘Double Hundred’ rural development project; this involves, for example, 
the approval or renewal of the fully-mechanized mining license, corporation expansion 
and resource integration during the period of coal mine restructuring.97 
 
4.3.1.2 Economic Controls: Ownership and Capital 
 
The coal mine restructuring project in neighboring Shanxi Province mainly involved one 
province owned enterprise in regaining the ownership and control over the coal mines. 
However, on the one hand, the local officials in Fugu County were forced to implement 
the restructuring policy imposed by upper levels; on the other hand, the local state did 
promote entrepreneurial-developmentalist systems to protect and foster the county-wide 
economy. Just prior to the implementation of the central coal restructuring policy in 
2007,
98
 the local state had already started forming five conglomerates to control and 
retain private enterprise capitals within Fugu County, namely Fugu Coal Industry 
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The Coal Industry Policy was launched by the National Development and Reform Commission on 
November 23, 2007. See Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia fazhan he gaige weiyuanhui gonggao 2007 
nian di 80 hao: gongbu meitan chanye zhengce (Coal Industry Policy). Website of Ministry of Commerce 
of PRC. http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/b/g/200712/20071205307849.html (accessed 5 October 2015). 
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Conglomerate founded in 2007, Fugu Coal Chemical Industry Conglomerate founded in 
2008, Fugu Magnesium Industry Conglomerate founded in 2008, Fugu Metallurgical 
Coal Conglomerate founded in 2008 and Fugu Special Alloy Conglomerate.99 Almost all 
of the private enterprises were incorporated into the five coal-led conglomerates under 
various production categories between 2007 and 2008. In order to further control the 
private sector and capitals, the local state implemented a series of strategies in two 
patterns. First, in 2009, the local state-owned assets management company
100
 
incorporated five large private enterprises to set up one guarantor company, controlled by 
the local state through a 78% share of the capital.
101
 In 2010, the same local state-owned 
company co-opted one of the five conglomerates (Fugu Coal Chemical Industry 
Conglomerate) to form a transportation infrastructure group, the controlling shares of 
which were held by the local state. The total registered capital is RMB 2 billion, of which 
the local state-owned assets management company raised RMB 1.06 billion and private 
enterprises RMB 0.94 billion.
102
 Second, the local state united with the above mentioned 
upper-level provincial SOE to first establish a SOE in which the province controls 57% 
of shares and the county controls the remaining 43%, and then proceeding to establish, 
respectively in 2009 and 2010, two coal-chemical corporations to control two 
conglomerates (Fugu Coal Industry Conglomerate and Fugu Metallurgical Coal 
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The founding year of the Fugu Special Alloy Conglomerate remains unknown. For more details of the 
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Conglomerate). So far, the local state has successfully used political strategies to control 
the ownership and capitals of the coal-endowed private sector. Which other 
entrepreneurial-developmentalist mechanisms did the local state adopt to carry out the 
control over the private enterprises? 
 
4.3.1.3 Commissioners and Board of Directors 
 
As is widely known, Fugu’s coal mine owners and entrepreneurs spring from poor 
farming families. They are labeled as “farmers-converted entrepreneurs” (nongmin 
qiyejia, lit. “peasant entrepreneurs”) and are people of humble educational backgrounds, 
most having only primary and/or junior secondary education. Considering their low 
educational level and shortage of professional training, the local government has played a 
significant and multifaceted role in designating commissioners and cadres to support the 
management of key corporations and projects, creating credit institutions for loans, 
providing financial, market and technical assistance through various platforms, tax breaks 
and support funds for private enterprises/mines. Furthermore, the town and village cadres 
have acted as mediators, intervening in conflicts arising between villagers and 
enterprises/mines in order to create a peaceful and favorable environment for their 
operations. 
 
In 2010, to implement the government institutions reform, Fugu County Government 
discharged 87 county-level cadres above 53 years of age from their positions at county 
level. How and where could these cadres be deployed? According to the Decision by 
Fugu County Government Regarding the Cadres Resettlement and Incentives during the 
Reform in Government Institutions, the local state assigned 81 of them to the enterprises 
and villages to assist in their administration. They are called commissioners (tepai 
zhuanyuan) relocated to new functions but with their formal civil-service positions 
(bianzhi) continued in their original place of service.
103
 Moreover, they still receive a 
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See Fuguxian renmin zhengfu guanyu yangdingshu deng tongzhi mianzhi tiqian ligang de tongzhi 
(Notice Regarding Cadre Deposition and Early Departure by the People’s Government of Fugu County). 
120 
 
RMB 1,000-1,500 subsidy per month from their original work unit until retirement
104
 Mr. 
Huang, the former president of the Party school of Fugu County and currently the Party 
secretary of one of the largest coal tar electrochemical companies in Fugu County, 
explained the reasons why the local state made such a decision: 
 
One reason is that the state intends young leaders to move up to leadership positions as the old 
ones have low promotion prospects; the other is that while many entrepreneurs lack education and 
are getting old, people with better educational background are working in the government. The old 
cadres are expected to help the entrepreneurs to better understand the economic and social policies, 
and assist the enterprises in business administration, in particular the enterprises are not familiar 
with bureaucratic systems. Furthermore, the enterprises benefit from the communications between 
these old cadres and government.
105
 
 
In this sense, some cadres are sent to villages, others are designated to key enterprises 
(zhongdian qiye) to assist in business administration. These cadres who join the 
businesses formerly held important positions and maintain a rich social and political 
capital. For instance, the largest enterprise (Group B) in the locality modeled by the local 
and provincial governments as an exemplary private corporate in Shaanxi Province has 
attracted quite a lot of influential cadres to function in its decision making. For instance, 
Mr. Yao, the chairman of the trade union, as well as the deputy director of the advisory 
committee of Group B, formerly worked as the Party secretary and director of Fugu’s 
Rural Credit Cooperative. The advisory committee established a “Leading Small Group 
for Enterprise Restructuring” (qiye gaizhi lingdao xiaozu) that directed the restructuring 
of ownership and management of Group B towards a “western style” pattern in August 
2009. Mr. Ye, the general manager assistant of Group B, was the former county mayor 
assistant in Fugu County. The two cadres are representatives designated to the company 
headquarters’ decision making layer. Others have been deployed as managers in its 
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subordinate company according to their strengths and specialization. For example, the 
agricultural development company of a giant conglomerate employs a cadre as its general 
manager who used to work in the government’s poverty alleviation department. His 
experience and specialized knowledge contribute to strategically develop agriculture and 
improve farmers’ livelihoods in the village receiving aid. On top of the control on the key 
private corporations, the local state has exerted further control over the private 
conglomerates during the coal restructuring period. For example, the general manager of 
the Fugu Coal Industry Conglomerate is the former director of the Coal Industry Bureau 
of Yulin Prefecture. In a word, control and political power is used by the local state to 
intervene in the locality’s county-wide economy. Nevertheless, control is only one 
defining feature of the relationship between the local state and the private sector. The 
local state has concurrently offered inducements as strong state intervention contained in 
the entrepreneurial-developmentalist mechanisms. 
 
4.3.1.4 Inducements for Private Sector: Credit and Financial Consulting 
 
To prevent the businesses from falling into decline due to the lessening of resource 
endowments, the local state has advised private enterprises to diversify their investment 
into, for example, real estate, finance and logistics sectors. However, the diversified 
business expansion faces shortages of capital. The local state has implemented a series of 
mechanisms to resolve the difficulties facing enterprises in raising capital and getting 
loans. As is widely known, private sector has difficulties in crossing the threshold for 
loans, especially the long-term loans provided by the commercial banks. Thus, the local 
state plays a middleman role in providing private sector with credit guarantee. In the 
above described example, dated January 2009, the state-owned assets management 
company raised RMB 30,000,000 to set up one guarantor company associated with five 
private enterprises. 78% of the shares are controlled by the local state.
106
 Based on the 
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platform created by the local state, the local state-controlled guarantor company has 
provided RMB 0.5 billion credit guarantee for 67 medium-sized enterprises by 2011, 
associated with 6 commercial banks.107 Given the fact that the local state has adopted a 
package of measures to intervene in the private enterprises business management and 
operation, the entrepreneurs have indeed received quite attractive capital benefits to 
expand their business which lead to a booming county-wide economy.
108
 As Mr. Qiu 
claimed: 
 
Using the guarantor company, the government provides the guarantee, helping the owner of Group 
B to get a RMB 2 billion loan so that he can invest in his new business.
109
 
 
The local state has invited several commercial banks to set up branches in Fugu County 
and encouraged the banks to lend to private enterprises. By 2013, 58 bank institutions had 
been established in the locality. On top of that, the local state created 15 micro-finance 
institutions and 4 pawnshops to support the private enterprises with capital-raising.110 As 
stated above, the capital of theses micro-finance institutions are from the private 
enterprises. For example, Group B, as a provincial exemplary enterprise, has established 
one micro-finance company with registered capital RMB 0.3 billion as well as one 
pawnshop under the county government’s directives. These micro-finance institutions and 
pawnshops are strictly overseen and regulated by the local state for prevention of illegal 
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fund-raising.
111
 Although loan interest rates from these private credit institutions are 
higher than that from the commercial banks, they offer private enterprises access to easier 
borrowing. It is apparent that all of the credit institutions have had the explicit support of 
the local private sector. 
 
4.3.1.5 Market and Technical Assistance 
 
Since the 2000s, in order to encourage the development of private enterprises, local 
officials have provided assistance in a number of ways, from creating a platform between 
technical colleges and enterprises, buyers and suppliers to helping with markets. For 
example, to provide the private sector with technical advice and market information, the 
local state has created the first nationwide county-level coal transaction center in Fugu 
County. The center acts as a transaction platform, collecting and analyzing market 
information for enterprises and customers. The ultimate goal of the local state-created 
platform is to promote the coal sales and bring in new revenues.
112
 
 
Having realized that technology and innovation play a significant role in an enterprise’s 
long-term development, the local state thus initiated and created a collaborative platform 
between technical colleges and enterprises in order to cultivate human resources in 
particular the special technicians and researchers for enterprises. Some enterprises choose 
to delegate the cultivation to the specific technical college. For example, the Fugu Coal 
Industry Conglomerate implemented a training program with one railway school in 
Taiyuan City to promote local railway development.
113
 Some prefer to build up 
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See Fugu meiye jituan yu Taiyuan tielu jiexie xuexiao xiaoqi hezuo qianyue yishi juxing (Fugu Coal 
Industry Conglomerate and Taiyuan Railway Mechanical School Sign a Cooperation Agreement). Website 
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collaborations with research colleges. For instance, one coal corporation has built up a 
research base with one university in order to promote the technology of coal industry.
114
 
 
Concerning troubleshooting of business issues, the local state has formulated a 
responsibility system (zerenzhi) for leaders in charge of key projects (zhongdian 
xiangmu). The projects are protected by the government and the developments of the 
projects are the main duty of the cadres and state. In 2013, when most enterprises 
encountered a financial crisis due to the sudden contraction of the coal market, the county 
mayor intervened to prop up the local market for coal by leading an official team to 
Hebei, Shandong, Inner Mongolia and other northern parts of China to investigate the 
coal market, seek customers and tie up with local coal suppliers.
115
 He even intended to 
rent a place for stocking coal in Hebei Province in order to transfer and sell it through 
Hebei Province.116 
 
4.3.1.6 Tax Breaks and County Support Funds 
 
Local governments in Fugu County at all levels have tried to help their private sector to 
weather the coal market crisis by directly granting economic assistance to enterprises 
through tax breaks, electricity price subsidies and support funds from their own channels. 
In 2012, the local state benefited the enterprises RMB 0.37 billion through tax waivers, 
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fees and subsidizing electricity costs.
117
 While in 2013, the local state returned RMB 
0.84 billion of coal price adjustment fund to enterprises that had paid before the 
assistance policy was issued in 2012.118 These measures of tax breaks and subsidies were 
very important in helping enterprises survive the stagnant coal market. 
 
To foster the development of small and medium-sized enterprises, the finance bureau 
earmarks RMB 20,000,000 to subsidize small and medium-sized enterprises that 
encounter business operation difficulties.119 To support the research and development of 
new products, in 2011, the local state established a RMB 0.1 billion science and 
technology innovation fund for private enterprises.
120
 The foundation is funded by 
government financial input together with enterprise fund raising, in which, the state 
raised RMB 30,000,000 and enterprises raised RMB 70,000,000. The local government 
also invests RMB 10,000,000 to assist the enterprises in employee skills training. The 
support funds from county government are particularly valuable because enterprises have 
to pay off such loans in a number of ways, from granting fiscal loan discounts (tiexi 
daikuan), repaying the loan to free use of the funds. The money provided by the county is 
up to the county government to decide how much has to be repaid. When local funds are 
insufficient, the county government could even request project loans from the prefecture 
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of the province. For example, in 2012, the Fugu County Science and Technology 
Commission and Finance Bureau selected 21 projects to apply for the earmarked funds 
from their upper authorities.121 
 
4.3.1.7 Conflict Mediation 
 
Fugu County Government not only provides credit, funds and business development 
strategies to the private enterprises, more important, creates a favorable environment for 
business operation and development. The role of mediator is manifest in the service 
functions of the local state. For instance, the government makes plans for industrial parks 
(gongye yuan) and constructs the infrastructure so that the enterprises have access to 
carrying out large scale projects. Concerning land use and security, the local state tries its 
best to assist the enterprises in compensation issues. When conflicts arise, the local 
government immediately engages in the mediation until they are settled. As Mr. Tian put 
it, “[w]ithout the town government’s mediation, the enterprises/mines are not able to run 
their businesses in the villages.”
122
 The government intends to secure a peaceful 
environment for business operations, which is just one of the reasons. In addition, 
redistribution and maintaining stability count as well. 
 
Both county government and the private sector have benefited from the local 
entrepreneurial-developmentalist mechanisms. With the rapid development in the 1990s 
and 2000s of private enterprises, taxation has become more important both as a source of 
revenue and as a means of regulating and guiding the local economy. As Figures 4.1-5 
show, on the one hand, the local state has achieved a substantial growth of the number, 
output value, profits, taxes, GDP and revenues of the private sector since the 1980s. The 
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great jump of the above indicators took place in 2005, which was the year of a major coal 
price increase. The restructuring of the private coal sector and the founding of five 
conglomerates conducted by the local state between 2007 and 2008 reinforced the 
booming county-wide economy in terms of revenue extraction. On the other hand, the 
administrative and economic constraints as well as the inducements created by the local 
state have enabled the private enterprises to expand their business and maximize the 
benefits to the highest degree. As Mr. Qiu explained: 
 
Whether the private entrepreneurs earn profits is determined by the environment created by the 
government. If the environment is not favorable, they may not make money. Fugu County 
Government has provided a lot of preferential policies and measures for the private sector. On the 
contrary, Inner Mongolia is just adjacent to Fugu County and owns enormous coal resources as 
well, but Fugu’s entrepreneurs do not make such profits as here and are forced to return to Fugu 
County in the end.
123
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Number of the Private Sector in Fugu (1984-89, 1991, 1999, 2005 and 
2008) 
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Source: Adapted from Fugu xianzhi, p.376 and Lu et al. (2010), p.18.  
 
Figure 4.2: Output Value of the Private Sector in Fugu (RMB Million) (1984-85, 
1989, 1991, 1999, 2005 and 2008) 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Fugu xianzhi, p.377 and Lu et al. (2010), p.19.  
 
Figure 4.3: Profits of TVEs and the Private Sector in Fugu (RMB million) (1984-85, 
1989, 1991, 1999, 2005 and 2008) 
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Source: Adapted from Fugu xianzhi, p.378 and Lu et al. (2010), p.19.  
 
 
Figure 4.4: Taxes of TVEs and the Private Sector in Fugu (RMB million) (1984-85, 
1989, 1991, 1999, 2005 and 2008) 
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Source: Adapted from Fugu xianzhi, p.378 and Lu et al. (2010), p.19.  
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Figure 4.5: The Contributions of the Private Sector to County’s GDP and Revenues 
(1991, 1999, 2005 and 2008) 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Lu et al. (2010), p.20. 
 
4.3.2 The State-Business Symbiotic Relationship 
 
The fast growth of the private sector driven by the local state implied that the locality has 
established symbiotic relations of mutual dependence between the private 
enterprises/mines and local government. In rural areas, where the private sector relied on 
the state to reduce risks while pursuing their economic interests, the relationship between 
the local state and the private sector are not likely to be adversarial. On the contrary, the 
local governments have used their control of resources in terms of capital and funds, 
coupled with technical and market assistance, to bring the private sector into the 
entrepreneurial-developmentalist fold. As for the local state, due to the constraint of 
revenue, the local state needs the corporations to provide funds for poverty alleviation 
and social development programs devolved from the center when facing the shortage of 
funds. In return, when the enterprises/mines encounter issues of market crisis, land 
acquisition, labor force and resources, they need the local governments to take 
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countermeasures by creating formal credit institutions, provide technical and market 
assistance and coordinate the interests between enterprises and villages. Aside from the 
resources and assistance, the corporations need the local governments’ approvals for 
bureaucratic processes, including the granting and renewal of the business license, 
certification, prizes, and tax breaks.
124
 In a nutshell, “a symbiotic relationship between 
officials and entrepreneurs that is conducive to economic growth is likely only in a stable 
political environment in which actors can afford to take a longer-term perspective, not a 
grab-and-run view, of their interests in the local economy” (Heilmann, 2008b, p.24).  
 
The symbiotic relationship of mutual dependence between the private sector and local 
state is manifest in the mixed ownership structure that has appeared to provide 
connections and opportunities for private entrepreneurs. Early in the 1990s, “horizontal 
linkages” (hengxiang lianhe) form between large urban state and collective factories (at 
the county level or above) and rural enterprises was created in Fugu County.
125
 These 
formations were based on production contracts according to which private enterprises 
would produce and assemble specific products and sell their products to large urban, 
collectively owned factories. The urban counterparts would supply the raw materials and 
provide product specifications. In this sense, the private enterprises had their contracts 
secured to minimize risks, reduce transaction costs and make profits by engaging in 
symbiotic relationships with the local government, specifically, the large state owned and 
collective factories. However, since the ownership structured altered in 2007, the 
symbiotic relationship between private enterprises and local state has been characterized 
by the mixed ownership structure. The evolution of “horizontal linkages” is present in the 
connection between private conglomerates and large state-owned enterprises because the 
private sector has difficulties in crossing the threshold for loans, especially the long-term 
loans provided by the commercial banks, while the state-owned sector has great 
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advantages in capital and resource allocation.
126
 The local state has gained control of the 
private sector by changing the local economic structure in terms of distribution of 
ownership. 
 
Without question, Fugu’s government plays a significant and multifaceted role in the 
symbiotic relationship in order to foster the county-wide economy that is the 
indispensable foundation for the poverty alleviation and social development programs. 
The role in the administrative and economic control in terms of granting license, 
regaining ownership and capital control through restructuring five conglomerates and 
designating commissioners and officials to manage large and key-point 
corporations/projects is only one facet of the local state. More importantly, the 
multifaceted role of the local state in the intervention has strengthened the implications 
for the symbiotic relationship between the private sector and local government. At county 
level, the officials create credit institutions, provide financial solutions, market and 
technical assistant through various platforms, tax breaks and funds for private sector. At 
town and village levels, the cadres act as the mediators, addressing the conflicts between 
villages and corporations/mines in order to secure peaceful and favorable conditions for 
corporations/mines operations. With the positive intervention conducted by the local state, 
the private sector is able to get through the period of economic crisis, continue their 
mining operations in conflicting villages and maximize their economic interests. Fugu 
County has been awarded a place in the “Top Ten Counties of County-wide Economy and 
Social Development” by Shaanxi Provincial Government for seven years since 2007 by 
virtue of the local state’s developmental strategies with economic and social development 
approaches.
127
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The concrete economic foundation has promoted the effectiveness of the “Double 
Hundred” rural development project and other county-wide social development programs 
through entrepreneurial-developmentalist mechanisms. By contrast, another poverty 
alleviation project was not ideally implemented due to a lack of funds. In 2012, the local 
state initiated the 3331 poverty reduction project to pair corporations/mines with poor 
households, however, the upgraded program failed to raise enough money as it expected 
because the coal market price fell from RMB 400-500 per ton to RMB 200 per ton 
sharply. Thus the coal-related industries were thus constrained to support the poverty 
alleviation programs. As the town cadre claimed, up until September 2013 when I 
conducted the second fieldwork, Xinmin Town Government had not received a cent from 
enterprise, except for the transfer payment from county finance bureau for the new 
poverty alleviation program.128 Moreover, the entrepreneurial-developmentalist 
mechanisms that are constrained by the rural economy have induced the repetition of 
conflicts in a dynamic way. Consequently, the farmers’ coal-based business, including job 
opportunities, leasing dumper trucks and service trade for coal transportation are affected 
by the coal business. As Mr. Qiu complained: 
 
The conflicts between village and corporations/mines change from time to time. When the mines 
give money to the farmers, the conflicts are settled. The enterprise were willing to give money 
when they made good benefits, but now they are reluctant to give because they have trouble in 
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making good benefits, then the conflicts recurs. In addition, the farmers are not that considerate. If 
the corporations/mines give money to them to address the conflicts, they think the government and 
corporations are both good, but not vice versa.
129
 
 
It is apparent that the significant role the local state plays in resolving the conflicts has 
further consolidated symbiotic relationships between the private sector and local 
government. Associated with financial, market and technical assistance provided by the 
local developmental state, the relationships have kept the private sector within the 
entrepreneurial-developmentalist fold. 
 
4.3.3 Principals and Agents 
 
Corporations, like all organizations in principal-agent relationships, face a few problems 
(Oi 1999; Whiting 2001). A main issue is asymmetrical knowledge: Agents always have 
an advantage over the principal due to their information about the true level of 
implementation and performance of business operations. Monitoring can be used by the 
principal to oversee and regulate agents’ behavior and performance, however, the process 
is costly and less effective if the agents collude with partners to deceive the principal. 
Another issue is moral hazard: They are likely to use that knowledge to serve their own 
rather the principal’s interests. So for the principal, it is necessary to devise sufficient 
incentives that make it appealing to the agents to fulfill the principal’s interests.   
  
The agency problems described above appeared before the five conglomerates were 
restructured by the local state in Fugu County, where there were many different principals 
and agents. In the private sector, principal and agents consist of the same family members, 
which is a long-practiced tradition in China, in particular in the cottage enterprises 
(jiating zuofang qiye). This tradition has intensified the problems of information 
asymmetry and moral hazard. A large amount of evidence has shown how the principal 
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colludes with agents when their illegal activities are found out, so that it becomes more 
difficult for the local state to oversee and regulate misconduct. For instance, a substantial 
tax evasion by the enterprises was revealed in Fugu County before 2006.130 Obviously, 
this harmful behavior has increased the information and transaction costs of governing 
private firms. 
 
Nevertheless, the new economic structure characterized by the restructuring of five 
conglomerates and the sent-down cadres (xiapai ganbu) in the private sector 
implemented by the local developmental state has intensified the agency problems in 
terms of asymmetrical knowledge and moral hazard. On the one hand, the principal is 
still composed of private entrepreneurs/shareholders, but the agents are composed of 
former local officials. Considering the low education levels and poor professionalism of 
the farmer-converted entrepreneurs, these officials are commissioned by the local state to 
manage the private enterprises/conglomerates. In this sense, the agents face two 
principals: the private entrepreneurs and the local state. The local state is the more 
immediate principal because the designated cadres’ formal positions still remain in their 
original work units and they are still paid by the state and may not have received any 
salary from the corporation they serve.131 Furthermore, the local state provides unified 
incentives and common interests for the agents, which is to promote the county-wide 
economy and generate revenue extractions. The incentives and interests are embraced by 
all local officials in Fugu County. On the other hand, the agents have the upper hand with 
regard to information. As they are commissioned by the local state to perform duties, they 
are likely first to protect the local state’s interests by intensifying the regulation of the 
enterprises they serve. They act as the local state’s internal monitors, overseeing and 
regulating the illegal activities the enterprises have conducted. Moreover, they can obtain 
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and report first hand information of difficulties that enterprises have encountered, for 
example, land conflicts, license approval/renewals and fund shortages. To solve these 
difficulties faced by their secondary principals, the agents act as middlemen and use their 
political and social capital within their jurisdictions by reporting to and meeting with the 
local officials and visiting credit institutions. In a word, the officials, as the agents in the 
newly restructured conglomerates and private enterprises usually first protect the local 
state’s interests and only second the private enterprises. This does not mean that the 
secondary principal’s interests are not as important as that of the local state. Rather, it is 
also very important to maximize business profits because they are the necessary base of 
county-wide economy and revenue extraction. However, the role of the local state has 
shifted from sharing the residual of collectively-owned enterprises before they were 
transformed to private enterprises to expanding the tax base and collecting tax from the 
private sector. Therefore, the priority of safeguarding the local state’s interests in terms of 
taxation regulation is given to the agents. 
 
The agency problem in the newly mixed enterprises by a local state-owned enterprise 
controlling the shares is less complex because the local state has become the major 
principal and local officials are the agents. For example, the general manager of the 
mixed guarantor company described earlier is the deputy manager of the local state-
owned assets management company. Other private shareholders form the minor principal 
but the agents fulfill more duties commissioned by the local state because their private 
entrepreneurs are seen as incapable of making decisions. In this sense, the private 
enterprises are simply incorporated by the local state in control over the capital and 
ownership. The agents are likely first to safeguard the local state’s interests and only 
second the interests of their private partners. 
 
The rise of local state entrepreneurial-developmentalism in the Fugu case has further 
intensified the moral hazard problem because it has increased the need of agents to first 
protect the local state’s interests and second the private sector’s. Rather, the principal-
agent framework implemented by the local state has strengthened the regulation and 
monitoring of the private sector through controlling shares and ownership, retaining 
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capital within their jurisdiction. 
 
4.4 Summary 
 
First, this chapter has focused on a review of the institutional incentives of rural private 
sector growth after the reform period, and the evolution of rural private industrialization 
in particular, the coal sector in Fugu County. It has illustrated that the coal-endowed 
industry is accountable for a significant contribution to the county’s revenues. Then I 
demonstrated how local officials in Fugu County used entrepreneurial-developmentalist 
mechanisms to protect and foster the county-wide economy. They have adopted both 
administrative and economic controls: Granting licenses, ownership and capital control, 
designating commissioners, as well as inducements: providing credit and financial 
consulting, market and technical assistance, tax breaks and support funds and mediation. 
Finally, I argued that the fast growth of the private sector driven by the local state implied 
that the locality has established symbiotic relations between the private enterprises/mines 
and local government. However, the new economic structure characterized by the 
restructuring of five conglomerates and sent-down cadres to the private sector 
implemented by the local developmental state has intensified the agency problems in 
terms of asymmetrical knowledge and moral hazard. Moreover, the officials, as the 
agents in the newly restructured industrial clusters and private enterprises, first protect 
the local state’s interests before those of the private enterprises. 
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Chapter 5. Strategic Groups and Strategic Agency 
 
5.1 Preamble 
 
Following Heberer and Schubert’s analytical approach to strategic groups and based on 
extensive interviews, documentary analysis and field-based observations, this chapter 
examines how the strategic group approach may help us understand the case of Fugu 
County. The emergence of the strategic group and the strategic agency played by local 
cadres in policy implementation are at the core of the chapter. It is presented in three 
parts. First, I identify the differences and features of various bureaucratic institutions, 
namely, the local state, the Party committee leadership small groups, and the strategic 
groups. Then I examine how the strategic group is established by leading county and 
town cadres and how local coal mine owners/entrepreneurs are incorporated in the 
strategic group. Next, I examine the strategic agency in the implementation of the 
“Double Hundred” project. Third, I look at the internal evaluation system and how CSR, 
as strategic agency of the redistribution mechanisms formulated by the local state. 
 
5.2 Institutional Structures: The Party, the State and the Strategic Group 
 
Before examining the dynamics of strategic group, it is necessary to identify the 
differences and features of various organizational structures among the Party Committee 
leadership small group, the state/local people's government and strategic group in the 
policy-formulation and implementation process. 
 
China’s policy formulation and implementation process has been characterized by its 
intense interactions with the Communist political system since the reform era. As a 
formal political institution, the CCP has the ultimate authority and leads the work of the 
state while it is intertwined with the state and society. The formal and permanent structure 
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of the communist polity is constituted in the following manner: “At the apex of the CCP 
is the national Party organization headed by the Standing Committee of the Politburo, the 
Politburo, and the Central Committee, which are served by a Secretariat and other 
departments” (Shirk 1992, p. 60-61). Likewise, the leadership bodies, namely CCP 
committees, are established at provincial, municipal, county and town/township levels. 
Each government agency at national, provincial, municipal, county and town/township 
levels has its own Party committee. The Party leadership small group (lingdao xiaozu) is 
formed ad hoc to coordinate and consult over policies, in particular specific tasks. Even 
though the Party leadership small group within a government organ is much smaller than 
a Party committee, consisting only of three to five members (normally the Party secretary, 
the minister, and a few vice ministers), it is much more powerful than the Party 
committee in terms of appropriating the authority of the official heads of the government 
organ. As Yan (1988, as cited in Shirk 1992, p. 64) puts it, “[i]n the government setup, the 
CCP bypasses the government executives at all levels by leading all government 
departments directly through the 'leading Party groups' in government institutions.” 
Consequently, the Party members are recognized as having great prestige and authority, 
special political status and greater political authority on many matters than higher-ranking 
non-Party officials (Barnett 1967, as cited in Oi 1999, p. 141). The superiority complex 
and divergent interests are likely to create political obstacles in the path of policy making. 
The leadership small groups cast the roles in integrating officials in decision making 
across authority boundaries through formal meetings and tasks. The purpose of the 
formal bureaucratic institution is to comply with policy demands and resolve local 
interests by building consensus on issues that cut across the government agencies, sectors 
and subordinate units. 
 
The State Council, as the highest central administrative authority under the leadership of 
the CCP, is formally in charge of policy making and conducting a wide range of 
government functions both at the national and the local levels. Its formal bureaucratic 
structures and local formation are vested in the local people’s governments, which are the 
organs administering the work at provincial, municipal, county and town/township levels. 
As the nominal actor authorized by the National People's Congress (NPC), the state is 
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limited in formulating policy due to the administrative borders and separation of authority. 
Thus both formal and informal coordination is needed in making and executing policies. 
The formal coordination is conducted by the party leadership small group within a 
governmental agency at every level of authority (i.e. center, province, prefecture, county, 
town/township). 
 
The state and the CCP are tightly interlocked. Shirk (1992) defines the relation between 
the state and CCP as an “agency relationship” in which the CCP is the “principal” and the 
state is the “agent.” As argued above, because the CCP has formal political authority over 
the state by means of appointing and promoting government officials, the Party delegates 
authority to its agents, the government bureaucrats, in carrying out policies that conform 
to the Party’s demands. Furthermore, “the Party also sets the general policy line (luxian), 
which the government implements, and oversees the work of the government” (Shirk 
1992, p. 61). 
 
Informal coordination is here considered as taking place through what can be termed 
strategic groups. A strategic group is an open and informal network, consisting of people 
in various levels who share the common interests. The informal institutional structure is 
contained in a network established by influential people who can offer political, social 
and economic capital. In the case of Fugu County, the strategic group is established by 
the local state, incorporating both influential officials and coal mine owners/entrepreneurs. 
Informal coordination is needed in order to resolve local and individual interests and to 
achieve targets and carry out the cadre evaluation system. 
 
Although the three institutional structures in terms of the Party, the state and the strategic 
group take formal or informal forms, they share overlapping lines of authority. It is very 
common to observe officials of the Party overseeing bodies playing dual roles by also 
serving the government agencies. 
 
5.3 Strategic Group Dynamics: The Emergence of a Strategic Group 
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Fugu County is a coal-endowed industrial county with a rapidly developing county-wide 
economy, where social problems and village-enterprise/mine conflicts are becoming 
increasingly prominent. There are four reasons that have intensified the social and 
environmental problems and village-enterprise/mine conflicts. First, Fugu County has 
been on the national list of the poorest counties since 1994, and the epithet of “poor 
county” was not removed until 2012 (Chapter 1). However, the regional economic 
development is very uneven in the county. The county center, its surrounding areas and 
the resource-rich western region have developed rapidly, while the purely agricultural 
eastern and southern regions are economically backward. The rural landscape has 
undergone no major change over the years. Second, regional inequality and disparity has 
widened. The structural (institutionalized) poverty is induced by coal mining,
132
 which 
induced severe income inequality between coal mine owners and farmers. On the one 
hand, in the rich coal-endowed region, a large number of private entrepreneurs 
accumulate tremendous wealth through mining and business operations. On the other 
hand, farmers who control no coal resources still live below the poverty line. The 
increasing inequality between the high and low income groups consequently kindles 
farmers’ hostility towards people they regard as upstarts squandering money. Third, the 
destruction of the natural environment due to coal mining destroys the livelihoods and 
agricultural production of local farmers through air pollution, and degradation of water 
and land. In the mining areas of Xinmin Town, large quantities of toxic wastewater from 
coal mines are discharged after, at best, limited treatment. These effluents, combined with 
runoff from mine tailings, have badly polluted both surface and ground water in the 
mining areas, often contaminating soils and crops. Furthermore, buildings, roads and 
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croplands frequently suffer major incidents of land subsidence. In one natural village, for 
example, more than 120 farmers in 30 households have lived in temporary housing since 
2009 after coal mining caused the land on which their houses stood to collapse. The 
temporary houses are hot in summer and cold in winter and will remain so until the 
relocation project funded by the responsible coal company is finished.
133
 Fourth, there is 
a stark contrast between high incidence of poverty and low coverage.
134
 In recent years, 
the local state has increased a large input into poverty alleviation practices. Nevertheless, 
the government's investment only scratches the surface due to the limited anti-poverty 
funds transferred from higher authorities and the large number of poor people in the rural 
areas. 
 
In general, the financial constraints in terms of anti-poverty funds has created the prime 
obstacle in the rural development practice. Historically, being tagged as a “poorest 
county” brings multiple benefits to the county. For example, the county would enjoy the 
financial anti-poverty funds transferred from the central and upper authorities; the central 
government initiates pairing schemes to organize the coastal developed regions to aid the 
inland under-developed regions where the poor county is located; some large SOEs and 
public agencies also help the poor county to reduce poverty by all means; in addition to 
these, some industrial and fiscal preferential policies are ad hoc formulated for the poor 
regions in order to promote rural development.
135
 In the case of Fugu County, the biggest 
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challenge resides in fund raising, in particular in the rural areas.
136
 As Mr. Tian explained: 
 
Since the epithet of “poorest county” was removed in 2012, the anti-poverty funds transferred 
from the central and upper authorities have decreased badly. The prime source of funds is only 
from the county-wide economy in terms of tax revenues.
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By and large, the structural poverty and environmental destruction cause frequent village-
enterprise/mine conflicts over land requisition, pollution and compensation to become 
major factors affecting social stability. Some farmers in the business operation areas 
demand that the enterprises provide money to restore the destroyed production and living 
conditions and to increase their income. Some landless farmers even obstruct business 
operations by blocking roads, cutting off power and collectively petitioning to 
government officials through the letters and visits system. A typical case was narrated by 
Mr. Qiu: 
 
Before the “Double Hundred” project, one village of Tianjiazhai Town was an intense village-
enterprise/mine conflict area. Due to the mass brawl and petition, the business interruption lasted 
for one year long until the enterprise invested RMB 10,000,000 in improving local farmers living 
and production conditions.
138
 
 
Against this backdrop of such challenges posed and inspired by the framework of CNSC 
program, Fugu government established a strategic group in 2007 to design and implement 
the central policy programs reasonably well at local level. Following Heberer and 
Schubert’s theoretical approach to strategic groups, I examine what is strategic group in 
the context of Fugu locality and how Fugu state’s leading county and town officials 
constitute the strategic group to perform strategic agency and institutionalize CSR as a 
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redistribution mechanism to alleviate poverty and the dynamics of locality based policy 
innovation and implementation. 
 
Yet, without doubt, the large-scale alleviation programs and redistribution mechanism 
function well because of the strong economy within the county. In other words, the huge 
wealth created by the coal mine owners and entrepreneurs form an indispensable 
economic precondition and foundation. For this reason, before studying the establishment 
of the strategic group, I examine the multifaceted and strategic roles of the local state, to 
show, in particular, how it boosts county-wide economic growth. This examination also 
provides an important perspective and context to explain the role of the local state in the 
poverty alleviation program. 
 
5.3.1 Leading County and Town Cadres as a Strategic Group 
 
According to Heberer and Schubert (2012), a strategic group refers to a group of persons 
that (a) have shared interests which they pursue strategically; (b) operate through formal 
organizations; (c) maintain mutual awareness and a collective identity, draw boundaries 
between themselves and other social constituencies and develop an esprit de corps; as 
well as (d) possess a common habitus related to the similar positions of their members in 
a given social field. In the case of the “Double Hundred” project in Fugu County, the 
strategic group is led by the “Core Group” (lingdao banzi) and comprised of local cadres 
within Fugu County across bureaucracies both horizontally and vertically.
139
 Unlike the 
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party committee that is officially constituted of formal membership, the strategic group 
takes the form of an informal network opens to the cadre representatives cross various 
layers and departments. The members are, first and foremost, connected by common 
interests in terms of material goods or immaterial goods. Material benefits mainly refer to 
subsidies for the CNSC program from the upper authorities. To be specific, the 
“demonstration villages of CNSC” program enjoy considerable advantages in the 
distribution of scarce government funds and are the main destinations for the regular 
inspection teams sent down by the county, city and provincial governments (Schubert and 
Ahlers, 2012). Immaterial incentives include, most notably, promotion, social standing 
(Heberer and Schubert, 2012) and mianzi. For instance, the effective policy 
implementation by Fugu County government has enhanced the Party secretary through 
promotion to the vice mayor of a prefecture city of Shaanxi Province, as well as a 
Municipal Party Standing Committee member in charge of industrial development and 
national assets supervision and management. The former director of the poverty 
alleviation office who used to be responsible for the implementation of the “Double 
Hundred” project was awarded “the provincial excellent individual of poverty alleviation 
and development work” (quansheng fupin kaifa gongzuo xianjin geren). Due to his 
outstanding performance, he was transferred to the bureau of industrial economy in 
charge of the establishment of the “experimental zone of transformation and upgrading of 
the private economy” at Shaanxi Provincial level (minying jingji zhuanxing shengji 
shiyanqu). As for its social standing, it includes but is not limited to power, prestige, 
knowledge, respect and rongguang (lit. “glory”). Mr. Shao proudly explained and 
highlighted the connection between local cadres’ political achievements in terms of 
common interests and rongguang: 
 
If the political achievements are outstanding, local cadres feel glorious. For example, when the 
vice mayor of Fugu County meets and talks with the vice-mayor of Jia County,
140
 our mayor feels 
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glorious and likely superior to the vice-mayor of Jia County because he works in Fugu County that 
is rich and has booming economy. He has a well-developed sense of superiority even though he 
does not put it straightforward that “My county is wealthier than yours.” Our common interest is 
to boost rural economy and improve the populace’s benefits that make us feel glorious when we 
go out to communicate with other cadres from outside of Fugu County. The leaders feel glorious 
and if upper authorities have recognized their achievements, their political prospects will be 
brilliant correspondingly.
141
 
 
Power, as an important immaterial factor in terms of shared interests, plays a crucial role 
in structuring the relations between the policy implementation and political significance 
in the case study. In 2013, Fugu County was selected as the first provincial-level 
experimental zone of transformation and upgrading of the private economy. As Schubert 
and Ahlers (2012, p.76) suggest, “[e]xperimentation and modeling are important 
components of the Chinese policy process.” The provincial government selected Fugu as 
the model county of private industry transformation due to the decreasing resource 
endowments that boost the intra-county economy simply relying on raw material 
manufacturing, on the one hand. As a rule, the private corporations in Fugu County have 
been, during the last three decades, characterized by an extensive growth pattern with low 
technology and negative impacts on the environment. On the other hand, as the board of 
directors, financial consultant and mediator, the local state has played very important 
multifaceted and strategic roles in the booming rural economy. In the meantime, the local 
state has accumulated ample experiences in terms of the sustainable development of a 
circular economy and industrial upgrading from the economic practice. In addition, the 
successful policy implementation of CNSC (the “Fugu Model” of poverty alleviation 
highlighted by the central government) based on the concrete economic foundation also 
contributes to the final decision of the upper authorities.
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As a result, the experimental county has brought the local state considerable shared 
interests in relation to political autonomy, discretionary power and funds from the upper 
authorities, and enjoyed tailor-made policies from those upper authorities. In 2014, first 
and foremost, the Shaanxi Province issued the Opinions on the Piloting Counties of Fugu 
and Shenmu under Direct Provincial Administration (shengguanxian).
143
 The prime 
criterion for the piloting counties of both Fugu and Shenmu is their powerful economic 
growth strength.144 One of the objectives of the reform is to expand the county’s 
autonomy in terms of becoming a city and promote county-wide economic growth and 
urbanization.
145
 As Yang (2013) notes, the county cadres influence the policy reform 
through three channels, through which they intend to accelerate the county’s development 
and increase the political influence of the county. The findings of Fugu officials’ behavior 
and achievements match that outlined above.146 To put it differently, first, the 
demonstration effect of poverty alleviation project (the Fugu Model) was recognized by 
the State Council in 2008; second, the successful implementation of the “Double 
Hundred” project influenced the provincial authorities on decision making in 2010, in 
which, Shaanxi Provincial Government launched a province-wide “Thousand 
Corporations Aid Thousand Villages” (qian qi qian cun) project that generally imitated 
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Fugu’s pairing schemes
147
; third, more importantly, the advanced economic position is a 
key contributor to the upper authorities' decisions on which county to choose as piloting 
county. Notably, Fugu County has entered the ranks of “China's top 100 counties” 
(zhongguo bai qiang xian) four times since 2010.
148
 The main evaluation benchmark of 
GDP in terms of county-wide economy, as the precondition and economic foundation, 
guarantees that the upper authorities will attach considerable attention to Fugu and 
Shenmu counties with regards to the shengguanxian reform. To effectively implement the 
experimental zone project and promote institutional innovations the authorities have, 
without doubt, adopted a package of measures to grant Fugu’s cadres more political 
autonomy and economic management power, associated with financial resources and 
policy supports. 
 
1.  Establish a Leading Small Group and Administrative Committee for transformation 
and upgrading of the private corporations that are under the direct administration of 
provincial authorities.
149
 
2.  Grant the private corporations considerable access to financial and land resources to 
guarantee the steady private economic growth, for example, the implementation of 
the fee waiver and electricity price subsidy policies, provision of discount loans to 
private enterprises. 
3. Cultivate leading enterprises (longtou qiye) by improving the infrastructure, setting 
up platforms for fund raising, coordinating the financial institutions for credits and 
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loans. For example, under the coordination of Fugu County Government, a leading 
project of Group B has obtained RMB 0.6 billion loans and RMB 2.5 billion 
corporate bonds. 
 
Based on the common interests in terms of material goods and immaterial factors, (i.e. 
career advancement, political influences and rongguang), and positional closeness 
(Heberer and Schubert, 2012), Fugu’s cadres establish a strategic group to strengthen the 
internal coherence. Since the cadres are in similar positions in the administrative 
hierarchy of China’s political system, on the one hand, they are in the similar situation 
and have to fulfill their task of implementing the CNSC program assigned by upper 
authorities. On the other hand, to generate social stability and regime legitimacy, they 
have to resolve the severe problems of income inequality induced by coal mining and 
conflicts between villages and corporations/mines (resistance by farmers) and satisfy the 
farmers’ demands for improvements to their livelihoods. In addition to the positional 
closeness, the similar social status, life-style patterns (habitus) and organizational 
structure (i.e. the local Party branch) also contribute to fostering group coherence 
(Heberer and Schubert, 2012). Specifically, first, the members of the strategic group are 
aware of their similar social status, that is in terms of resources, influence, reputation, 
prestige and privileges. As Mr. Jiang put it: 
 
The county [Fugu] is only this big, in other words, many people are, more or less, related by blood 
and marriage to build up the ties of kinship. Some others are connected as former army comrades, 
classmates and mahjong/cards friends. Thus we [the cadres] are bound to see much of each other 
(taitou bu jian ditou jian) and of course we know each other’s strengths and capacity not only in 
work but also in daily social life.
150
 
 
Second, they share similar life-style patterns that stem from positional closeness in local 
politics and the bureaucratic hierarchy not only through formal institutions, for instance, 
regular work meetings and attending Party schools (Heberer and Schubert, 2012), but 
also informal institutions. For example, according to my field observations, leading 
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county cadres and their families live in the prefecture city, in particular the Party 
secretary and mayor, while town cadres usually live in the county and commute to the 
towns by car, and village cadres live in towns. In this way, the county and township 
cadres perceive that they share common life-style patterns and interests in terms of career 
advancement and personal connections with the upper levels.
151
 
 
Third, the Party branch, as a formal political apparatus, played a salient role in ensuring 
the group unity of local cadres. The Communist Party led by the Party secretary unifies 
all the ideas (tongyi sixiang) of the local cadres regarding implementing policies and 
tasks (Heberer and Schubert, 2012). Moreover, in the case of Fugu County, the local state 
even establishes village-enterprise joint Party branches incorporating that of the 
corporations/mines and village. However, in addition to the formal institutions, informal 
factors also compel the party secretary to unite his subordinates. For instance, in my 
interviews, many county and town cadres highlight leadership skills, working capacity in 
terms of working experience, ability to solving problems and flexibility. Mr. Shao 
concluded that the institutions are united by the leaders with the cadres using “both carrot 
and stick” (enwei bingshi).
152
 Mr. Qiu explained this in detail: 
 
The leader should have a good personality to play an exemplary and leading role in all respects; 
working capacity, for example, speaking techniques, if the leader speaks with a stutter, the 
subordinates will not be convinced and the ability to addressing the clash between subordinates, 
maintaining the right direction of policy implementation. Another important indicator is the ability 
to managing cadres that can be not only rely on formal institutions but also the leader’s personal 
relations to the cadres, in other words, the leader has to care for the cadres’ lives, for instance, the 
leave of absence policy is rigid that the total days of leave are no more than seven days every 
month, but in practice, it is flexible otherwise the cadre will take a dislike to the leader because the 
cadre may take a leave of more than seven days this month and no days off next month. In this 
sense, the total leave days are balanced. Furthermore, the leader should also flexibly give cadres 
some treatments in terms of monetary rewards, for instance, cadres who are absent from duty get a 
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fine, while those who are on duty get an award. It is generally considered to be a very reasonable 
way of dispensing rewards and punishment because the leader should not only manage the cadres 
by assigning tasks without any extra treatment.
153
 
 
As Heberer and Schubert (2012) suggest, a strategic group that consists of the county and 
township cadres is not a “homogenous group in terms of non-conflictive in-group 
behavior. In fact, much political strife and bickering resulting from diverging interests 
going on within the cadre bureaucracy.” The factional infighting and fierce political 
competition might cause the group members to work against each other. As Mr. Qiu put it 
helplessly: 
 
Many cadres look forward to advancement so the competition is very fierce, because there are 
only two places for section chief level or deputy section chief level, but there are six or seven even 
eight candidates fighting for the places when the selection is made. All cadres want to be 
recommended by the leader as they all claim that they have worked in the position for many years 
already. However, the recommendation standard is not only based on performance evaluation, but 
also the important work the cadre has fulfilled. In addition, personal relations and impressions are 
considered as well. In other words, the cadre should have a good personality and has to do more 
work. If the cadre has a good personality and is accepted by other cadres, he will be accepted by 
the leader accordingly. In fact, the leader also listens to other cadres' opinions. Only when the 
cadre is accepted by other cadres and leader, will the cadres vote for and the leader recommends 
the cadre but finally it is still decided by the leaders (i.e. organizational department). The township 
cadres have little prospects of advancement due to the fierce competition and limited space of the 
strict hierarchical system. It depends on your own capacity besides the length of service. The 
capacity refers not only the work ability but also the personal relation with upper levels.
154
 
 
Nevertheless, the positional closeness and shared habitus nurture collective identity that 
strengthens the internal group coherence (Heberer and Schubert, 2012). Specifically, the 
shared identity within the strategic group results from the common networks the cadres 
belong to, the members’ shared experiences and similar life-style patterns, equal positions 
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in China’s politics and access to specific information in the locality. The common 
networks consist of formal and informal networks. The former is established through 
official occasions, such as, regular meetings and Party school trainings, and the 
mechanism that ties up the cadres works together in important Party and government 
organizations. The informal networks are embedded in informal institutions, for instance, 
social customs, norms and local knowledge. Mr. Qiu elaborated how local custom in 
terms of giving a gift or money (suili) and mianzi connect the local cadres closely: 
 
The custom of giving a gift or money is based on mutual courtesy. One invitation hands out and 
means all cadres have to attend the event (i.e. an engagement ceremony, a wedding, a child’s 12th 
birthday
155
 or a funeral). Even though the cadre is not able to turn up in person, he has to give 
money in the range of RMB 300-500. If the cadre neither shows up nor gives money, it is 
perceived that the relation between the two cadres is not very good. The invitations connect the 
cadres in the group. If the cadre doesn’t attend, he will be ostracized by other cadres and excluded 
from the group. Moreover, mianzi is another factor involved in the invitation custom. For instance, 
I am just getting to know a village cadre and then the cadre invites me. Because of mianzi, he 
invites a lot of people and if the town cadre presents, he feels having more mianzi in front of his 
guests. For this reason, I have spent more than RMB 3,000 out of my RMB 4,000 salary on the 
invitations this month.
156
 
 
The access to specific policy and information ensures that the cadres within the strategic 
group perceive themselves to be distinct from other groups in terms of farmers, 
entrepreneurs so that strengthens their shared identity. For instance, Mr. Jiang explained 
the reason why the local state organized the policy dissemination in particular among the 
entrepreneurs as follows: 
 
The private entrepreneurs in Fugu County generally have low educational levels. They don't know 
much about Party and state's policies or they lack the access to coal-related policy and information. 
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Some corporations invest in building temples in villages to pray for favorable weather, but this is 
feudal superstition and against the policy of CNSC program. Thus, we (poverty alleviation 
officials) have to help them to get access to the correct information and policy, for example, the 
“three rural policy” (sannong zhengce).
157
 
 
As a result, the county and township cadres within the strategic group are tightly bounded 
together by the shared identity. They develop and strengthen a group spirit and realize 
that they have to undertake cooperative action to implement the CNSC program. The 
goal-oriented strategic cooperation is reinforced by local cadres' institutional environment 
and a collective identity. By implementing the CNSC program cooperatively, the cadres 
gain more benefits resulted from positive evaluations, maintain and expand their common 
interests in terms of promotions, establishing experimental zones, piloting political 
reform of the county (shengguanxian) and influence on policy making (i.e. the 
“Thousand Corporations Aid Thousand Villages” rural development project). 
 
5.3.2 Strategic Agency in the Implementation of the “Double Hundred” Project 
 
Strategic agency and a collective identity are the major features of strategic groups. 
Strategic agency refers to “the gathering of strategic information and the commitment to 
strategic analyses, strategic planning, and strategic (policy) implementation as much as 
continuous organizational learning” (Heberer and Schubert, 2012). County and township 
officials engage in strategic agency to effectively implement the CNSC program in order 
to maintain their relative political autonomy and discretionary power from upper 
authorities. However, the outcomes of policy implementation (i.e. strategic agency) are 
determined by (a) external factors in terms of economic development, resource 
endowment (i.e. financial and human capitals, and, in the case, coal resources); various 
project monitoring and evaluation systems in terms of inspection from upper levels and 
cadre performance evaluation; (b) incentive mechanisms consist of extrinsic incentives, 
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such as material goods in terms of remuneration and rewards, and immaterial goods in 
terms of career advancement, social status, prestige, respect, mianzi; intrinsic motivation 
including personal background, experiences and values, etc.; (c) discretionary power in 
terms of “organized anarchy” (Heberer and Schubert 2012, p. 239). The extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivations are identical for all or many counties in contemporary rural China 
(Heberer and Schubert 2012, p. 240), and given the assumption that other external factors 
are similar with regard to economic development, financial and fiscal resources and 
institutional constraints, it argues that examining the discretionary power in terms of 
leeway and autonomy in policy process is necessary to explain the different patterns of 
strategic agency. 
 
In Fugu County, strategic agency results in effective implementation of the CNSC 
program by virtue of the success of the “Double Hundred” project. The 20-character 
guideline (see Chapter 1) encourages, in line with all such general policy statements, 
broad interpretations in response to local conditions. In this sense, local governments are 
required to make specific blueprints to promote local rural development within the 
central framework. To be specific, Fugu County officials framed a “Comprehensive Plan 
for the CNSC Program (2007-2012)” that incorporates 20 town/township plans and 102 
village plans, and a “Construction Plan for Four Agricultural Zones.”
158
 County and 
township governments are the actors of implementing the specific projects in accordance 
with the blueprint and local conditions. In the case of Fugu County, for instance, various 
projects including infrastructure construction (i.e. roads, schools, electric grid and 
drinking water), relocation projects, and modernization of agricultural production 
(i.e. greenhouse vegetable planting, agricultural products processing and livestock 
breeding) are carried out. The local state enjoys considerable leeway and autonomy to 
carry out the program. For instance, one model village (yangban cun) and 12 prefectural 
standard demonstration villages (shifan cun) are established by the Fugu County 
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government.
159
 These model/demonstration villages are decided by the leading cadres in 
charge of the program and enjoy considerable advantages in resource allocation in terms 
of government funds and political importance attached by upper inspections. For instance, 
in 2006, the Bureau of Finance appropriated RMB 4 million in earmarked funds to 
develop the piloting/demonstration villages in order to generate four models.
160
 
 
Concerning the implementation funds, Fugu County Government finances the CNSC 
program with transfer payments or earmarked funds provided by higher levels of 
government (Schubert and Ahlers, 2012), and is thus required to provide matching funds 
(peitao zijin) for the earmarked funds. For this reason, the local state has the obligation of 
raising matching funds. As argued in Section 5.3, the county and township governments 
encounter fiscal constraints due to the uneven economic development and widening 
regional inequality and disparity induced by coal mining in Fugu County. However, in 
return, the fiscal constraints have given Fugu County Government some financial leeway 
and opportunities to innovate its institutions. In the meantime, the social instability results 
from frequent village-enterprise/mine conflicts over land requisition, pollution and 
compensation imposes severe pressure on local cadres not only the regime legitimacy, but 
also the local cadres’ performance evaluations. Mr. Qiu described how the resistance by 
farmers, in other words, the petition system, has imposed huge pressure on the local 
cadres: 
 
When a farmer appeals to county, city and provincial authorities to complain, the Complaints 
Bureau (xinfang ju) from upper level just telephones us to bring the farmer bac, issuing an eight-
character instruction: “make them return, address the issue” (ren ling huiqu, shi yao jiejue). The 
pressure is consequently imposed on us. Furthermore, the farmers’ petitions are among the defined 
indicators to assess the local cadres’ performance in the end of every year. Thus the grassroots 
cadres really have big pressure from both upper levels and local populace. Without the grassroots 
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cadres, the populace would rise up.
161
 
 
This concern is echoed by Mrs. Zhou, the head of Wujiazhuang Town.
162
 Thus the local 
state has to take actions to respond to pressures from above (i.e. performance evaluation 
that may lead to demotion or dismissal) and to maintain regime legitimacy. In this context, 
CSR is adopted by the local officials to incorporate coal mines and coal-related 
corporations to initiate the “Double Hundred” project which is under the framework of 
the CNSC program. Through the effective implementation of “Double Hundred” project, 
first and foremost, the local state solves the trouble of shortage of matching funds of the 
CNSC program, associated with maintaining social stability at local level, and political 
significance recognized by upper levels in respect to experimental zone of private 
economic transformation and upgrading, piloting county of shengguanxian system and 
career advancement. 
 
I argue that the local cadres, as a strategic group, fully play a role as a strategic agency to 
formulate collective aims, take cooperative actions in carrying out the “Double Hundred” 
project. To examine the strategic agency in the case study of implementation of “Double 
Hundred” project, I show how the organizational structure of the project that involves 
government departments and coordinating body is established, how the roles of local 
cadres function as strategic group, how the project is designed and launched in 
chronological sequence and how the strategic agency constituted and in the section. 
The “Double Hundred” project is coordinated by Fugu’s Leading Small Group of Rural 
Work (Fuguxian nongcun gongzuo lingdao xiaozu) under Fugu’s Party Department of 
Rural Work (Fugu xianwei nongcun gongzuobu). 28 project-related departments and 
organs are coordinated by the Leading Small Group of Rural Work that integrates all the 
information concerning the “Double Hundred” project by investigating the details and 
links of project implementation, and coordinates the cooperation of all government 
                                                 
161 
INT-18-201309. 
 
162 
INT-22-201211. 
 
157 
 
departments and organs in case there are overlapping responsibilities arise during the 
project implementation (Schubert and Ahlers 2012, p. 72). As argued earlier, the leading 
county cadres include 11 members of Fugu's Party Standing Committee who are the most 
influential members in the strategic group. The Leading Small Group is led by the mayor 
and composed of 28 project-related department heads and many town leading cadres 
within Fugu County across bureaucracies both horizontally and vertically (see Figure 5.1). 
They together are the main operators in the strategic group implementing the “Double 
Hundred” project. 
 
Figure 5.1: Organizational Structure of the “Double Hundred” Project: 
Government Departments and Coordinating Body 
Leading County Cadres 
 
Department of Rural Works 
Leading Small Group of Rural Works Office  
(Coordinating Body) 
 
 
28 Related Departments: 
Safety Inspection 
Reform and Development  
Human Resources and Social Security 
Finance 
Agriculture 
Forestry 
Waterworks 
Technology 
Civil Affairs 
Poverty Alleviation 
Livestock 
Agricultural Investment Co. Ltd. (County Owned) 
Transportation 
Land Resources 
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Audit 
Health 
Family Planning 
Statistics  
Industrial Economy 
Education 
Energy 
Radio and TV 
Supply and Marketing Cooperative 
Electrical Power 
Telecommunications 
Youth League Committee 
Women’s Federation 
Disabled Federation 
Source: Own compilation 
 
The various roles and functions of the actors in terms of county and town cadres and 
entrepreneurs in the implementation of the “Double Hundred” project are stipulated 
distinctly by the scheme of “Double Hundred” project (see Table 5.1). Among the 
members, as the top leader of the strategic group, the role of the Party secretary attracts 
the most attention. According to Mr. Shao, between 2006 and 2009, the Party secretary 
united the members by stressing the importance of the “Double Hundred” project, and the 
mayor took responsibilities for specific work, for example, when he carried out 
inspections in villages, he asked the corporations how much money they had given, and 
pushed those that had not done so. When the mayor took up the position of Party 
secretary in 2009, he did not shift the specific work to the mayor but was still in charge of 
the “Double Hundred” project163 The Party secretary’s dedication to the project decision-
making and implementation explains the importance of the role, why the project has 
achieved positive outcomes and his personal career advancement consequently. In this 
sense, the Party secretary “does not only figure as the chief designer of local policies, but 
also has to ensure group cohesion and the compliance of all members to follow the 
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leading core's decision” (Heberer and Schubert, 2012, p. 233). Although the 
responsibilities among the actors may overlap, for example, the heads of “assist the 
town” (baozhen) government departments, the public institutions and town cadres 
concerning carrying out projects, they may not bring negative effect on the project 
implementation but, to some degree, reinforce the outcomes of fund raising from the coal 
mines/corporations. 
 
Table 5.1: Fugu’s Actors and Functions of “Double Hundred” Project Compared 
The role of actors specified in Fugu’s “Double 
Hundred” project 
The responsibility of actors specified in Fugu’s 
“Double Hundred” project 
1. Leading county cadres-General initiator 1. To mobilize and push the public institutions 
and enterprises to make contributions to the 
pairing villages in terms of human power and 
funds; 
To organize the public institutions and 
enterprises to tie up long-term and stable pairing 
relationship with villages. 
2. Leading town cadres (Party secretaries and 
heads)- Project principal responsible persons 
2. To design the pairing scheme and blueprint of 
town “Construction of a New Socialist 
Countryside” program and implement “Double 
Hundred” project; 
To carry out the projects on the ground, ensure 
and follow up project funds, coordinate the 
relationship between “assist town” government 
departments, public institutions and enterprises, 
evaluate and manage the village-stationed cadres 
designate by public institutions; 
To contact agriculture departments and project 
management offices for technical assistance.  
3. Leading Small Group of Rural Work-General 
coordinator and researcher 
 
 
3. To make decisions on selection of specific 
project plans and projects submitted by 
township governments for funding, final 
allocation of funds, and the participation and 
coordination of government agencies; 
To study the details of implementation of 
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“Double Hundred” project, refine the orders 
from Fugu County Government; 
To formulate monthly, quarterly and yearly 
reports and evaluation systems, push the project 
progress. 
4. “Assist the Town” government department 
leaders-General assistant  
4. To assist the county level cadres in carrying 
out specific tasks by monitoring public 
institutions and enterprises, including design 
construction plan, promote infrastructure 
construction, develop a characteristic industry 
and labor economy. 
5. Heads of public institutions- Project specific 
responsible persons (fund raiser)  
 
 
5. To be paired with aided villages and push the 
coal mine/corporations to send funds to aided 
villages; 
To carry out projects by investigating in 
villages, introducing technology and generating 
incomes.  
6. Agriculture-relevant departments-Technical 
assistance 
6. To provide technical assistance, ensure good 
use of funds, eliminate funds abuse.  
7. Coal mines and coal related corporations-
Project fund pillar 
7. To timely send funds in accordance with the 
pairing scheme and poverty alleviation plan;  
To help villagers to develop third industry, 
promote labor economy by employing rural 
surplus labor force. 
8. News media-Watchdog 8. To publicize the good performance of public 
institutions, enterprises and cadres, expose any 
poor project implementation.  
Source: Own compilation 
 
Once the coordinating body is established and project-related government departments 
are confirmed, the project design and implementation are conducted in a chronological 
sense. First, in 2006, the county Party secretary and mayor led the heads of relevant 
departments to repeatedly and extensively conduct investigation and research in villages 
and enterprises. Their findings included: (1) The core issue of the conflicts between 
mines/corporations and villages that result in farmers' collective petitions to authorities is 
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the farmers in the business operation areas demand the corporations/mines to restore the 
destroyed production and living conditions and to increase their income. (2) The 
institutional foundation for guiding enterprises to engage in poverty alleviation existed in 
Fugu County since 1995. More than 300 industrial enterprises and 100 coal-related 
enterprises have conducted aid projects in the business operating areas, including road 
construction, drinking water supply and power grid renovation. Some entrepreneurs have 
engaged in poverty alleviation practice in their hometown villages, including 
infrastructure construction; some made donations to charity or poor students; some give 
money to help those in need who approach them. The practice in 1995-2006 was 
characterized by spontaneous and voluntary giving. (3) To a large extent, 
mines/corporations are willing to improve the local production and living conditions 
because they also enjoy the considerable advantages of the program in terms of smooth 
and fast business operations. (4) More importantly, because Fugu’s corporations gained 
strength to develop into conglomerates, most of them have the economic foundation to 
engage in poverty reduction practice.
164
 
 
Second, in March 2007, building on the principle of “government guides actively, 
enterprises participate voluntarily” (zhengfu jiji yindao, qiye ziyuan canyu), Fugu County 
Government issued the “Arrangements by Fugu County Government Regarding the 
Implementation of the ‘Double Hundred’ Project to Promote CNSC” that determined that 
155 functional departments and 176 mines and coal-related enterprises (accounting for 
33% of all mines and corporations in Fugu County) be paired with 165 villages 
(accounting for 42.5% of all administrative villages in the county), seven strong 
economic towns
165
 located in middle and west supported seven pure agricultural towns 
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See internal report, Womende zuji-Fugu Xian shehui zhuyi xinnongcun jianshe jishi (Our Footprints: 
Record of Fugu’s CNSC Program Implementation). 
 
165 
In 2011, according to the town planning, the number of town-level jurisdictions changed from 12 towns 
and eight townships to 15 towns in Fugu County. See Shaanxisheng fabu chexiangbingzhen ji bufen 
xiangzhen xingzheng quhua tiaozheng gonggao (The Announcement of Dismantling Townships and 
Merging Towns Issued by Shaanxi Province). Website of The Central People’s Government of PRC. 
http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2011-07/07/content_1901351.htm (accessed 5 October 2015). Among the 15 towns, 
there are seven pure agricultural towns having no coal resource or industrial base and eight economic towns 
extracting revenues from coal-led industry.  
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located in east and south (see Table 5.2). The pairing institutions functioned on the basis 
of entrepreneurs’ wishes, some of them wished to help their hometown villages; some 
wished to support the villages in their business operation areas; some wished to aid the 
villages that had connection with them. For those entrepreneurs who didn’t have specific 
desires, the government made decisions to pair villages with them. 
 
Meanwhile, the local state arranged 20 county-level leaders and 20 county-level 
functional departments to assist 20 towns in implementing the “Double Hundred” project 
and connect with 40 villages. It also determined 34 county-level leaders, 34 functional 
departments, 34 working groups and 53 enterprises and mines that must assist 34 key 
villages in CNSC program. Shortly after the policy was formulated, the Leading Small 
Group of Rural Work deliberately organized a mobilizing meeting attended by all county 
and town leaders, and heads of project-related functional departments, villages receiving 
aid, and listed enterprises were involved. The county government’s main purpose of 
convening the meeting was to mobilize entrepreneurs to engage in the implementation of 
the “Double Hundred” project in a dynamic environment. The mobilizing meeting was 
held once every year, under the rubric of rural work. The following narrative by Mr. Shao 
presents how government agencies and enterprises interacted at the mobilizing meeting: 
 
The meeting is held at beginning of every year. First, the Party secretary and mayor give speeches. 
After that, the functional departments in charge and villages describe the project plan this year, 
then the enterprises and mines state clearly their stand. When the government leaders encourage 
the enterprises, they say, “The profits of your business are so high. Even though you give much 
money out, so what?” Once one enterprise or mine offers RMB 500,000, the others just follow 
unless your mine has encountered some problems of running down. In this case, you can give less, 
something like RMB 300,000. The declaration of donation amount is made one by one, so 
everyone can hear how much others give. Because of mianzi, you will feel ashamed if you give 
less than others.
166
 
 
Third, in April 2008, Fugu County Government reissued the “Arrangements by Fugu 
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County Government Regarding the Continuous Implementation of ‘Double Hundred’ 
Project to Promote CNSC,” based on the lessons and experiences learnt in 2007. It 
determined that 158 functional departments and 173 enterprises and mines should aid 162 
villages (see Table 5.2). The number of economic towns required to support pure 
agricultural towns fell from seven to six. Since the infrastructure constructions were 
nearly completed in 2007, the focus of the CNSC program shifted to agricultural 
industrialization in 2008. Table 5.2 compares the funds contributed by the coal mines and 
coal-related corporations, and the engagement in the “Double Hundred” project between 
2007 and 2010. Apparently, the mines/corporations have made overwhelming 
contributions to solving the shortage of funds for CNSC program because the funds made 
available by corporations/mines are 28.4 fold of the earmarked funds appropriated by the 
Bureau of Finance between 2006 and 2008.
167
 
 
Table 5.2: Fugu’s “Double Hundred” Project Funds Raised and Engagement 
Compared (2007-10) (Billion RMB) 
 
Year Project 
Funds 
Raised 
 
 
 
 
Earmarked  
Funds  
Appropriated 
 
 
Projects 
Completed 
Number of 
Enterprises/Mines 
Engaged 
Number of 
Public 
Institutions 
Engaged 
Villages 
Involved 
2007 0.161  0.012  261 176 155 165 
2008 0.180    208 173 158 162 
2009 0.184    200    
2010 0.310    199    
Total 0.835
168
     868    
Source: Own compilation 
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 According to the internal report, the earmarked funds appropriated by the Bureau of Finance are 
calculated for the period 2006 to 2008 (RMB 12 million), while the funds collected by corporations/mines 
are from the period 2007-2008 (RMB 341 million). 
 
168 The total Project Funds I calculated are based on the breakdown of funds. It is different from the figure 
in the internal report issued by Fugu County Government that is RMB 0.909 billion. 
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5.3.3 The Consolidation of the Strategic Group: Local Private Entrepreneurs 
Incorporated in the Strategic Group 
 
In virtue of the combination of open and informal traits, the leading county and town 
cadres have successfully incorporated the local private entrepreneurs in the strategic 
group. In the “Double Hundred” project, the local cadres have created a formal 
institutional environment of participation in the project implementation. The local 
officials interact with and incorporate local coal miners/entrepreneurs vividly through a 
package of measures. In more detail, there are quite a few measures that equally involve 
the local cadres and entrepreneurs. First, county leading cadres actively and publicly 
propagate the “Double Hundred” project. Second, an incentive system is introduced, 
whereby the corporations that make great contributions in the “Double Hundred” project 
are given priority to resource allocation. Third, local cadres advise entrepreneurs to aid 
the poor by describing the poor people’s living conditions and recall the hardship they 
themselves experienced prior to establishing their corporations. This plays on the moral 
duty of the entrepreneurs to be true to their roots and thus to cultivate their mianzi. Fourth, 
aside from these measures, the local state creates a favorable environment to encourage 
local enterprises to take part in the project, including media reports and exposures. For 
the entrepreneurs who had donated a large amount of money and made notable 
contributions to the “Double Hundred” project and other social development programs, 
the local media, including newspaper and TV station highlighted their engagement in the 
poverty alleviation practice; conversely, poor project implementations are exposed as 
negative examples. The local state creates several exemplary entrepreneurial models by 
holding commendation meetings calling paragon entrepreneurs wearing red ribbons and 
flowers onto the stage and presenting them with awards. In 2008, 48 coal corporations 
received commendations from the local state for their considerable contributions in terms 
donations to the project. In the same year, to promote the coal boss's political and social 
status, the local state even employed four coal bosses who had paid more than RMB 10 
million taxes in the previous year, associated with notable donation in the rural 
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development projects, to work as assistants to the county mayor. According to the 
director of the Organization Department of the Party Committee, these four county mayor 
assistants continued working in their past functions (butuochan), while being seconded to 
the county government and entitled to take part in the process of economic development 
decision making. However, they were removed from office after eight months due to the 
strong force of public opinion.
169
 On top of these, appointing the coal mine owners or 
managers to work as village cadres is quite common in this county. For instance, one 
mine owner as well as manager was appointed by the town government as a village’s 
Party secretary.
170
 
 
However, the informal institutions (involving, broadly, networks, norms, customs and 
personal relations in the form of guanxi) that are deeply intertwined further prove that 
they not only connect the local cadres closely but also contribute to the effective 
implementation of the “Double Hundred” project. For instance, the pairing meeting is 
supposed to be a formal institution created by the local state to encourage the local 
entrepreneurs to engage in the fund raising practice. However, the informal social 
networks and other relations lead to competition and emulation due to peer pressure and 
the mianzi “ideology.”As Mr. Cao put it: 
 
The pairing meeting affects a lot on the entrepreneurs because it creates big pressure for others to 
follow and donate. Some complain that they are forced to donate or aid the poor villages or 
otherwise lose mianzi in front of other entrepreneurs.
171
 
 
In addition to that, local cadres are encouraged to befriend entrepreneurs. Building on 
friendship, the cadres are very likely to convince the coal mine/corporations to engage in 
the “Double Hundred” project in respect of fund raising. Mr. Shao, the senior officer of 
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http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/14562/8759256.html (accessed 5 October 2015). 
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the Rural Work Department as well as one of the members of Leading Small Group, is 
responsible for raising funds for his village from the coal mines/corporations. He 
explained how guanxi functions in the process of fund raising: 
 
The heads of government departments have personal relations with owners, some are hometown 
fellows, some are classmates. I come from a village in the east that is a purely agricultural area 
without coal mines. I have a classmate who owns a coal mine in another town and I let him assist 
my village for two years by means of the relationship of classmate. In that year, the owner and 
town/village cadres were convened by me in order to persuade the owner to give money. He was 
not born in our village, but he spent his childhood in my hometown, a production team at that time, 
so he still has special feelings for the village. Other corporations that were arranged to pair with 
my village are reluctant to send funds, but I have no solutions because I don't have personal 
relations with the owners. In another case, it is about networking. One corporation located in 
Xinmin Town funds my village through Xinmin Town’s Party secretary. I invited the owner and 
the Party secretary to a meal and finally he agreed to aid my village. Without the Party secretary, I 
was unable to invite him and make things done.172 
 
Moreover, the local state has formulated a favorable ideological rationale with which to 
promote the implementation of the poverty alleviation program. The ideological tenor is: 
 
1. Local consensus is reached in the locality that “coal resources are owned by the state, 
and the corporations’ business is legal. Once the masses experience difficulties, the 
corporations should help them.” 
2. Positive ideas promoted by Party organizations and cadres involves maxims like 
“when everyone helps each other, there'll be no poor people” (renren bang renren, 
shishang wu qiongren). 
3. The principle of “the government helps corporations to solve their difficulties in 
business, and enterprises help government to share worries in social development.” 
4. The win-win notion of “promoting corporations’ and farmers’ common 
development.” 
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The formal and informal institutional factors enriched with such ideological reasoning 
and practices, join together to undergird the strategic agency of local cadres in project 
implementation and in particular fund raising. The mines/corporations are officially 
encouraged to send funds to the “Double Hundred” project voluntarily by pairing with 
poor villages. In this sense, the local cadres command a discretionary power to persuade 
the coal mine owners/entrepreneurs to ensure contributions are made, but mainly through 
informal networks. Furthermore, the formal and informal institutions have established the 
symbiotic relations between villages and mines/corporations; locate state and 
corporations in Fugu County. 
 
5.3.4 The Internal Evaluation System 
 
As the formal institutional constraint, the internal evaluation system also plays an 
important role in ensuring the effective implementation of the “Double Hundred” project. 
The assessment system of towns and departments is established and conducted by the 
Leading Small Group of Rural Works. The assessment of project implementation and 
management is conducted quarterly in order to, on a regular basis, inspect and control the 
progress of project implementation. The comprehensive evaluations are conducted at the 
end of each year. The results of quarterly assessments are considered in the annual 
comprehensive evaluation system. As Mr. Shao recounts, according to the final 
comprehensive evaluation results, towns and departments that perform the project 
implementation relatively well used to be rewarded RMB 10,000-20,000 but nowadays 
they receive “spiritual” encouragement like metal plaques, because the practice of giving 
material rewards has been abolished by upper levels.
173
 The career advancement of the 
Party secretary and the director of the poverty alleviation office (Section 5.3.1) is an 
exemplary demonstration of the cadres’ overall excellent performance. In contrast, for 
those towns and departments that stand at the bottom of the final list, the internal 
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evaluation system imposes pressure on them because the public list within all government 
agencies makes the cadres lose mianzi and their departments or towns may be punished 
by future fund reductions (Schubert and Ahlers 2012, p. 83). Without doubt, the 
incentives and punishments of the internal evaluation system unite the local cadres to 
take strategic cooperative actions to fulfill the project and expand their common interests. 
 
5.3.5 CSR as Strategic Agency and as a Redistribution Mechanism 
 
The strategic group in Fugu County adopts administrative and economic measures to 
transfer resources from the corporate sector to villages in order to compensate for poverty 
and loss of livelihood under the heading of CSR schemes. In fact, apart from the 
implementation of the “Double Hundred” project that is the focus of this study, the local 
state has formulated a package of redistribution mechanisms to minimize the downsides 
induced by coal mining: 
 
1. In December 2006, the local state issued the Guidelines on Setting up the 
Compensatory Mechanism for Coal Resources Exploitation and Conflict Resolution 
to levy a compensation fund at RMB 3 per ton for state-owned, township and village 
coal mines, and RMB 1 per ton for coal mines supporting large coal fueled electricity 
plants and chemical projects. 70% of the compensation fund is used to compensate 
the farmers and villages that are immediately affected by coal mining, in other words, 
the county government collects the compensation fund and distributes it to towns, 
then the town governments transfer it to the villages and finally the village cadres 
hand it over to the farmers.
174
 30% of the compensation fund is used to subsidize the 
farmers who are indirectly affected and do not have coal mines in their area. It is 
called a coal subsidy for the winter season. The local state accumulated RMB 0.36 
billion between 2006 and 2010. 
2.  In September 2008, Fugu County Government issued the Implementation Measures 
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for the Land Collapsed Areas on Ecological Rehabilitation and Relocation Projects. 
The relocation project is embedded in the CNSC program by the local state. The coal 
mines and enterprises have invested RMB 0.75 billion in the relocation project, 
covering over 8,000 farmers in 60 villages who are affected immediately by coal 
mining. 
3. Fugu’s government also persuades the private entrepreneurs and their enterprises to 
engage in social programs, expanding them to the whole county. In 2010, 57 coal 
business entrepreneurs and the 77 coal mines they own donated RMB 1.28 billion to 
build a high-grade middle school, one vocational school, one primary school and one 
hospital located in the county so that all the residents in the county could benefit from 
the educational and medical facilities. Shortly afterwards, the government organized 
other entrepreneurs involved in coal chemistry and the magnesium industry to 
contribute RMB 0.276 billion to set up one education foundation and one serious 
illness aid foundation, in which the government inputs RMB 30,000,000 in the two 
respective foundations.
175
 
 
These redistribution mechanisms are seen as the strategic agency displayed by the local 
state not only serve to compensate for poverty and loss of livelihood, but also bring about 
positive outcomes of local regime and expand their common interests in terms of 
promotions, experimental zone, piloting county of political reform (shengguanxian) and 
influence on policy making (i.e. the "Thousand Corporations Aid Thousand Villages" 
project). 
 
5.4 Summary 
 
First, this chapter described the differences and features among the Party Committee 
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 See Jiaoyu jijin (Education and Health Care: Education Foundation). Website of Fugu County 
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(Education and Health Care: Serious Illness Aid Foundation). Website of Fugu County Government. 
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leadership small group, the state/local people’s government and strategic group in the 
policy making and implementation process. Compared to the very formal CCP and the 
state, the strategic group served as the informal coordination institution, which is an open 
and informal network consisting of influential people at various levels who share 
common interests. However, the Party, the state and the strategic group share overlapping 
lines of authority and Party officials play dual roles both in the Party and government 
organs. 
 
The chapter then examined how the leading county and town cadres in Fugu County 
establish a strategic group in order to effectively implement CNSC. It shows that the 
strategic group is led by the “Core Group” (lingdao banzi) and comprised of local cadres 
within Fugu County across bureaucracies both horizontally and vertically through 
common interests in terms of material goods or immaterial goods. Material goods include 
scarce government funds distributed from upper authorities after regular inspections. 
Immaterial incentives include promotion, social standing, mianzi and rongguang and so 
on. The strategic group plays a systemic strategic agency to implement CNSC by 
designing a “Double Hundred” project in line with CNSC. Furthermore, the strategic 
group has successfully incorporated the local private entrepreneurs in the project 
implementation through formal and informal mechanisms. As a consequence, the local 
coal mine owners/entrepreneurs have become part of the strategic group. 
 
Finally, the chapter demonstrated that CSR is institutionalized by the strategic group as a 
redistribution mechanism to compensate for poverty and loss of livelihood. The powerful 
mechanism as part of the strategic agency played an important role in the effective 
implementation of CNSC.  
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Chapter 6. Case Studies of Xinmin Town and Wujiazhuang Town 
 
6.1 Preamble 
 
Town governments are the major implementers of the “Double Hundred” project. This 
chapter investigates two cases that display diverging patterns of strategic agency in the 
implementation of the “Double Hundred” project at the town level. The case of Xinmin 
Town represents approaches in which miners are voluntarily compelled to adopt various 
mechanisms in order to deal with severe conflicts between enterprises/mines and villages 
in business operation areas, while the case of Wujiazhuang Town demonstrates the 
countermeasures undertaken in an entrepreneur’s hometown that is a purely agricultural 
village without a coal endowment. Both case studies suggest that informal institutional 
factors (i.e. local customs, personal relations, prestige, skills, knowledge, affinity and 
mianzi) are manifest within the broader framework formal institutional arrangements in 
terms of fund raising, redistribution and mediation mechanisms during the 
implementation of the rural development project. Nevertheless, Wujiazhuang Town has 
used much more informal institutions to raise funds since the town cadres encounter 
severe fiscal constraints, rather than relying on financial appropriation from upper 
authority and pairing enterprises. 
 
The case studies are organized in three parts. First, I describe the socioeconomic situation 
of Ximin Town and explore how local town cadres create diverging patterns of strategic 
agency by examining the mechanisms of fund raising, redistribution and mediation. 
Second, I present the case of Wujiazhuang Town in a similar format with Xinmin Town. 
Third, some commonalities and differences between the two cases are compared. 
 
6.2 The Case of Xinmin Town 
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6.2.1 Field Setting 
 
Xinmin Town is situated in the west of Fugu County and is home to more than 12,000 
residents in 3,539 households and a 16,000-strong “floating” population. It covers 204 
square kilometers and manages 11 administrative villages and 95 natural villages. In 
contrast with other parts of Fugu County, Xinmin Town owns abundant coal resources 
and is referred to as the “western gateway” of Fugu’s economy and one of the most 
dynamic areas in northern Shaanxi’s social and economical developments during the last 
decade. The 51 enterprises in Xinmin Town include 21 restructured coal mines, three 
industrial parks, eight metal magnesium factories and 19 other type of enterprises. The 
town accounts for 96% of the county’s revenues.
176
 
 
With its booming local economy, Xinmin Town has become one of the most attractive 
towns in northern Shaanxi. It was given the status awards of “National Key Town” 
(quanguo zhongdian zhen),
177
 “Shaanxi Provincial Key Town,” and “Yulin Prefectural 
Key Demonstration Town.” Nevertheless, the rapid and massive coal mining has induced 
profound social and environmental problems that are illustrated in Section 5.3. As such 
dissatisfactions intensify, social order has become more problematic and the danger 
increases that local cadres seek to divert discontent by creating a redistribution system 
through the “Double Hundred” project. 
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6.2.2 Fund Raising Mechanisms 
 
As the major implementers of the “Double Hundred” project, town governments have 
listed tasks to fulfill. One of the most important and urgent issues is to push the 
mines/corporations to send funds. According to the pairing schemes formulated by county 
government, towns with mines and coal-related corporations are more likely to have 
access to getting funds. A large number of mines/corporations aid local villages in the 
business operation areas because they have to respond to the social and economic 
pressures exerted by the farmers (see Chapter 5). In this sense, they are forced to pair 
with local villages to improve their living and production conditions that are beneficial to 
corporations manufacturing as well. However, besides the formal financial resources 
provided by mines/corporations in terms of pairing agreements, informal networks 
(i.e. personal relations) are embedded in town and upper governments. Mr. Qiu 
elaborated how personal relations (guanxi) impact on the outcome of project 
implementation with regard to fund raising: 
 
If you have close relationship with the Poverty Alleviation Office, you will get more funds for 
poverty reduction. In theory, there is specific standard of poverty alleviation funds allocating to 
each town, but it's also possible to allocate more funds (i.e. RMB 100,000) to your town. For 
example, our Party secretary used to keep regular contacts with the Poverty Alleviation Office, 
inviting the leaders to meals and having more communications, which means the Poverty 
Alleviation Office is expected to take more care of our town when allocating funds. In the end, the 
relations between the Poverty Alleviation Office and our town become closer.
178
 
 
As argued in Chapter 4, town governments not only get hold of the power of approval 
and resource allocation, but also the coordinating forces of land circulation and 
compensation. The official services of town governments have guaranteed 
mines/corporations to maximize profits, and in return, the personal relations between 
town cadres and mine owners/entrepreneurs facilitate fund raising at grassroots level. As 
Mr. Qiu put it: 
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We do not ask for more money from local mines/corporations unless there are exceptional cases 
that the farmers have encountered extreme difficulties. For example, one farmer was unable to pay 
for the hospital fee, the former town mayor telephoned one mine owner to give RMB 5,000 to that 
farmer because the mayor knew the owner quite well. In general, the town Party secretary and 
mayor have close relations with mine owners or entrepreneurs by having meals together 
sometimes. Since mines/corporations are managed by town government, they still need the 
approval of town Party secretary and mayor, and relevant cadres. You can’t manage all things 
relying on formal institutions, some private relations may make things easier.
179
 
 
Mr. Qiu’s explanation matches that of Mr. Shao (see Chapter 5) in recognizing that 
personal relations, together with other informal institutions, interlock with formal pairing 
schemes and mobilizing meeting in the process of fund raising at or across county and 
town levels. 
 
6.2.3 Redistribution Mechanisms 
 
A large number of mines and coal-related corporations in Xinmin Town pair with villages 
located in their business operation areas that create a pairing model representing the 
business operation area. In 2007, 14 villages were paired with mines or coal-related 
corporations that accounted for 82.4% of total administrative villages. The town 
government has introduced a package of measures to compensate for structural poverty 
and address conflicts of interests under the pairing schemes. From 2006 to 2010, farmers’ 
average income increased by 2.66 times and their production and living conditions were 
greatly improved through buying shares in enterprises/mines, renting land to 
enterprises/mines, working in enterprises, contracting construction projects and providing 
service trade. 
 
6.2.3.1 Purchasing Shares and Earning Dividends 
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During the coal resource integration process, Fugu County Government proposed that 
farmers buy individual shares in mines to share the benefits. In 2010, Xinmin Town 
Government thus institutionalized it and regulated that all mines in Xinmin Town sell in 
the range of 1% -5% of the shares to the farmers who lived in mine operation areas.
180
 
The regulation integrates the farmers with mines in the sense that farmers become the 
“minor shareholders” (stakeholder) to participate in the mine business and support its 
development.181 On the one hand, the idle capital in the hands of farmers was introduced 
as new investment capital into the coal mines to a certain degree. On the other hand, the 
shares bind the farmers and coal mines tightly together in terms of profits. The 
mechanism has made farmers immediate stakeholders to participate in the business 
practice, in other words, helping maintain a peaceful and smooth operation environment. 
Mr. Wu made the following claims: 
 
It seems that we earn less once the farmers purchase individual shares, in actuality, we do not 
suffer losses (chikui) in the long run. They help to maintain the business operation environment. 
When the mine has to stop producing and does maintenance work, the farmers are concerned with 
the halt. Due to the enormous support among the farmers who have purchased shares in the coal 
mine, my mine has run lucrative business for six years. In addition, we have completed the 
technical reformation six months ahead of time, although the state allows a 20-month 
reformation.
182
 
 
The joint Party branch and village committee organize the local farmers to buy shares in 
the form of cash and land transfer. By 2011, about 31% of the farmers in seven mine 
towns in Fugu County had bought shares, which accounted for 3% of total shares. In 
particular, the farmers’ shares in Xinmin Town had reached 5%, in which cash purchases 
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accounted for 3.5% and land transfers for 1.5%. 
 
Before the regulation was launched by Xinmin Town Government, an important case 
took place in one administrative village that was a dense coal mine area with a high 
frequency of conflicts of interests between the village and the mine. The mine owner 
decided to incorporate all the farmers by having them buy shares in his mine. All the 
farmers bought the shares and got the dividends in the same year. Afterwards, he was 
elected as the village Party secretary by other Party members. 
 
These symbiotic relations between villages and enterprises/mines, coupled with the 
intervention offered by the town government, have turned the farmers into “minor 
shareholders” (stakeholder) and tied their benefits closely with the mines to transfer 
benefits to the farmers. Mr. Qiu took the following view: 
 
The farmers get considerable benefits from the dividends, and become more and more supportive 
to the mine business, unlike before, they always impeded the business operations when there were 
conflicts of interests. It is a good way to achieve a win-win outcome.
183
 
 
6.2.3.2 Promoting Indigenous Employment Programs 
 
Fugu County Government has implemented the indigenous employment programs by 
explicitly regulating that private enterprises should accommodate at least 60% of 
employees from Fugu County, and central and provincial projects should accommodate at 
least 30% of local employees. It serves two purposes: one is to improve the local people’s 
livelihoods by providing employment opportunities; the other is to secure enough labor 
for local enterprises, in case they encounter a labor shortage. By 2011, approximately 
116,000 people were employed in industrial and mining enterprises in Fugu County. In 
the meantime, Xinmin Town Government has stipulated that, under equivalent conditions, 
all mines should give preference in recruitment to indigenous farmers. The village-
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enterprise joint Party branch thus not only organizes farmers to buy shares in mines, but 
also helps those famers who do not have money to buy shares to find jobs in the 
enterprises located in their village areas. 
 
The job selection is interesting, for almost all the miners are from outside Fugu County, a 
large portion being migrant workers from Sichuan and Shanxi Provinces. One reason is 
that the local farmers are not willing to do the dirty and dangerous mining work in the 
pit184; another is that the mine owners are reluctant to hire local farmers for mining 
because they request far larger compensations than the outsiders in the case of accidents. 
To avoid unnecessary troubles, the mine owners prefer to employ workers hailing from 
neighboring provinces. As Mr. Zhang put it, “[w]e give the profits made by migrant 
workers from Shanxi Province back to Fugu's populace.”
185
 The relatively few decent 
jobs do not even attract local farmers in Xinmin Town because compared to working hard 
and earning less, they pursue fast and easy money from land lending and shares in 
mines.
186
 
 
6.2.3.3 Contract Construction Projects 
 
The local state requires, under equivalent conditions, that construction materials be 
provided by the local farmers. Industrial companies and mines should let local farmers 
and construction companies contract to build the infrastructure. 
 
6.2.3.4 Develop Service Trade 
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The last measure is to encourage the farmers to develop service trade in the mine areas, 
including transportation, catering, accommodation and recreation services. Moreover, the 
local government demands that enterprises and mines give priority to the local truckers 
for the transportation business. Many farmers, accordingly, buy dumper trucks to 
transport the coal for the mines. However, the farmers consider driving long distances a 
hard job, so they hire drivers from outside of Fugu County to do this. 
 
6.2.4 Conflict Mediation Mechanisms 
 
6.2.4.1 Village-Enterprise Joint Party Branch 
 
There are currently 17 Party branches administered by Xinmin Party committee, 
including 11 village Party branches, three village-enterprise joint Party branches and 
three government Party branches.
187
 In 2009, Xinmin Town Government set up a village-
enterprise joint party branch mechanism to mediate the conflicts of interests between 
farmers and mines/enterprises. In the system, 17 village party secretaries have been 
assigned to mines as deputy managers. The village party secretaries are assigned to the 
joint party branch as party secretary, and the enterprise managers are deputy party 
secretaries of the joint party branch. When a conflict arises, the intertwined party 
secretary and enterprise manager try their best to settle the dispute. On the one hand, the 
joint party branch is mainly responsible for assisting the development of villages and 
obtaining benefits for farmers, for example, the joint party branch arranges for the 
farmers to buy shares in mines, find jobs in enterprises, etc. On the other hand, it 
mediates the conflicts of interests between farmers and enterprises in order to remain 
there and address the conflicts within villages. When the conflicts cannot be addressed 
within villages, the town government is involved. In a worst case, the farmers then go to 
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county or upper authorities to complain when they are not satisfied with the results 
mediated by the town cadres. Consequently, the county and town cadres are faced with 
political legitimacy from local level and a performance evaluation from the upper 
authorities. Thus remaining and addressing the conflicts within villages is the key task for 
the Party secretary of the Joint Party branch. The Party secretary’s skills, knowledge and 
prestige facilitate the dispute settlement in the negotiation process. As Mr. Qiu put it: 
 
We have several high level village party secretaries and village directors in Xinmin Town. They 
know both the details of villages and corporations quite well. When the conflicts arise between 
villages and mines/corporations, the village Party secretary just goes and talks to the village and 
the corporation and then settles the dispute.
188
 
 
In fact, the joint party branch mechanisms use mianzi of the village party secretary and 
corporation manager who are bonded together to address the conflicts. Because of mianzi, 
the two party secretaries try to reach an agreement as soon as possible. The joint party 
branch interlocks the corporations with the village in the course of sharing benefits. 
Mr. Sun, the party secretary of one administrative village and the joint party branch of 
Company A, has some shares in a coal-related production company. He has been elected 
as village Party secretary since 1991, and admitted that he is accepted by most local 
residents.189 In other words, he has high prestige among the farmers in all village affairs. 
He described the process of addressing a conflict as doing a business. Furthermore, he 
explained how the joint Party branch works as a mediation mechanism: 
 
The joint Party branch functions as a mediator. The most intense conflicts happened between 2006 
and 2009 in our village, and the main dissatisfaction involved land acquisition. What I do is to 
coordinate the interests of two parties, advising farmers to ask for less money and enterprises to 
pay more so that they can reach a consensus. I meet the deputy Party secretary, who is also the 
vice general manager of Company A, once every week, discussing the needs of the local people 
and the enterprises. We work together to find out the best solution to both parties. For example, if 
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the company wants to use the land of individual farmers, we get the farmer and company together 
to negotiate the price.
190
 
 
Apparently, Party secretary’s skills, knowledge and prestige, and mianzi, as informal 
factors facilitate the dispute settlement in the negotiation process. The relations between 
farmers and enterprises are improved because the joint Party branch plays a salient role in 
mediating the conflicts of interests between villages and enterprises. Table 6.1 presents 
the comparisons of conflicts mediated in Xinmin Town from 2008 to 2011. The figures 
from 2009 when the joint Party branch institution was established drop sharply. In 
addition, the mines and enterprises invested over RMB 0.3 billion in improving the 
infrastructure and living environment from 2009 to 2011. 
 
Table 6.1: Change of Conflicting Cases and Compensation Funds before and after 
the Establishment of a Joint Party Branch in Xinmin Town 
 
Year  Conflicting Cases  Change (%)*  Compensation Funds  
(billion RMB) 
2008  182  +8%  0.0860 
2009  146  -21%  0.0650 
2010  119  -19%  0.0575 
2011 
(till June) 
 39  -22%  0.0226 
* Compared with the same period last year. 
Source: Own compilation 
 
The village-enterprise joint Party branch in Xinmin Town is highlighted as an 
institutional innovation and best practice by Fugu County Government. The model is 
further disseminated in those regions with rich natural mineral resources by the central 
state. Up until June 2011, Fugu County Government had set up 175 Party organizations in 
the non-public sectors, in which, 55 village-enterprises were joint Party branches. 31 core 
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Party leaders in enterprises hold a post in the joint Party branches. Furthermore, 46 
village Party secretaries and directors were sent to 46 mines as deputy managers. The 
Party-based mediation mechanism functions as a platform to not only connect the village 
and enterprise to build a harmonious negotiation environment, but also as a vehicle to 
distribute the benefits. 
 
6.2.4.2 People’s Mediation Committee 
 
In fact, before the joint Party branch mechanism functioned well, the People’s Mediation 
Committee (mintiao weiyuanhui) was already set up by Xinmin Town Government in 
1998. Unlike the joint Party branch, it is composed of only local cadres, excluding the 
managers of enterprises. It is led by the core leaders of Party committee, government and 
people’s congress, filled by relevant governmental cadres from the disciplinary inspection, 
the organization, the justice and the civil affairs departments and the police station. The 
People’s Mediation Committee serves the villages that haven’t established joint Party 
branches or those that may be unable to address conflicts through the joint Party branch. 
It functions in a similar way to the joint Party branch in that the core principle of the 
mediation mechanism is to help the farmers get benefits from enterprises/mines. Mr. Qiu 
made the following claims: 
 
The farmers rely much on the government. Compare to enterprises, the farmers are disadvantaged 
groups. We should help them to get some real benefits (shihui) from the enterprises/mines. 
Furthermore, if the business is interrupted, the owner will lose a lot of money. Actually the money 
the owner returns to the farmers is not worth mentioning, compare to the money he loses.
191
 
 
Before 2011, all 17 village committees set up People’s Mediation Committees. In this 
sense, there are three types of People’s Mediation Committee at different levels, 
including a village committee, a joint Party branch and town level. Initially Xinmin Town 
Government tended to let the civil dissension among farmers be mediated at village level, 
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however, when more and more conflicts involved village and mine/enterprise, the joint 
Party branch was set up. If any case arises at the town level, the town mediate committee 
then intervenes.192 The three-layer mediation mechanism associated with economic 
measures stopped people appealing to the upper authorities for help from 2009 to 2011. 
 
6.3 The Case of Wujiazhuang Town 
 
6.3.1 The Research Site 
 
Wujiazhuang Town is a purely agricultural town. It lies in southern Fugu and is 40 
kilometers from the county, covering 240.75 square kilometers, of which the size of 
arable land is 75,861 mu.
193
 The town has a population of 15,696 inhabitants in 4,608 
households. It manages 22 administrative villages, 90 natural villages and 18 
governmental institutions.
194
 
 
6.3.1.1 The Rise of a Demonstration Village 
 
As Schubert and Ahlers (2012) note, local governments in Shaanxi Province prefer to 
establish model villages (or piloting villages, demonstration villages, key villages) to lead 
rural development in the implementation of the CNSC program. The local state has 
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adopted diverging strategies in respond to local conditions. According to the 
“Comprehensive Plan for the CNSC Program (2007-2012),” in 2006, Fugu County 
Government identified 13 demonstration villages at prefectural city level. Gaozhuangze 
Administrative Village became one of the 13 demonstration villages. It is located in 
Wujiazhuang Town, 13 kilometers away from the town government and is composed of 
three natural villages and has 363 residents in 96 households. The arable land is 1,800 
mu.
195
 An internal report by Fugu’s Party Department of Rural Work highlights that the 
majority of farmers from this village work in Group B. Some of them hold managerial or 
technical positions. Some of them have purchased shares of Group B. Why has Group B 
employed such a large amount of farmers from this village as workers? One explanation 
claims that the founder who holds the majority of shares of Group B was born and grew 
up in Gaozhuangze Village and he was concerned with the livelihood of the farmers in his 
home village.196 Mr. Zhu elaborated that young people who are educated all go to work 
in the headquarters (Group B) situated in the county center. Others who are not educated 
stay working in the agricultural development company of Group B located in 
Gaozhuangze Village. The people working in the headquarters are entitled to purchase 
individual shares, while currently workers in the agricultural company are not. In general, 
Group B and its agricultural company have provided jobs for the farmers.197 
 
In fact, before the “Double Hundred” project, the owner of Group B spontaneously spent 
RMB 51.22 million in poverty alleviation projects, including infrastructure construction, 
relocation project and helping those people in need (see Appendix II). Many of the 
projects were carried out in his hometown. In 2006, knowing his hometown was 
identified as the demonstration village, the owner spent RMB 12 million on improving 
the living conditions by building modern homes with adequate facilities (i.e. tap water, 
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toilets) to move his village fellows out of cave houses dug into the loess. As argued in 
Chapter 4, the spontaneous engagement in poverty alleviation and rural development of a 
few leading entrepreneurs inspired the local officials to initiate the “Double Hundred” 
project, uniting 33% of mines and coal-related corporations in implementing the rural 
development project and solving the financial constraint in terms of development funds. 
Observing that the owner of Group B has a close affinity with his home village, the local 
state paired Group B with Gaozhuangze Village. 
 
In 2007, the local officials persuaded Group B to participate in agricultural development 
in accordance with the Comprehensive Plan for Fugu’s CNSC Program (2007-2012) by 
inviting experts from the Planning and Design Institute of the Ministry of Agriculture to 
draw up a “Plan for Gaozhuangze Modern Agriculture Base.” Finally, Group B decided 
to invest RMB 0.15 billion in the agricultural development project that covered and 
benefited three administrative villages, eight natural villages with 1,058 residents in 290 
households. In contrast with the overwhelming amount of development funds collected 
by Group B, the local government appropriated RMB 5.73 million as earmarked and 
matching funds, in which, the matching funds provided by agriculture-related 
departments was only RMB 1.88 million. Nevertheless, before the model of the 
demonstration village was identified, government departments refused to contribute funds 
to the CNSC program in order to protect their own interests within their departments. The 
projects of demonstration villages have united the members of strategic group that build 
alliances in pursing and maintaining their common interests with regard to effective 
implementation of the rural development program. The agriculture base consists of a few 
distinct function areas, for example, residential areas, breeding and processing areas, 
greenhouse vegetable planting areas and ecological tourism areas. Wujiazhuang Village 
thus has not only enjoyed government funds, but also political interest from the upper 
authorities because it is the main destination for the regular inspection teams sent down 
by the county, city and provincial governments. Based on the demonstration effect of 
Gaozhuangze Village, the local cadres undertook strategies to propose that the agriculture 
base at the prefectural city level upgrade to the provincial-level modern agriculture 
demonstration zone. In 2012, the proposal was approved by the provincial authorities. 
185 
 
The total budget has increased to RMB 5 billion and the investment made by Group B 
has reached RMB 0.5 billion. The upgraded demonstration zone involves Fugu and 
Shenmu Counties, covering five towns and 26 administrative villages and has expanded 
from eight to 303 square kilometers. 
 
6.3.2 Fund Raising Mechanisms 
 
Unlike Xinmin Town, the purely agricultural towns find it difficult to collect funds from 
the mines/corporations because county governments basically pair them with villages 
based on their wishes. Since there are no conflicts of interest involved, many 
mines/corporations are reluctant to pair with the purely agricultural villages unless the 
mine owners/entrepreneurs have personal ties with the villages, for example, as ancestral 
hometowns and birthplaces. Wujiazhuang Village seems lucky to have had such an 
entrepreneur born in that village 53 years ago and who grew up there, and who now owns 
a company (Group B) with a registered capital of RMB 2.158 billion. Mr. Cao explained 
why the owner of Group B decides to aid his home village instead of other villages in the 
“Double Hundred” project: 
 
We help the government to solve problems, for example, the infrastructure construction. The 
government says that the owner has a lot of money so it persuades the owner to spend money on 
large-scaled infrastructure construction. The owner is not stupid, and he chooses his hometown to 
continue rural development projects under the rubric of the “Double Hundred” project.
198
 
 
Following the mobilizing meeting organized by the Leading Small Group at county level, 
town governments, as the major fund raisers of the “Double Hundred” project, have to 
organize various meetings (i.e. pairing meeting, group meeting) in order to receive the 
funds promised by mines/corporations in a timely manner. According to the pairing 
schemes, Group B and seven mines outside of Wujiazhuang Town arranged to aid 
Wujiazhuang Town. As the town mayor claimed, in contrast to Group B, it is rather 
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difficult to get funds from the mines on the pairing list.
199
 She further elaborated how the 
informal institutions are present in the interactions between town cadres and mine 
owners/entrepreneurs in the process of pairing meeting organized by the town 
government in order to push the mine owners/entrepreneurs to send funds: 
 
The pairing meeting is usually directed by the Party secretary. But he was transferred to another 
town at that time, so I took over the job to organize the pairing meeting. First, I contact the 
corporations in advance and visit the owners in person. I bring along with the documents issued by 
the county government, explaining the details of documents. After visiting all owners, I invite the 
owners to the pairing meeting, emphasizing that they have to attend the meeting not mention the 
funds they want to give. By doing that, I have to coordinate their available time. Then I contact 
some corporations by inviting the owners to meals, hoping them to take the lead to send 
intentional funds (yixiang zijin) in front of other owners/entrepreneurs. When everything is done, 
we send invitation letter to the corporations in person.
200
 
 
After the pairing meeting, town leading cadres have to follow up the mines/corporations 
closely until their funds flow into the town government’s earmarked account. By doing 
this, informal factors (i.e. mianzi, local customs in terms of gifts) are involved in the 
interactions between town cadres and owners/entrepreneurs again. As Mrs. Zhou put it: 
 
 
The deputy Party secretary and I have to visit the corporations again after the pairing meeting. 
Both Party secretary and mayor have to present together, because a) It’s better to make things 
done; b) It shows the importance attached to the issue, otherwise the owners will not be happy, 
saying ‘The leading cadres don't come, why should I give you money?’ We always bring along 
with special agricultural products as gifts when visiting the owners. We also invite the owners to 
meals after we use their funds to implement specific projects, showing our gratitude and the 
outcomes of the projects they fund. Some entrepreneurs think the county government has already 
formulated the pairing schemes, plus the town Party secretary and mayor follow up very closely, 
they finally give us mianzi by sending funds.
201
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In addition, Wujiazhuang Town Government uses the personal networks in which the 
owner and his family are embedded to raise funds in order to implement the “Double 
Hundred” project. For instance, in 2011, the town Party committee manipulated 
Gaozhuangze Village’s Party secretary election by appointing the nephew of the owner as 
the official candidate. Then the village Party members cast the inner-Party vote and the 
nephew of the owner’s clearly won the Party election and acted as Gaozhuangze Village’s 
Party secretary.202 Obviously the town Party committee violated the two-ballot system 
adopted in Fugu County in 2005
203
 and the village party election was thus a formality.
204
 
In addition, the administrative affairs of the village fell to the deputy Party secretary, 
while the Party secretary only attended the meetings convened by upper authorities. 
However, the town officials reinforced the ties with the owner indirectly through his 
nephew and the kinship networks they are embedded in. In this sense, the town cadres 
have effectively incorporated the owner and his family members in the implementation of 
the rural development project. As Mr. Zhu explained: 
 
The town government appointed the nephew of the owner's to be Gaozhuangze Village’s Party 
secretary because he is the relative of the owner’s and he also manages one of the coal mines of 
the owner's. He and the owner are both very generous to the government and populace. For 
instance, even though he doesn’t live in the village anymore (albeit his household registration, 
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hukou, remains in Gaozhuangze Village), he returns to give money to the elderly people of no 
family of the village.
205
 
 
6.3.3 Redistribution Mechanisms 
 
As noted in Chapter 5, local cadres have adopted two approaches to carrying out the 
specific rural development projects. For the giant projects where investment exceeds 
RMB 10 million, the funds are kept and the projects are implemented by the corporations. 
For instance, Group B set up a Head Office of the CNSC program in Gaozhuangze 
Village to coordinate various rural development projects. Under the head office, an 
agricultural development company was established in 2008 and the former cadres sent by 
the local government became the managers (See Chapter 4). 
 
The agricultural development project implemented by Group B adopted distinct 
approaches to compensating farmers with regard to relocation and benefit distribution in 
accordance with different standards within three administrative villages. First, in 2006, 
the owner of Group B started to build 66 luxurious town houses, each with a floor area of 
330 square meters, for the farmers living in Gaozhuangze Natural Village that is his 
birthplace. He was inspired by Huaxi Village
206
 and imitated it by building a well-off 
village to relocate all the farm households in his home village from their cave houses.207 
Second, he built Chinese style bungalows for those farmers living in another two natural 
villages under the Gaozhuangze Administrative Village.
208
 Third, as the project involves 
three administrative villages that provide essential lands, he has carried out a benefit 
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distribution system: (a) All the households get daily supplies, such as rice, flour and oil 
during the Chinese New Year; (b) farmers over 60 years old within Gaozhuangze 
Administrative Village receive RMB 2,000 as a pension per year, while those from the 
other two administrative villages receive RMB 1,500 per year.
209
 The explanation is that 
the owner has special affection for his birth place that is deeper than for those outside of 
that village. As Mr. Cao explained: 
 
He [the owner of Group B] himself is a farmer, was born and grew up in a poor famer’s family. 
Now he is rich, and he hopes to help his fellows from his birth place to move in the town houses 
and build a well-off hometown.
210
 
 
Mr. Cao’s explanation matches Mrs. Zhou’s claim.211 The lower compensation standards 
of the other two administrative villages mean the agricultural development company is in 
need of lands as it expands its business. In this sense, the company has to make 
compensation to the farmers in accordance with the lower standards they experience 
compared to those in the owner’s birth place. 
 
To generate income for local farmers, the company has distributed greenhouses equally 
among households based on the number of households. The farmers contract the 
greenhouses free of charge and all utilities used for growing vegetables are paid by the 
agricultural development company. In this sense, the farmers plant and manage the 
greenhouses by themselves, and increase their income. In addition, the farmers of the 
three villages have priority to work for the company. For instance, Mr. Xie, who is a 
farmer in Gaozhuangze Administrative Village, has worked for the agricultural 
development company as a forester since 2012. He claimed the priority given to the local 
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farmers as a principle of the company.
212
 Because he doesn`t have enough labor to grow 
vegetables, he has leased his three greenhouses to a farmer in his village. The contractor 
could earn approximately RMB 30,000 per year. 
 
6.3.4 Conflict Mediation Mechanisms 
 
Since the agricultural development project involves many villages, the situation is more 
complex than in Xinmin Town, that is characterized as a coal-related business operation 
area. Despite the owner of Group B building modern houses compensating for the 
farmers in his home village and distributing pensions for old farmers in the project 
villages proactively, it does not mean that there are no conflicts at all. In fact, the 
conflicts arising as a result of the expansion of the agricultural development project are 
mainly in close relation to the land but are more complex because the various 
compensation mechanisms are based on different standards. 
 
The agricultural development company started to rent land from Gaozhuangze 
Administrative Village in 2007 and the other two administrative villages from 2009. The 
initial contracting price is RMB 150 per mu per year, for each additional five years, the 
price increases RMB 20 per mu per year. The contracting period is 50 years for 
Gaozhuangze Administrative Village, while 30 years for the other two administrative 
villages. How are the interests of farmers and the agricultural development projects 
coordinated? The local cadres play a role as mediator to address conflicts by adopting a 
land circulation approach. The natural village regains the ownership of land to lease to 
the agricultural development company.213 Mr. Zhu, the deputy party secretary of 
Gaozhuangze Administrative Village explained how the town government and village 
cadres got involved in signing the contract of land circulation with the company: 
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Since many farmers have already left the villages and thus substantial land is uncultivated. To 
facilitate the agricultural development company to rent the land, the natural villages regain the 
ownership of land that was distributed to farmers before. Therefore, the land is collectively owned, 
leased to and used by the development company. We, administrative village cadres, have to 
identify the circulated land in accordance with town government's development plan, and then the 
natural village cadres convene farmers meeting that both men and women of households have to 
attend. In Fugu, men used to make decisions in families, but on the issue of agricultural 
development company, men and women are required their signatures and thumbprint on the 
contract once they agree.
214
 
 
6.3.4.1 People's Mediation Committee 
 
Compared to Xinmin Town, conflicts arise between the agricultural development 
company and the villages much less frquently and are milder in Wujiazhuang Town. 
According to my field observations and interviewees’ talks, the conflicts of land use arise 
mostly between the company and farmers from outside Gaozhuangze Administrative 
Village. As Mr. Tang claimed: 
 
There is no resistance when the company uses the land of Gaozhuangze Administrative Village. 
Farmers basically have no objections to the contracting price because the owner of Group B has a 
great affection for his hometown and farmers. Thus he has really done a lot of projects for his 
home village. In return, the farmers of his home village provide great support to all his projects. 
However, when the company contracts other villages’ land, the conflicts arise and the governments 
are needed to coordinate them.
215
 
 
His claim echoes Mr. Xie, the farmer of Gaozhuangze Administrative Village, as well as 
the employee of the agricultural development company,
216
 and Mrs. Zhou, the head of 
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Wujiazhuang Town.
217
 As argued earlier, the village-enterprise joint party branch in 
Xinmin Town is highlighted as an institutional innovation and disseminated as example 
of best practice by Fugu County Government. None-the-less, the joint party branch 
established by the agricultural development company and Gaozhuangze Administrative 
Village merely functions in a formalistic way because conflicts hardly arise between the 
two entities. Instead, the conflicts that arise between the company and other villages are 
coordinated by the People’s Mediation Committee. Unlike the mediating body in Xinmin 
Town that is led by the core leaders of Party committee, government and the people’s 
congress, filled by relevant governmental cadres from the disciplinary inspection, the 
organization, the justice and civil affairs departments and the police station, the mediating 
team in Wujiazhuang Town is only composed of leaders and cadres in charge of the 
villages and town deputy cadres (i.e. deputy Party secretary or secretary of disciplinary 
inspection). Mrs. Zhou explained the reason why the town government does not follow 
Xinmin Town in forming a sophisticated mediating team and how the mediation 
mechanism works; 
 
We do not spare cadres for the conflicts deliberately because we don’t have as big a work load as 
Xinmin Town does. The mediating team mostly serves to coordinate lands for the agricultural 
development company. When the conflicts arise, the mediating team visits the farmers and check 
if the complaint is true. If it’s true, the mediating team communicates with the company and 
finally summons the two parties to coordinate their interests. We usually do ideological work 
(sixiang gongzuo) on both sides. On the one hand, we stress the points to farmers that Group B is 
developing agriculture in the villages instead of mining. The roads built by the company benefit 
everyone. Without the owner of Group B, it is unlikely that the villages get access to the outside 
world. If you demand to dig wells or build roads for villages, it’s possible to fulfill your wishes. 
But if you only want more money to split, it’s definitely rejected by our government. On the other 
hand, we convince the company to compensate for the famers' land. We have only one company 
and the owner is from this village, it’s much easier to convince the company than the farmers. In 
the end, the company and the farmers reach an agreement.
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6.4 Summary 
 
By reviewing the diverging patterns of strategic agency implemented by Xinmin and 
Wujiazhuang Town governments in the “Double Hundred” project, I draw up some 
commonalities and differences between the two case studies. 
 
Both town governments have adopted mechanisms in order to raise funds, compensate 
farmers and address conflicts of interests that arise between mines/corporations and 
villages. Several informal factors (i.e. local customs, personal relations, prestige, skills, 
knowledge, affinity and mianzi) underline the formal institutional arrangements outlined 
above. Personal relations, prestige and mianzi are found quite often and are useful in the 
process of fund raising and dispute settlement. However, Wujiazhuang Town has used 
much more informal institutions to raise funds since the town cadres face fiscal 
constraints. In this sense, the government relies on financial appropriation from the upper 
authority and pairing enterprises to generate funds. 
 
The differences lie between the two counties in the following aspects. First, the mines 
and corporations in Xinmin Town are voluntarily compelled to pair with local villages in 
the business operation areas because they have to respond to the social and economic 
pressures exerted by the farmers. If they do not make the farmers happy, the latter 
constitutes an interruption in business practice, in other words, the farmers’ 
dissatisfaction leads to economic loss. For the government, intensified dissatisfaction 
causes the local cadres to experience social and political pressures that may cause 
instabilities that challenge political legitimacy and make trouble for the cadres through 
the loss of their jobs. The local state coordinates the interests of the locality by mobilizing 
corporations to fulfill CSR initiatives through pairing schemes voluntarily. The 
corporations and mines are paired with villages and “donate” funds in accordance with 
the task formalized by the state. While in Wujiazhuang Town, before the implementation 
of the CNSC program, Group B carried out rural development projects in the owner’s 
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home village voluntarily because he had a close affinity with his hometown. He thus 
decided to continue to aid his hometown by officially pairing with Gaozhuangze 
Administrative Village through the town government. However, the compensation 
standards varied in his birth place and the other two project administrative villages. The 
owner offered free townhouses to the farmers in his birth place because of his special 
affection for the area that was deeper than for those outside that village. The lower 
compensation standards of the other two administrative villages meant that the 
agricultural development company was in need of lands to expand its business. In this 
sense, the company has to compensate the farmers due to their lower standards compared 
to those in the owner’s birth place. Second, Xinmin Town has much more severe conflicts 
between villages and mines/corporations. Thus the mediation mechanisms in terms of the 
village-corporation joint Party branch, the People’s Mediation Committee and village 
committee play important roles in coordinating the conflicts of interests, in particular, the 
joint Party branch interlocks the corporation with the village by uniting their common 
interests in terms of business practice and profits. In Wujiazhuang Town, the owner’s 
local identity and his proactive and voluntary investments in improving the locality’s 
living and production conditions are part of the reason why the conflicts have decreased. 
In this sense, the joint Party branch merely functions in a formalistic way. Instead, the 
People’s Mediation Committee mainly involves the town cadres in the negotiation 
process. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
 
7.1 Preamble  
 
The concluding chapter summarizes the core research findings and evaluates the research 
contributions. It closes with research reflections and suggestions for further research 
agendas.  
 
7.2 Summary of Findings 
 
Applying the sociological perspective, this dissertation has explained the political 
economy of institutional change in property rights, extractive, redistributive and 
mediative institutions and how these formal institutions interacted with various informal 
institutions in the process of rural social policy implementation in rural China. The 
institutional change process is highly path dependent. Dependence on local coal 
endowments on the one hand, and the form of property rights, economic, extractive, 
redistributive and mediative institutions on the other hand combined to create apparent 
path dependence in the implementation of CNSC. 
 
The study has been structured by the following three central research questions: (1) why 
do variations exist in project implementation under the unified framework of 
national policy programs and political ideology? (2) How do local governments 
respond to the institutional constraints? (3) How is the centrally-initiated rural 
development project implemented by local governments? The main findings with 
regard to the first question have been shown in Chapter 3 and identify how the revenue-
sharing fiscal systems and cadre evaluation system as the main institutional constraints, 
together with the tax-and-fee reform, influenced local officials’ behavior and policy 
outcomes. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the incentive structure contained in the cadre 
evaluation and fiscal systems impelled local cadres to expand the tax base in order to 
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increase revenues and concurrently finance the provision of public goods and social 
welfare programs devolved by the central state. Since the 1994 tax division system took 
effect, the requirement to match funds extracted from the budgetary revenue to fund rural 
development program (i.e. CNSC) has reinforced the institutional prerequisites for the 
rise of a private enterprise economy and county-wide economy. 
 
As a result, the local governments have developed various strategies to engage in 
economic activities in order to promote socioeconomic development. As Chapter 4 has 
shown, the rise of “Local State Entrepreneurial-Developmentalism” is reflected in the 
first research proposition: local officials regained state ownership of private firms 
because they must lower the transaction and information costs and reduce the 
bargaining power of private capital. Local officials in Fugu County, on the one hand, 
used managerial strategies to turn the private dominated economic structure into a state 
dominated mixed ownership. On the other hand, the local state offered inducements to the 
private sector by providing credit and financial consulting, market and technical 
assistance, tax breaks and support funds and conflict mediation. Only under these 
favorable conditions, was the private sector able to weather the economic crisis and 
generate substantial tax revenues.  
 
Nevertheless, extracting matching funds from the budgetary revenue was insufficient to 
fund CNSC because the local state must finance the provision of mandated public goods 
and the social welfare program as well. Indeed, the officials were faced with limited 
disposable incomes. Thus, raising matching funds from outside the budgetary revenue is 
the second important strategy to fund CNSC. The findings with regard to matching fund 
raising and CNSC implementation in Fugu County have been shown in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Leading county and town cadres formed a “Strategic Group,” which is characterized by 
an open and informal network and consisting of people at various levels who share 
common interests, to devise the “Double Hundred” project in line with CNSC and co-opt 
the private entrepreneurs into the strategic group. Formal and informal institutional 
dynamics are reflected in the second research proposition: the formal and informal 
institutions closely interacted in the process of implementing the “Double Hundred” 
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project, for example, in the formation of strategic groups and in the process of 
extracting matching funds, redistribution and conflict mediation through pairing 
schemes. Compared to the formal institutions including regular work meetings and Party 
school trainings, the informal institutions consisting of social customs, norms and local 
knowledge, personal relations (guanxi), glory (rongguang) and mianzi were also very 
important for leading county and town cadres to identify a collective identity and possess 
a common life style. CSR was used as the second approach for raising matching funds 
and implementing the “Double Hundred” project. In China, CSR is perceived by the 
government as the same as if it had stemmed from the Anglo-Saxon world where 
companies should integrate social and environmental concerns in the way they operate. 
However, due to the institutional environment and constraints, CSR practice in China is 
mandated and led by the state rather than on an enterprise-oriented voluntary basis. As 
CSR has become the solution to redressing the negative effects of market economy and 
activities, the local state adopted CSR to justify their behavioral pattern of redistributing 
resources through direct compensatory fiscal transfer from the private sector to affected 
farmers and the giving of charity to the county as a whole, and town cadres raising the 
matching funds from the private firms/mines through pairing schemes that paired private 
firms with aided villages.  
 
As Chapter 6 has shown, variations in the “Double Hundred” project implementation 
exist in different towns. Two comparative case studies of institutional arrangements for 
extracting matching funds, redistributing resources and mediating conflicts have both 
demonstrated that the informal institutions (i.e. local customs, guanxi, prestige, skills, 
knowledge, affinity and mianzi) closely interacted with the formal extractive, 
redistributive and mediative institutions. Nevertheless, the case of Xinmin Town has 
shown that coal mines and corporations were voluntarily compelled to pair with local 
villages in the business operation areas because they were faced with social and 
economic pressures exerted by the farmers. As a result, town cadres had innovated a 
package of mediative institutions to coordinate the interests in order to resolve the 
conflicts between the mines/corporations and farmers. The case of Wujiazhuang Town 
has shown that one coal mine owner had already voluntarily carried out rural 
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development practice in his home village prior to initiating CNSC. He had a strong 
affinity with his birth place, thus a distinctive compensation standard was offered 
between his birth place and another two project administrative villages. Therefore, the 
cadres of Wujiazhuang Town used much more informal institutions to raise matching 
funds than those of Xinmin Town.  
 
7.3 Research Contributions 
 
The dissertation has made several contributions to the existing literature. First, it 
contributes to knowledge of the institutional change in Chinese political economy and 
rural development policy implementation, in particular the far-reaching CNSC program. 
The analytical framework for institutional change in CNSC implementation (see Chapter 
1) helps to account for the causal relations between various institutional factors. More 
importantly, this dissertation strongly claims to be a sociological study because it brings 
formal and informal institutional interactions into the analysis of rural social policy 
implementation with the agency perspective of a political economic system. 
 
Second, more broadly, the dissertation contributes to the state-centered literature that 
China is a developmental state. Building on the notion of the developmental state and 
Oi’s “local state corporatism,” this study develops the “Local Entrepreneurial-
Developmental State” to highlight the nature of local state involvement in economic 
growth, marked by both entrepreneurial features of creating and managing new ventures 
and developmental inducements to the private sector. It further develops an essentially 
sociological framework of strategic groups to examine the agency of local officials and 
coal mine owners. These empirical patterns of local entrepreneurial-developmental state 
and strategic groups contribute to clarifying how agencies structure within China as a 
developmental state. 
 
The third primary contribution of this dissertation is to provide a new set of original data. 
The topic of coal mining in China can be sensitive as it relates to workplace safety, 
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environmental destruction and social unrest. Local officials were sometimes reluctant to 
release information when collecting data, especially when the above mentioned issues 
were disclosed by the media, a situation not surprising to those who are familiar with the 
Chinese political economic system. This study represents my painstaking efforts to 
achieve deeper insights into China’s private coal mining sector and how it functions in 
the Chinese political economic system and social policy regime, insights which are 
lacking in the literature, and are attained through in-depth interviews, field observation of 
natural settings and first-hand documentation collected during field research.  
 
Finally, this dissertation remedies an important gap left by previous scholarship regarding 
the role of governments in CSR practices and performance. Despite the vast literature 
addressing the central question of the role of government in relation to CSR in North 
America and Europe (Albareda et al., 2008), little is known of the role of government in 
relation to CSR in China. Given that the Western-centric research approach to CSR “may 
not sufficiently relate or respond to the context and circumstances encountered in 
developing economies” (Hamann, 2006, p. 179), this study, therefore, highlights an 
important CSR-related institution created by the local state. It demonstrates empirically 
how CSR is used and promoted by the local state as an extractive and redistributive 
institution to mitigate the negative effects of the market economy. 
 
7.4 Critical Reflections and Remaining Questions 
 
On the one hand, China’s economy has entered an early “new normal”
219
 status 
accompanied with a slow rate of economic growth. It also entered a crucial stage of 
undertaking a structural transformation towards a more liberal market economy: from 
labor-intensive model to capital/technology-intensive model; from land-led model to 
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 The economic term “new normal” was first put forward at the fourth plenary session of the 18
th
 CCP 
Central Committee on Oct.23, 2014. It describes an economic status of a crucial rebalancing, in which 
China diversifies its economy, embraces a more sustainable growth and distributes the benefits more evenly. 
See Zhongguo gongchandang dishibajie zhongyang weiyuanhui disici quanti huiyi gongbao (The 
Communiqué of the fourth plenary session of the 18
th
 CCP Central Committee). Website of Xinhua Net. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-10/23/c_1112953884.htm (accessed 5 October 2015). 
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consumer-led model; from export-oriented model to domestic and export model.
220
 On 
the other hand, China, as an authoritarian developmental state, is tilting the balance of its 
endeavors in and commitment to economic growth, environmental protection and social 
equality. Social policy initiatives and the expansion of the provision of social welfare and 
public goods will be the focus of developmental strategies as well. Thus, the dramatic 
economic transformation, the shift of developmental strategies, associated with the top-
down anti-corruption and rent-seeking movement, create path dependence and new 
constraints on and incentives for local governments to cope with the ever-changing 
institutional environment. Therefore, some questions arise and await further research. The 
following are just a few of the key issues that face China that grow directly out of the 
previous economic miracle during the last three decades and the current transformation 
under Xi jinping’s leadership.   
 
First, the incentives and constraints contained in the fiscal system, the cadre evaluation 
system, and the national political and macro market environments will reshape local 
cadres’ behavior and responses to the ever-changing environment. As the focus of CCP’s 
developmental strategies has tilted the balance of endeavors in economic development, 
environmental protection and social equality, the ratios of cadre evaluation system, target 
responsibility system and national and sub-national County-Wide Economy Evaluation 
and Praise Work have adjusted accordingly. However, the lion’s share of the evaluation 
system is still dominated by GDP. Under this circumstance, will local governments face 
greater incentives to promote economic growth? How will local governments transform 
the economic development structure and model to balance social and environment 
development? How will the institutional change take place?  
 
Second, changes in ownership in rural industrialization restructure the resource base of 
local governments. What will happen to government revenues when the private 
ownership structure changes to a mixed ownership structure? How are the relationships 
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(Decision of CCP on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform).Website of 
Xinhua Net. http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-11/15/c_118164235.htm (accessed 5 October 2015). 
For the detailed study of China’s economic transformation, see Huang (2014).  
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reshaped between the local government and central government, between the local 
government and upper level authorities, between the local government and SOEs, private 
enterprises? Will the mixed ownership structure facilitate socioeconomic development? 
How do private enterprises respond to the transformation of a mixed ownership structure? 
 
Third, CSR should be offered as a new perspective to examine institutional change during 
a dramatic transformation for future research. It could go beyond the county level to 
analyze how CSR as an institutional factor functions to mitigate the negative impacts of 
the market economy in a broader context, for example, at national, provincial and 
prefecture levels. How are the relations in the hierarchical control system restructured by 
CSR? How are the relations reshaped by CSR between the state, business and society? 
 
Fourth, the capacity of rural social policy initiatives generates legitimacy could provide a 
fruitful agenda for further research. Due to the restriction of space and analytical focus, 
the heart of this dissertation was on the institutional change in a single rural social policy 
implementation (i.e. CNSC), which helped to capture the systemic causal effects of 
institutional factors functioning on each other. Future studies could explore the policy-
making circle and examine whether or to what degree formal institutions facilitate the 
creation of informal institution in the process of policy-making. How do the dynamic 
interactions work between formal and informal institutions in the policy-making circle? 
What is the relationship between socioeconomic development and political change?  
 
7.5 Summary 
 
This chapter has reviewed the core findings, theoretical and empirical contributions of the 
dissertation. In the end, it provides critical reflections and attempts to provide the basis 
for more informed and precise questions about the current socioeconomic transformation. 
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Appendix I. Division of Tax Categories (1994) 
 
Central Taxes Local Taxes Central-Local Shared Taxes 
Customs duties 
Value-added tax 
 Consumption tax 
Enterprise income tax 
-from central enterprises 
-from local banks 
-from foreign banks 
-from other nonbanking 
financial enterprises 
Sales tax, income tax, 
profits and urban 
maintenance and 
construction tax from the 
railways and head offices 
of all banks and insurance 
companies 
Profit turnover 
-from central enterprises 
Tax refunds 
-to enterprises involving 
foreign countries 
Sales tax 
-from enterprises other than railways and head 
offices of all banks and insurance companies 
Local enterprise income tax 
-from enterprises other than local banks 
-from foreign banks 
-from other nonbanking financial enterprises 
Profit turnover 
-from local enterprises 
Personal income tax 
Urban land-use tax 
Fixed-asset investment orientation regulation 
tax 
Urban maintenance and construction tax 
-from enterprises other than railways and head 
offices of banks and insurance companies 
House property tax 
Vehicle and vessel license tax 
Stamp tax 
Animal Slaughter tax 
Agriculture-animal husbandry tax 
Special agricultural product tax 
Farmland-use tax 
Contract tax 
Inheritance tax 
Land value-added tax 
Compensatory payment for appropriation of 
state-owned land 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Value-added tax 
-75% central 
-25% local 
Natural resources tax  
-offshore oil tax, entral; 
-all other, local 
Stock market trading tax 
-50% each 
 
Source: Adapted from Oi (1999), Appendix B, Table I 3. 
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Appendix II. Group B’s Engagement in Poverty Alleviation Projects (1998-2007) 
 
Year Poverty Alleviation Projects 
(RMB 
Million) 
1998 
 
Built two village power grids, village road, purchased crop products processing 
equipment, drinking water supply project 
0.14 
 
1999 Built township road, school, power grid, drinking water supply project 0.18 
2000 Village drinking water supply project 0.01 
2001 Built one school, power grid, aided one school 0.04 
2002 Built road, village power grid, drinking water supply project 0.3 
2003 
2004 
Built school, road, drinking water supply project 
Built township and county school roads, school, drinking water supply project 
0.55 
0.32 
2005 Built road, drinking water supply project, aided school, hospital 5.892 
2006 Built school, road, landline telephone, drinking water supply project, relocation 
project 
28.98 
2007 Built road, school, drinking water supply project 1.96 
1998-2007 Rural cultural relics renovation and protection 0.8 
1998-2007 Aided 4,000 poor people in medical assistance and schooling 8.0 
2005-2007 Hardened hometown village road  3.0 
Others  1.05 
Total  51.22 
Source: Lu et.al (2010). 
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Appendix III. Table of Informants 
No. Index Position Level Unit 
1 INT-01-201210 Office Administrator Private Enterprise Company A 
2 INT-02-201210 Farmer Village Natural Village A1 
3 INT-03-201210 Party Secretary Village Administrative Village  
Committee A 
4 INT-04-201210 Office Administrator Private Enterprise Group B 
5 INT-05-201211 General Manger Private Enterprise Company B of Group B 
6 INT-06-201211 Deputy Party Secretary Village Administrative Village  
Committee B 
7 INT-07-201211 Farmer Village Administrative Village B 
8 INT-08-201211 Senior Officer County Rural Work Department 
9 INT-09-201309 Senior Officer County Rural Work Department 
10 INT-10-201211 Senior Officer County Local History Department 
11 INT-11-201310 General Manager Private Enterprise Company C 
12 INT-12-201210 Director County Bureau of Industrial 
Economy 
13 INT-13-201310 Director County Bureau of Industrial 
Economy 
14 INT-14-201211 Party Secretary Private Enterprise Company D 
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15 INT-15-201211 Party Secretary County Poverty Alleviation Office 
16 INT-16-201309 Party Secretary County Poverty Alleviation Office 
17 INT-17-201211 Deputy Town Head Town Town A 
18 INT-18-201309 Deputy Town Head Town Town A 
19 INT-19-201211 Deputy General 
Manager 
Private Enterprise Company E 
20 INT-20-201211 Employee /Farmer Private Enterprise Company E 
21 INT-21-201211 Farmer Village Natural Village  E 
22 INT-22-201211 Town Head Town Town B 
23 INT-23-201211 Office Administrator Private Enterprise Company B of Group B 
24 INT-24-201209 Chief of Research 
Section/Researcher 
State Council International Poverty 
Reduction Center 
25 INT-25-201302 Chief of Research 
Section/Researcher 
State Council International Poverty 
Reduction Center 
26 INT-26-201211 Town Head Town Town D 
27 INT-27-201211 Accountant Village Natural Village  
Committee D 
28 INT-28-201211 Employee Private Enterprise Company D 
29 INT-29-201210 Office  Administrator  Private Enterprise Company E 
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30 INT-30-201210 Farmer Village Natural Village A2 
31 INT-31-201210 Office  Administrator  Private Enterprise Company F 
32 INT-32-201211 Employee Private Enterprise Group B 
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